Ryan v. State
| Decision Date | 31 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 20A03–1408–PC–293.,20A03–1408–PC–293. |
| Citation | 31 N.E.3d 550 (Table) |
| Parties | Jeremy RYAN, Appellant–Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Stephen T. Owens, Public Defender of Indiana, Kelly A. Kelly, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
[1] The Elkhart Superior Court denied a petition for post-conviction relief filed by Jeremy Ryan (“Ryan”). Ryan appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court clearly erred in rejecting Ryan's claims that his plea of guilty to Class A felony manufacturing methamphetamine was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made and that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Concluding that the post-conviction court's decision was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
[2] On November 21, 2009, the police responded to a call of a domestic disturbance at a home where Ryan lived with his girlfriend and her two children. When the police searched the home, they found various items associated with the manufacture and use of methamphetamine, including one vessel with a liquid that contained methamphetamine and the methamphetamine precursors ephedrine or pseudoephedrine.
[3] As a result, the State charged Ryan on November 24, 2009, with Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine in an amount of three grams or more, two counts of Class C felony neglect of a dependent, Class D felony domestic battery, Class D felony strangulation, and Class A misdemeanor interfering with the reporting of a crime.
[4] Ryan was appointed counsel and reached an agreement with the State on March 3, 2010, whereby he agreed to plead guilty to Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine and two counts of Class C felony neglect of a dependent. In exchange, the remaining charges would be dismissed, and Ryan's sentence would be capped at thirty-five years. A plea hearing was held on March 4, 2010, at which Ryan was advised of his rights. Ryan indicated that he knew and understood his rights, and that he understood the terms of his plea agreement. Ryan, under oath, admitted to knowingly manufacturing more than three grams of methamphetamine. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Ryan to thirty-five years on the Class A felony conviction, with twenty-five years executed and ten years suspended to probation, and two concurrent sentences of five years each on the Class C felony convictions, to be served concurrently with the sentence on the Class A felony.
[5] On April 15, 2013, Ryan filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After the Indiana Public Defender's office filed an appearance for Ryan, he filed an amended petition on December 2, 2013. In this petition, Ryan claimed that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because he was misled by his trial counsel with regard to whether the State could have proved that he manufactured more than three grams of methamphetamine. Along these same lines, Ryan also claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise him that he had a defense to the Class A felony charge, i.e., that the State could not have proved that he manufactured more than three grams of methamphetamine.
[6] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Ryan's post-conviction petition on March 4, 2014. At the hearing, Ryan called as a witness Indiana State Laboratory chemist Kimberly Ivanyo (“Ivanyo”), who had analyzed the evidence submitted by the police in Ryan's case. Of the two vials of liquid submitted by the police, one contained methamphetamine and the precursor ephedrine/pseudoephedrine. Ivanyo explained that she did not weigh the liquid in the vial because the laboratory measures liquids by volume, not weight. She also explained a conversion formula exists that can theoretically calculate the weight of solid methamphetamine that could be obtained from a liquid containing methamphetamine but that she did not use such a formula in Ryan's case.
[7] Ryan also called as a witness his trial counsel, who did not recall any specific discussion of the weight of the methamphetamine discovered by the police. He did, however, remember that Ryan had been very cooperative with the police, showing them where the various items were as they searched his residence. Ryan had also admitted to his counsel that he had been manufacturing methamphetamine. Ryan's trial counsel recalled that he and Ryan agreed that a plea agreement was in Ryan's best interest.
[8] Ryan himself testified at the post-conviction hearing that he did not know how much methamphetamine the police had discovered at his home but that he believed the State had sufficient evidence to convict him based upon the advice of his trial counsel. Ryan also testified that he believed that he was facing a sentence of up to seventy-eight years and pleaded guilty to avoid such a lengthy possible sentence. Ryan further stated that he learned in 2012, years after his conviction, about a conversion formula that can be used to calculate the weight of solid methamphetamine that could be obtained from a liquid containing methamphetamine. He also learned of recent developments in case law that he thought would have made the State's case against him difficult to prove, thus motivating his petition for post-conviction relief.
[9] On July 29, 2014, the post-conviction court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Ryan's petition. The court determined that, at the time of Ryan's plea, the State did not have to prove the amount of solid methamphetamine and that the case law relied upon by Ryan was handed down two years after his conviction and sentence. The post-conviction court therefore determined that Ryan had not shown that his plea was not knowingly, involuntarily, and intelligently made. The court further determined that Ryan's trial counsel was not ineffective based on the state of the law at the time of Ryan's plea. Ryan now appeals.
[10] Post-conviction proceedings are not “super appeals” through which a convicted person can raise issues he did not raise at trial or on direct appeal. Fowler v. State, 977 N.E.2d 464, 466 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), aff'd on reh'g, 981 N.E.2d 623 (Ind.Ct.App.2013). Instead, post-conviction proceedings afford petitioners a limited opportunity to raise issues that were unavailable or unknown at trial and on direct appeal. Id. Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and petitioners bear the burden of proving their grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. When a petitioner appeals the denial of postconviction relief, he appeals from a negative judgment. Id. Consequently, we may not reverse unless the petitioner demonstrates the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. We accept the post-conviction court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we do not defer to its conclusions of law. Id.
[11] Ryan first claims that the post-conviction court erred in determining that Ryan's plea of guilty was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must determine that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading, that the plea will waive certain rights, and the range of penalties he faces. See Ind.Code § 35–35–1–2. These statutory requirements ensure that the guilty plea “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice.” Diaz v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1089, 1094 (Ind.2010). “[P]ost-conviction relief is a proper vehicle for challenging a guilty plea, and we look at all evidence before the post-conviction court that supports its determination that a guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Collins v. State, 14 N.E .3d 80, 85 (Ind.Ct.App.2014). In this context, voluntariness is dependent “on whether the defendant knowingly and freely entered the plea[.]” State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1266 (Ind.1997).
[12] Here, Ryan does not claim that the trial court misadvised him or failed to advise him regarding any of his rights. Instead, he claims that his plea was based on incorrect information regarding the evidence the State had against him, i.e., that the State could not prove the quantity of the methamphetamine he manufactured sufficient to support a Class A felony, i.e., three grams. See Ind.Code § 35–48–4–1.1(b) (2008).
[13] Ryan argues, “[b]ecause the State did not provide direct evidence for the weight of methamphetamine, an essential element of dealing as a Class A felony, it cannot show Ryan manufactured three grams or more of methamphetamine.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. However, Ryan did not proceed to trial; he instead pleaded guilty. Thus, the State was not required to present any evidence, as Ryan admitted that he manufactured more than three grams of methamphetamine.
[14] Ryan argues, however, that his admission was based on incorrect information and advice given to him by his trial counsel. Specifically, Ryan notes no significant amount of solid methamphetamine was found at his home and that the methamphetamine in the intermediate liquid mixture found at his home was not weighed. He therefore claims that the State had insufficient evidence to convict him of a Class A felony and that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to the contrary.
[15] Ryan notes that our supreme court has held that, “in order to prove the element of weight of drugs or controlled substances, the State must either offer evidence of its actual, measured weight or demonstrate that the quantity of the drugs or controlled substances is so large as to permit a reasonable inference that the element of weight has been established.” Halsema v. State, 823...
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