Rybovich Boat Co. v. M/Y Blue Star

• Decision Date: 29 June 2021
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 20-80136-CIV-ALTMAN
• Citation: 546 F.Supp.3d 1270
• Parties: RYBOVICH BOAT COMPANY, LLC, Plaintiff, Southern Cross Boatworks, Inc., Intervening Plaintiff, David Thornburn, et al., Intervening Plaintiffs, Mega Yacht Refinishing, LLC, Intervening Plaintiff, Yacht Chandlers, Inc., Intervening Plaintiff, v. M/Y BLUE STAR, a 1993 model 37.12 meter Keith Marine motor yacht bearing hull identification number PLK00027F293 and registered with the Cayman Islands Shipping Registry as Official Number 723333, her engines, tackle, furniture, furnishings, apparel, appurtenances, personal watercraft, and tenders in rem, Vladimir Gusinsky a/k/a Vladimir Gusinski, and Shakra Holdings Limited, in personam, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

546 F.Supp.3d 1270

RYBOVICH BOAT COMPANY, LLC, Plaintiff,Southern Cross Boatworks, Inc., Intervening Plaintiff,David Thornburn, et al., Intervening Plaintiffs,Mega Yacht Refinishing, LLC, Intervening Plaintiff,Yacht Chandlers, Inc., Intervening Plaintiff,

v.M/Y BLUE STAR, a 1993 model 37.12 meter Keith Marine motor yacht bearing hull identification number PLK00027F293 and registered with the Cayman Islands Shipping Registry as Official Number 723333, her engines, tackle, furniture, furnishings, apparel, appurtenances, personal watercraft, and tenders in rem, Vladimir Gusinsky a/k/a Vladimir Gusinski, and Shakra Holdings Limited, in personam, Defendants.

CASE NO. 20-80136-CIV-ALTMAN

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed June 29, 2021

Entered June 30, 2021

James Weller Stroup, Farris James Martin, III, Stroup & Martin, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.

David Edward Irwin, Irwin Law Firm, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Intervening Plaintiff Southern Cross Boatworks, Inc.

James Hubert Perry, II, Perry & Neblett, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Intervening Plaintiffs Yacht Chandlers, Inc., Mega Yacht Refinishing LLC.

Adam B. Cooke, Fowler White Burnett, P.A., Robert Dewitt McIntosh, McIntosh Schwartz, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Intervenings David Thornburn, Rodilin Thornburn, Bud Morken, III, Dave Talling, Dan Rankin, Marco Volschenk, Michael Brittenden, Maria Tuvilla, Gregor Tuvilla, Karen Magpantay, Frittzie Dumdum, Richard Lima.

Clay Michael Naughton, Michael T. Moore, Moore & Company, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant Shakra Holdings Limited.

Clay Michael Naughton, Moore & Company, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for Defendants M/Y Blue Star, Vladimir Gusinsky.

OMNIBUS ORDER

ROY K. ALTMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this admiralty case, the Plaintiff—a yacht-repair company—has sued the Defendants for hundreds of thousands of dollars in unpaid yacht-repair jobs. Since the lawsuit was filed, the Yacht's captain and crew have intervened, seeking unpaid wages and reimbursement for expenses they advanced on the Yacht's behalf. The parties have agreed to sell the Yacht and to use the proceeds of that sale to pay back the Plaintiffs. But the parties disagree about how those proceeds should be distributed—and, in some cases, about how much is owed. And it's this disagreement that forms the basis of the two motions we resolve today.

In the first motion, the Plaintiff—Rybovich Boat Company, LLC—wants summary judgment on (1) its maritime lien against the Yacht, M/Y Blue Star¹ (Count I); and (2) its claim for breach of a maritime contract against the Defendants, Vladimir Gusinsky and Shakra Holdings Limited (Count II). See Rybovich Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 11] at 2. Rybovich also wants reimbursement of certain custodia legis expenses. Of the many interested parties in this case, none has responded (or objected) to Rybovich's motion. See generally Docket. And so, after careful review, we GRANT that motion.

