Ryckman v. Johnson

• Citation: 177 Wash. 498,32 P.2d 116
• Decision Date: 07 May 1934
• Docket Number: 24796.
• Parties: RYCKMAN v. JOHNSON et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

32 P.2d 116

177 Wash. 498

RYCKMAN v. JOHNSON et al.

No. 24796.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 7, 1934

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; A. W. Hawkins, Judge.

Action by Minnie Ryckman against John P. Johnson and Bertha B Johnson. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

N. K Buck, Grady & Velikanje, and Stanley P. Velikanje, all of Yakima, for appellants.

Snively & Bounds, of Yakima, for respondent.

MILLARD Justice.

This is an action to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by reason of false and fraudulent representations made by the defendants to induce the exchange and purchase of real estate. From judgment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants have appealed.

This cause was once Before in this court. Ryckman v Johnson, 161 Wash. 568, 297 P. 206, 207. The first appeal was from a judgment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. That judgment was reversed, with direction to grant a new trial 'because of the lack of any evidence of values upon which the verdict could rest.'

Respondent resided in Seattle, where she owned two lots upon which she had constructed a dwelling house. She was induced to exchange that property, which was subject to a mortgage, for a forty-acre farm in Yakima county, owned by the appellants. The farm property was also subject to a mortgage. In the trade, the farm property was valued at $7,500. After allowing for the respective mortgages, the respondent took title to the farm and gave back a second mortgage for the balance of the purchase price of $1,900.

Appellants first contend that the court erred in permitting respondent to testify over their objection, in view of the fact that the complaint did not allege that any such representation was made, that appellants told her that the mortgage for the balance of the purchase price could be paid out of the first year's crop raised on the land. We held on the first appeal that the evidence was admissible, saying: 'Such a statement, coming from the owner, who had himself farmed the land, was the equivalent of saying that, with proper skill and care, and in a normal season, the land was capable of producing a crop of the net value of $1,900.'

Appellants next insist that the evidence as to the value of the farm was insufficient. The complaint alleged that the trading price of the farm was $7,500, and that its actual value at the time was not in excess of $2,500, which allegation was denied by the answer. There was ample testimony of witnesses well acquainted with the land in question to the effect that the fair market value of the land at the time of the exchange of properties did not exceed twelve or thirteen hundred dollars; that at the present time the land is valueless for farming purposes, but the house thereon has a value of $600. One witness testified:

'Q. How long have you known this place called the Johnson place? A. About 15 or 16 years, I don't know exactly.

'Q. What would you say was the fair market value of that land in the later winter of 1926 or early winter of 1927, along in December and January? A. $1,200.00 or $1,300.00.

'Q. What do you think it is worth now? A. Well, that is a pretty hard question to answer, the land itself isn't worth anything, the house would have some value to move off and use on another place, I suppose $600.00, something like that.

'Q. Had it any value as farm land? A. No, it is worth less than nothing for value as farm land and has been for many years.

'Q. Was it worth anything in 1927? A. Not for farming.

'Q. Anything you know of could be raised on that land enough to pay the taxes and water? A. No, couldn't raise anything.'

A number of other witnesses testified that the land was incapable of producing crops sufficient to pay the cost of farming the land. There was ample competent evidence to sustain the verdict in favor of the respondent.

Appellants further contend that the court erred in refusing to admit testimony as to conversation relative to the value of respondent's property, in view of evidence that the prices were based upon trading values on both sides. In Edwards v. Powell, 121 Wash. 598, 210 P. 7, 8, 212 P. 163, which was an action for damages in misrepresenting the value of lands traded by defendant for a drug store, we held that the value of the drug store was immaterial, except to show that plaintiff parted with some value; and it was not error to exclude it upon an issue as to the amount of the damages. We said:

'There are cases which hold that in an exchange of properties the measure of damages is the difference between the values of the properties. These cases are from those jurisdictions which hold that the measure of damages in the case of a cash sale is the difference between the price paid and the value of the property received. As already stated, in the jurisdictions which have adopted...