Ryder v. Donovan

• Decision Date: 03 April 1933
• Parties: RYDER v. DONOVAN et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

282 Mass. 551

185 N.E. 473

RYDER

v.DONOVAN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

April 3, 1933.

Appeal from Superior Court, Essex County; Whiting, Judge.

Bill by Mary F. Ryder against James A. Donovan and another. The case was referred to a master, whose report was confirmed with a modification. From an interlocutory decree denying a motion to recommit and from a final decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

H. A. Bowen and H. C. Mamber, both of Lynn, for appellant.

J. M. Hargedon and F. Bernardin, both of Lawrence, for appellees.

LUMMUS, Justice.

On December 18, 1901, Frederick J. Ryder died, intestate, leaving his widow, the plaintiff, then fifty-three years old, and their only child, Alberta E. Ryder, then nineteen years old. The administrator of his estate settled his final account in due course, with the assent of the plaintiff and Alberta E. Ryder, and turned over to them cash amounting to more than $6,000, and corporate stock upon which they received dividends until the corporation was liquidated in 1929, amounting to $73,000, besides dividends in liquidation in 1929 amounting to nearly $18,000. Alberta E. Ryder worked for the corporation for some years prior to 1929. In addition, Frederick J. Ryder left them real estate which they sold in 1924 for $15,000. Of course, the plaintiff had one third, and Alberta E. Ryder two thirds, of the estate.

Alberta E. Ryder and her mother lived together at all times. The master finds that ‘their chief interest and concern in life was the welfare of each other.’ There was never any fraud, concealment or want of harmony between them. Soon after the death of Frederick J. Ryder, Alberta E. Ryder, with the consent of her mother, took charge of all their business affairs. Practically all the money received from the estate, from the sale of property derived from Frederick J. Ryder, and from the income of investments, was deposited in the name of Alberta E. Ryder. Almost all investments, whether in savings banks, stocks, bonds, real estate or jewelry, were made in her name. The income of all investments was used by her to defray the living expenses of herself and her mother and no record of payments was kept. There was no agreement that the mother should have any specific interest, legal or equitable, in any of the investments made. The mother apparently knew everything that was done, and was perfectly satisfied with whatever her daughter did.

In 1929 Alberta E. Ryder became seriously ill with cancer. The plaintiff knew that the daughter was about to die, knew that by an earlier will the daughter had given her entire estate for the benefit of the plaintiff for life with remainder to charity, suggested the making of the daughter's last will for the purpose of extending the benefit of the remainder to certain relatives in addition to charity, and never asked any accounting or division of the property known to the plaintiff to be standing in the name of the daughter. The daughter's last will, executed on December 31, 1929, and duly proved and allowed after her death, which occurred on May 15, 1930, appointed the defendants executors, and gave the entire estate to trustees for the benefit of the plaintiff for life, with power in the trustees to use the principal for her support if needed, and with remainder to various persons and charities. The inventory showed savings bank deposits, stocks, bonds and some jewelry, all of the value of $54,754.87, and real estate valued at $9,500.

On November 13, 1930, with the intention of benefiting at her own death one or more of her relatives and prospective legatees who have been closely associated with her since the death of her daughter, the plaintiff, then eighty-two years old, brought this suit for an accounting of the property of the plaintiff received many years ago by Alberta E. Ryder. The case was referred to a master, to whose report the plaintiff filed objections which became exceptions by force of rule 90 of the superior court (1932), following equity rule 26 of this court (252 Mass. 608). One exception was sustained and the other were overruled by an interlocutory decree, which also denied a motion of the plaintiff for a recommittal of the report for further and different findings, and confirmed the master's report with a slight modification. A final decree was entered dismissing the bill with costs. From both decrees the plaintiff appealed.

The recommittal of a report is a matter within the discretion of the judge. Greek Othodox Community v. Malicourtis, 267 Mass. 472, 480, 166 N. E. 863;Brine v. Parker, 271 Mass. 86, 93, 171 N. E. 324;First National Bank of Haverhill v....