In the second motion, the Intervening Crew Plaintiffs ask for summary judgment on their claim for a maritime lien—which was meant to secure the Crew's wages, their repatriation costs, and certain necessary expenses they advanced on the Yacht's behalf. Here, the Crew supports only some of its requests with concrete evidence. As to these, we GRANT in part the Crew's motion. But, as to the rest, the Crew offers little evidence and no small amount of speculation—which is why, as we explain below, we'll DENY in part summary judgment and allow the Crew to prove up the amount (and necessity) of these expenses at a bench trial.

THE FACTS ²

On a good day, the 143-foot Blue Star might fetch a sales price of over $3 million. See Appraisal [ECF No. 95-2] at 2. But the Yacht hasn't had a good day in more than two years—during which it's been languishing in port, waiting for its owners (Gusinsky and Shakra Holdings) to claim it and pay their bills. See Rybovich SOF [ECF No. 113] ¶¶ 8–11, 23.

Before the Blue Star (our Yacht) was struggling to stay afloat, it carried a crew of between 7 and 12, see Crew SOF [ECF No. 111] ¶ 5, who tended to the Yacht, its two jet skis, and its three tenders: an 18-foot Boston Whaler motorboat; an 18-foot custom motorboat; and a 35-foot Everglades motorboat, see Rybovich SOF ¶ 5.

Rybovich operates a boat repair, storage, and marina facility in Palm Beach, Florida. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. On May 1, 2019, David Thornburn (the Yacht's captain and manager) hired Rybovich to provide dockage, utilities, and other necessaries for the Yacht and its crew. Id. ¶¶ 8–11; see also Dockage Agreement [ECF No. 1-2]. Eight times over the next four months, Thornburn authorized Rybovich to repair and service the Yacht. Rybovich SOF ¶¶ 12–19. Pursuant to these requests, Rybovich repaired the Vessel's running gear, its generator exhaust, and its bulkhead. Id. ; see generally Work Authorizations [ECF Nos. 1-3; 1-4; 1-5; 1-6; 1-7; 1-8; 1-9; 1-10]. Thornburn repeatedly assured Rybovich's project manager, Craig Simon, that the Vessel's owners would pay Rybovich's accruing bills. Id. ¶ 22. But no payment came. And, as the weeks turned into months, Simon began complaining to Thornburn, who responded with the oft-deployed (but rarely fulfilled) promise of an imminent "check in the mail." See 8/9/2019 Work Authorization [ECF No. 1-8] at 4 ("With regard to payments the owner is aware and extremely apologetic. He is having banking issues getting money out of Russia .... I am hoping I can make some sort of payment this week."). After months of such empty promises—and no paychecks—Rybovich filed this lawsuit in January 2020, by which it hopes to recover the monies (it says) the Defendants owe. See Complaint [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 23–27.

But Rybovich isn't the only party that has come to collect. The Blue Star's Crew³ has intervened in the case, see Intervening Crew Complaint ("Crew Complaint") [ECF No. 56], seeking (1) wages (they say) they're owed for work they performed on the Yacht between September 2019 and February 2020, (2) repatriation expenses for two Crew members, and (3) reimbursement for "necessaries" they advanced on the Yacht's behalf, see Crew's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 111] at 3–6.

THE LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. Id. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

At summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of "showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."). Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to "come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." See Bailey v. Allgas, Inc. , 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).

The Court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3) ; see also HRCC, Ltd. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (USA), Inc. , 703 F. App'x 814, 817 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that a "court may decide a motion for summary judgment without undertaking an independent search of the record" (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee's note)). In any event, on summary judgment, the Court must "review the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Pennington v. City of Huntsville , 261 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001).

In sum, then, if there are any genuine issues of material fact, the Court must deny summary judgment and proceed to trial. Whelan v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. , 2013 WL 5583970, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2013). On the other hand, the Court must grant summary judgment if a party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case."

Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; see also Lima v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families , 627 F. App'x 782, 785–86 (11th Cir. 2015) ("If no reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted." (quoting Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp. , 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994) )).

ANALYSIS

I. Custodia Legis Fees

Typically, "services or property advanced to preserve and maintain the vessel under seizure, furnished upon authority of the court or of an officer of the court should be allowed as custodia legis expenses." Associated Metals & Mins. Corp. v. Alexander's Unity MV , 41 F.3d 1007, 1018 (5th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up) (quoting Gen. Elec. Credit & Leasing Corp. v. Drill Ship Mission Expl. , 668 F.2d...