Ryder v. Faxon

• Decision Date: 20 May 1898
• Citation: 171 Mass. 206,50 N.E. 631
• Parties: RYDER v. FAXON et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

171 Mass. 206

50 N.E. 631

RYDER v. FAXON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

May 20, 1898

COUNSEL

F.M. Bixby, for plaintiff.

R.O Harris, for defendant.

OPINION

BARKER J.

The first lease was made March 1, 1883, for the term of three years from that date. At the beginning of the term the demised premises were a vacant parcel of land upon which the lessee thereafter erected a two-story hotel building. On March 1, 1884, the lease was canceled, and a new lease made for the term of five years from that date. On February 26 1886, the building, which was set on posts, was detroyed by fire. On March 1, 1886, the second lease was canceled, and a new lease made for 10 years from that date, after which a new building upon the old foundations, and having no cellar, was erected by the lessee. In 1894 the lessee made a bill of sale of the building to a third person, who in turn made a bill of sale to the present plaintiff, who is the wife of the lessee. Before the third lease expired, the lessee died, and on the expiration of the lease his heirs, the present defendants, took possession of the land and building and refused to allow the plaintiff to remove the building, whereupon she brought this action for conversion of the building, claiming under her bill of sale.

1. At the trial the defendants excepted to the introduction of evidence tending to show an agreement between the lessor and the lessee, outside of the lease, that the building should be and remain the personal property of the lessee. This evidence was rightfully admitted. When the lease of 1886 was made, the premises were simply land upon which were certain posts which had served as the foundations of a building which had been destroyed by fire, and which might serve as the foundation of another building. The phrase following the description of the land, "to be occupied by a building erected thereon by said Ryder," is not inconsistent with an agreement that the building should be the personal property of the lessee nor is the covenant that at the termination of the lease the lessee should deliver up the premises in as good order and condition as they then were, or should be put into by the lessor, inconsistent with such an agreement. The removal of personal property from the land would be neither waste nor an alteration, within the meaning of the clauses of the lease which relate to those subjects. So an agreement...