Ryder v. Ryder, 18-0865
| Decision Date | 06 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-0865,18-0865 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Thane A. Ryder, Petitioner v. Angelena Ryder, Respondent |
Petitioner Thane A. Ryder, by counsel Paul S. Detch, appeals the Circuit Court of Pocahontas County's September 17, 2018, order denying his motion for reconsideration. Respondent Angelena Ryder, by counsel Jefferson L. Triplett and George R. Triplett, filed a response in support of the circuit court's order. Petitioner filed a reply. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in determining that the contract at issue was unenforceable, due to either a lack of consideration or as being against public policy, and, further, in determining that the contract was unenforceable because it was a contract to make a will and not an actual will.1 Petitioner also argues that the circuit court erred in not providing any reasoning as to whypetitioner's father or children could not enforce the contract against petitioner and respondent.
This Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court's order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Petitioner and respondent married in February of 1992. Three children were born of the marriage, all of whom are now adults. In May of 2002, petitioner became aware of a tract of land approximating 608 acres for sale by Robert Jacobson.2 Petitioner and respondent desired to purchase the tract of land, but did not want to use their house as collateral for the mortgage. For this reason, petitioner and his father, Willie Ryder, agreed to purchase the land together. On May 3, 2002, Mr. Jacobson conveyed the tract of land to petitioner and Willie Ryder as tenants in common for a sum of $360,000. Although not noted as a tenant in common in the deed, respondent contends that she executed "the deed of trust and note," obligating herself to the mortgage, along with petitioner and Willie Ryder.
On the same day, petitioner and Willie Ryder executed an agreement that reads as follows:
Respondent admits to being in the room while Willie Ryder and petitioner discussed this agreement with Willie Ryder's attorney, but denies participating in the conversation. Willie Ryder and petitioner signed the agreement, but respondent did not review the document or sign it. This agreement was never recorded at the county clerk's office.
Respondent filed for divorce in January of 2016. During the divorce proceedings before the family court, petitioner argued that the 2002 agreement only granted respondent a marital interest in what he described as a life estate in the tract of land for the purposes of equitable distribution. The family court found that the 2002 agreement was unenforceable, as there was no consideration and because respondent was not a party to the agreement. As such, the family court found that respondent was entitled to an undivided, one-half marital interest in the one-half fee interest acquired by petitioner. Petitioner advised the family court of his intent to file a declaratory judgment action with the circuit court and moved to stay the divorce proceedings in the meantime. The stay was granted.3
Around June of 2017, petitioner filed a petition for declaratory judgment with the Circuit Court of Pocahontas County, requesting a determination of the ownership rights with regard to the tract of approximately 608 acres.4 In an order entered August 20, 2018, the circuit court found that petitioner's and Willie Ryder's 2002 agreement was void and unenforceable for several reasons. First, the agreement lacked consideration. The circuit court found that neither Willie Ryder nor petitioner "gave up anything." Second, the agreement violated public policy. The circuit court noted that allowing a contract void of consideration to divest a spouse of her marital interest would essentially provide a court-sanctioned means of diverting assets and would thereby undermine the laws of equitable distribution. Lastly, the circuit court found that theagreement could not be construed as a will or testamentary device. Thus, the circuit court determined respondent was entitled to an undivided, one-half marital interest in the one-half of the tract of land acquired by petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.5 The circuit court reiterated its findings that the agreement was void and unenforceable for lack of consideration, leaving the deed to control the ownership interests. Because the deed conveying the property to petitioner and his father as tenants in common contained no limiting language, respondent was entitled to "an undivided, one-half marital interest in the one-half fee interest acquired by [petitioner]." The circuit court further noted that, because the agreement was void for lack of consideration, petitioner's children had no interest in the property. Petitioner appeals the circuit court's September 17, 2018, order denying his motion to reconsider its prior order denying his petition for declaratory judgment.
We have previously held that ." Syl. Pt. 2, Blankenship v. City of Charleston, 223 W. Va. 822, 823, 679 S.E.2d 654, 655 (2009). "As we explained in Cox, 'because the purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to resolve legal questions, a circuit court's ultimate resolution in a declaratory judgment action is reviewed de novo.'" Id. at 824-25, 679 S.E.2d at 656-57 (citation omitted).
On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the agreement was void and unenforceable on the basis that it lacked consideration and violated public policy. According to petitioner, the circuit court ignored the plain language of the agreement and "the circumstances that led to it." Petitioner claims that the agreement does contain consideration in that "at the death of Willie Ryder his portion is to go to [petitioner] and at [petitioner's] death to Angelena for her lifetime, then to the three children of [respondent and petitioner]." Moreover, the agreement limited with whom petitioner and Willie Ryder could be partners.6 Both petitioner and Willie Ryder were "giving up a right to sell their property and giving a benefit to someone of their approval." Petitioner contends this was sufficient consideration for the agreement. We disagree.
We have acknowledged "[t]hat consideration is an essential element of, and is necessary to the enforceability or validity of a contract is so well established that citation of authority therefor is unnecessary."[First Nat. Bank of Gallipolis v. Marietta Mfg. Co., 151 W. Va. 636, 642, 153 S.E.2d 172, 177 (1967).] Further, "[n]o promise is good in law unless there is a legal consideration in return for it." [Syl. Pt. 1, Thomas v. Mott, 74 W. Va. 493, 82 S.E. 325 (1914).] And, "where there is no benefit moving to the promisor or damage or injury to the promisee, [the contract] is void." [Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Sturm v. Parish, 1 W. Va. 125, 144 (1865).] Consideration is a broad term; we have stated that "[a] valuable consideration may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the one party or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." [Syl. Pt. 1, Tabler v. Hoult, 110 W. Va. 542, 158 S.E. 782 (1931).]
Young v. Young, 240 W. Va. 169, 174, 808 S.E.2d 631, 636 (2017). We agree with the circuit court's determination that the 2002 agreement between petitioner and Willie Ryder is void for lack of consideration. The question "what did you give to get what you got?" can be instructive as to the issue of whether consideration is present. Id. at 176, 808 S.E.2d at 638. Here, neither Willie Ryder nor petitioner gave anything to "get what they got." Facially, the agreement is executed as an exchange of promises: Willie Ryder promises to bequeath his interest in the property to petitioner upon his death and petitioner promises to bequeath his interest in the property to respondent for her life and then to his children. In actuality, petitioner gave up nothing to receive Willie Ryder's interest in the property at the time of his death. Rather, petitioner simply agrees to pass his property to respondent for her life and then on to his children. Willie Ryder receives nothing in return for bequeathing his property to petitioner.
As to contracts for which a return promise supplies the requisite consideration, we have held:
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