Ryan v. State

Decision Date22 March 1967
Docket NumberNo. 6885,6885
Citation197 So.2d 37
PartiesRobert RYAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and William H. Namack, III, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William D. Roth, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was in custody serving a twenty-five year commitment upon a conviction of second degree murder. While so incarcerated, he held up the deputy warden at gun-point, took from him approximately $50.00 and escaped from prison, allegedly in the warden's step-daughter's automobile. He subsequently left the State of Florida and eigher was apprehended or turned himself in while in the State of Illinois.

After being returned to Florida, he was charged by way of information on three charges, i.e., robbery, escape and larceny of an automobile. On June 29, 1961 appellant was arraigned and entered a plea of nolo contendere. He waived formal arraignment on January 17, 1964 and entered a plea of not guilty. He was formally arraigned on July 16, 1965 and entered a plea of not guilty. A trial by jury followed on September 23, 1965 on all three counts. The jury found him guilty of robbery and escape. The trial judge sentenced him to be confined in the state prison for a term of six months to ninety-nine years on the charge of robbery and for a term of one year on the charge of escape, both sentences to run consecutively.

Appellant was represented by public defender at the arraignments and at the trial; however, he advised the trial judge that he chose to conduct his own defense but the trial judge ordered the public defender to be present and sit with the defendant at all stages in the hearings and trial. This appeal followed.

Again by representation of the public defender two questions have been posed for our consideration. First, it was contended that the trial judge committed reversible error when he refused to dismiss the charges on the grounds that a period of four and one-half years had elapsed between the filing of the information and the trial, and thus the defendant was denied a speedy trial. Section 915.02 of the Florida Statutes F.S.A. provides the manner in which a speedy trial, as guaranteed by Sections 4 and 11, Declaration of Rights, F.S.A., may be secured. However, our courts have on many occasions determined that there must...

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2 cases
  • Finney v. State, 68--456
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 11 March 1969
    ...the statutes of this State. Kelly v. State ex rel. Morgan, Fla.1951, 54 So.2d 431; Loy v. Grayson, Fla.1957, 99 So.2d 555; Ryan v. State, Fla.App.1967, 197 So.2d 37; § 915.02, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Error has not been made to appear in the ruling on the motion to suppress. Bonner v. State, Fla.1......
  • Panzavecchia v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 15 April 1975
    ...of the defendant's motion for severance of the offenses did not represent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Ryan v. State, Fla.App.1967, 197 So.2d 37; Eagle v. State, Fla.App.1971, 249 So.2d 460, 465--466. Cf. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606. Also t......

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