Rybakowski v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 08 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13 C 6775,13 C 6775
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: ROBERT RYBAKOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

ROBERT RYBAKOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 13 C 6775

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

October 8, 2015

Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Robert Rybakowski filed this action seeking reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 423 et seq, 1381 et seq. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(c), and Plaintiff has filed a request to reverse the ALJ's decision and remand for additional proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I. THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

To recover Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), a claimant must establish that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. York v. Massanari, 155 F. Supp.2d 973, 976-77 (N.D. Ill. 2001).¹ A person is disabled if he or she is unable to perform "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). In determining whether a claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner conducts a standard five-step inquiry:

1. Is the claimant presently unemployed?

2. Does the claimant have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that interferes with basic work-related activities and is expected to last at least 12 months?

3. Does the impairment meet or equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations?

4. Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation?

5. Is the claimant unable to perform any other work?

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520; see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). "An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled." Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). "The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; only at step five does the burden shift to the Commissioner." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB² and SSI on January 10, 2008, alleging he became disabled on August 19, 2006 due to a left elbow injury, rotator cuff surgery, and a bad right knee. (R. at 115-16, 119, 515). The application was denied initially on February 27, 2008, and upon reconsideration on August 20, 2008. (R. at 115-18). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on August 19, 2009. (R. at 51-114). On September 25, 2009, an ALJ issued a decision denying benefits (R. at 19-27), and the Appeals Council denied review on June 24, 2010 and December 23, 2010. (R. at 1-3, 12-14). Plaintiff filed a civil action in the Northern District of Illinois. Rybakowski v. Astrue, 1:10-CV-05351 (filed Aug. 24, 2010). On November 9, 2009, Plaintiff filed a second set of applications for DIB and SSI that was denied through the reconsideration level. (R. at 679-85). On December 19, 2011, the district court remanded the first case (R. at 595-599), and on April 26, 2012, the Appeals Council entered an order remanding to the ALJ with instructions; the district court's remanded action was consolidated with Plaintiff's second set of applications for DIB and SSI. (R. at 504-09, 516).

After the case was remanded, ALJ Steven H. Templin held a supplemental hearing on May 9, 2013. Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified. The ALJ also heard testimony from Thomas Gusloff, a vocational expert, and Ashok Jilhewar, M.D., a medical expert. (R. at 540-594). The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision on June 28, 2013, finding Plaintiff disabled as of September 4, 2012. (R. at 511-533).The decision determined Plaintiff was eligible for SSI benefits, but not eligible for DIB benefits.

Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, at step one, that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time material to the decision, with an alleged disability onset date of August 19, 2006. (R. at 518). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe musculoskeletal impairments. (R. at 518-524). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any of the listings enumerated in the regulations. (R. at 524). The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC)³ and determined that, as of the onset date, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work, and as of September 4, 2012, Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work. (R. at 524). Based on Plaintiff's RFC and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. at 531). At step five, based on Plaintiff's RFC, his vocational factors, and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform prior to September 4, 2012. (R. at 531). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was disabled on September 4, 2012, but not under a disability prior to that date. (R. at 533). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision that he was not disabled prior to September 4, 2012,which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(a) ("when a case is remanded by a Federal court for further consideration, the decision of the administrative law judge will become the final decision of the Commissioner after remand [ ] unless the Appeals Council assumes jurisdiction of the case").

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act. In reviewing this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it "reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Id. The Court's task is "limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Evidence is considered substantial "if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a conclusion." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 2014) ("We will uphold the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.") (citation omitted). "Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance." Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). "In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis ofthe evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).

Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ's determination, it "must do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). "This deferential standard of review is weighted in favor of upholding the ALJ's decision, but it does not mean that we scour the record for supportive evidence or rack our brains for reasons to uphold the ALJ's decision. Rather, the ALJ must identify the relevant evidence and build a 'logical bridge' between that evidence and the ultimate determination." Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court must critically review the ALJ's decision to ensure that the ALJ has built an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Young, 362 F.3d at 1002. Where the Commissioner's decision "lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

IV. MEDICAL EVIDENCE

In 1994, Plaintiff fractured his left elbow and scaphoid after falling off of stilts at work. (R. at 315, 354). He sustained a radial head fracture and underwent open reduction and internal fixation surgery and three screws were inserted into the bone. (R. at 324-25). On June 16, 2003, Plaintiff underwent right rotator cuff repair surgery on his right shoulder. (R. at 321). In 2006, Plaintiff was involved in a rear-endcollision and diagnosed with a bruised kidney which resulted in severe lower back pain. (R. at 290).

David Schafer, M.D.

On May 15, 2007, Plaintiff saw David Schafer, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, for left elbow pain. He stated his pain was 8/10 and he was unable to extend his elbow. Plaintiff was referred to physical therapy. (R. at 387-88). Plaintiff was discharged from physical therapy on August 9, 2007. (R. at 385). At a follow-up on September 18, 2007, he was unable to perform simple work activities with his left upper extremity because of loss of motion and pain. (Id.). A physical exam showed mild swelling, tenderness, crepitus, and decreased range of motion and strength secondary to pain. (Id.). He was diagnosed with left elbow post-traumatic arthritis and right knee possible meniscal tear. (R. at 386, 405). The option of total elbow...