Rycraw v. White Castle Systems Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 October 2000
• Citation: 28 S.W.3d 495
• Parties: (Mo.App. E.D. 2000) Angela Rycraw, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. White Castle Systems, Inc., Defendant/Respondent. ED77530
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

28 S.W.3d 495 (Mo.App. E.D. 2000)

Angela Rycraw, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. White Castle Systems, Inc., Defendant/Respondent.

ED77530

Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District

10/10/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Hon. Michael B. Calvin

Counsel for Appellant: Derald L. Gab

Counsel for Respondent: Kenneth M. Lander and Sara J. McAvoy

Opinion Summary: Plaintiff Angela Rycraw appeals summary judgment in favor of defendant White Castle Systems, Inc. in her personal injury suit arising from a slip and fall in White Castle's restaurant.

Division Five holds: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact still remains. When viewed in the light most favorable to Rycraw, her deposition testimony provides circumstantial evidence from which it can be inferred that the warning cone itself was a dangerous condition and that she fell as a result of it.

Robert E. Crist, Senior Judge

This appeal concerns the propriety of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of White Castle Systems, Inc. (Defendant) in a personal injury case arising from a slip and fall that occurred in Defendant's restaurant. Angela Rycraw (Plaintiff) appeals, contending summary judgment is improper because she established a fact issue as to whether she fell from a dangerous condition on the floor. Because we find a genuine issue of material fact remains in the case, summary judgment is improper and we reverse and remand.

Plaintiff filed a one-count petition against Defendant, alleging she suffered personal injuries resulting from a slip and fall while she was a customer in Defendant's restaurant. Plaintiff alleged that when she moved back from the cashier's counter area, "she stepped on a pool or puddle of liquid on the floor near the cashier's counter area, then stumbled over a 'cone' that had been placed behind her as she stood in line to pay for her purchased food." Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant was negligent in maintaining the floor and for placing the cone directly behind her without any notice.

After discovery had ensued, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In the motion, Defendant asserted Plaintiff could not prove an essential element of her claim, that any negligence of Defendant caused her injury. Defendant noted that Plaintiff alleged she slipped on a puddle or pool of liquid on the floor, but in her deposition she testified she saw no substance on the floor and did not know what caused her fall. As a consequence, Defendant averred Plaintiff could not prove her cause of action and her petition failed as a matter of law. Defendant attached a copy of Plaintiff's deposition to its motion. Defendant asked the trial court to enter summary judgment in its favor.

Plaintiff filed a response to the motion, contending Plaintiff's deposition testimony did establish a causal connection between a condition on the floor and her injuries. Plaintiff pointed to her deposition testimony where she stated:

she knew that there was something on the floor "Because I slipped". (See Plaintiff's deposition, page 38, line 2.) She testified that she had explained the causation to the Defendant's representatives: "I proceeded to tell her [the manager] it was something on the floor, had to be because I slipped. . . " (See Plaintiff's deposition, page 40, lines 3-5).

Plaintiff further stated she had identified an obstacle on the floor, the warning cone. Plaintiff alleged the presence of the warning cone alone implied the existence of a hazardous condition on the floor. Plaintiff further asserted that her deposition testimony showed that "when she began to slip, she was unable to catch or right herself because the cone was in her walking path. (See Plaintiff's deposition pages 16, lines 12-15, page 20, lines 3-4)."

After argument on the motion, the trial court granted Defendant's motion and entered summary judgment in its favor. The trial court found that Plaintiff was unable to show causation, that her injuries were caused by a dangerous condition in Defendant's restaurant. The court stated that the "mere occurrence of a slip and fall, or any other accident, does not establish negligence, and does not obviate the need to show causation by a dangerous condition." The court also found the testimony did not establish that the warning cone itself was a dangerous condition, but that only the cone was in the way of Plaintiff's fall.

In her appeal, Plaintiff contends the court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis there was no evidence of a dangerous condition on the floor that caused her to fall. Plaintiff points to two instances that she claims show a dangerous condition: (1) her testimony that she was unable to catch herself during the fall because her foot came into contact with a cone on the floor, which constitutes evidence that she fell as a result of the cone, a dangerous condition on the floor; and (2) there is evidence from which it may be inferred that Plaintiff fell due to spilled food or drink.

Rule 74.04 provides a trial court may enter summary judgment where a moving party has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04(c)(3); ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). A moving party may establish a right to summary judgment by showing facts that negate one of the plaintiff's elements. Id. at 381. When considering appeals from summary judgments, we review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Id. at 376. We must accord the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Id. As the trial court's judgment is founded on the record submitted and the law, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment. Id. Accordingly, our review is essentially de novo. Id.

In oral argument, Defendant raised for the first time that Plaintiff's response to its motion was inadequate under Rule 74.04(c)(2) because Plaintiff failed to admit or deny each of its factual statements in numbered paragraphs corresponding to its paragraphs. As a result, Defendant contends Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted all of the assertions contained in its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's response does appear inadequate, because she failed to admit or deny each of Defendant's paragraphs. Where a response fails to admit or deny each factual statement in the motion, we take the factual assertions contained in the motion as true. Peck v. Alliance General Ins. Co., 998 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). However, even if Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted all factual assertions in Defendant's motion, her response still raises a genuine issue of material fact.

Defendant's motion consists only of ten paragraphs. The first five paragraphs of the motion only refer to Plaintiff's allegations contained in her petition. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did make those allegations in her petition, so it was unnecessary for Plaintiff to admit or deny them. In paragraphs six, nine, and ten, Defendant made the following assertions:

6. In a negligence action, there is a necessity for the plaintiff to show a causal relation between the act complained of and plaintiff's injury. (Stroot v. Taco Bell Corp., 972 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998)).

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9. Because plaintiff cannot testify that there was a pool or puddle of liquid on the floor in the White Castle as a matter of fact, plaintiff cannot prove that White Castle breached their duty by the pool/puddle's presence. (Wilburn v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 382 S.W.2d 49, 53 (Mo. App. 1964)).

10. As plaintiff cannot prove that White Castle breached their duty, plaintiff cannot prove her cause of action couched in negligence and, therefore, her petition must fail as a matter of law.

Defendant's assertions are only...