Ryder v. State

• Decision Date: 12 March 1897
• Parties: RYDER v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

28 S.E. 246

100 Ga. 528

RYDER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

March 12, 1897

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where an application for the continuance of a criminal case on the ground of the absence of witnesses complied strictly with all the requirements of section 962 of the Penal Code and it appeared that the proof which the accused expected to make by the absent witnesses was not only material upon the controlling issue in the case, but was also such as he could not as fully and satisfactorily make by any other witness or witnesses, it was error not to grant the continuance, or at least postpone the trial until, the attendance of these witnesses could be had.

2. The rule above announced is specially applicable to a case in which the accused was indicted for murder, and the main defense was that at the time of the homicide he was afflicted with insanity, alleged to have been produced by a chronic disease originating at an early period of his life, the absent witnesses being persons who had exceptional opportunities for knowing the accused and his mental and physical condition, --two of them being his brothers, with whom he had for years associated more intimately than with other relatives; another a witness who had been acquainted with him from his childhood; and the remaining one a physician, who had known the accused all his life, and was professionally familiar with the nature of his alleged disease,--and the application for a continuance averring that all these witnesses would swear to his insanity, and setting forth in detail the facts upon which their testimony to this effect would be based.

3. Such a showing was good, and ought to have been so held, although it appeared by way of counter showing that there were other witnesses, including near relatives, by whom many of the facts within the knowledge of the absent witnesses could have been proved, and although it appeared also that none of the latter had actually seen the accused for some time previous to the homicide. The main question being whether he was or was not insane when the killing was done, it was his right not only to put in evidence the facts he could prove by the absent witnesses, but also to have their opinions, based on such facts, passed upon by the jury. This right certainly ought not to have been denied in the present case, there being much evidence for the state to show sanity, and the burden being upon the accused to prove insanity.

4. It is the right of the accused in a criminal case to introduce his witnesses in the order which he or his counsel may deem best; and the fact that a witness is compelled to leave the court for providential cause does not constrain the accused for the purpose of getting the benefit of his testimony, to put him on the stand at an earlier period of the trial than was otherwise contemplated and intended.

5. In order to render the distinctive defense of insanity available as a basis for an acquittal, the burden is upon the accused to show affirmatively by a preponderance of the evidence introduced at the trial that he was insane at the time the act for which he is indicted was committed. Though this burden may not be successfully carried so as to authorize a verdict of not guilty on this particular ground, it is nevertheless the duty of the jury to consider the evidence touching the alleged insanity in connection with the other evidence in the case, and then, in view of it all, determine whether or not a reasonable doubt of the guilty of the accused exists in their minds.

6. In instructing the jury as to the nature of expert and nonexpert testimony, and explaining the rules under which witnesses belonging to each class might give their opinions as to the sanity or insanity of the accused, it was error to charge that the testimony of expert witnesses was entitled to great weight, and to add, "The same way with parties who associated with the defendant, lived with him, lived in the same community," etc. It is safer and better to leave all these matters to be weighed by the jury, and to let them determine the probative value of the testimony of each witness.

7. There was, in the present case, no violation of the well-settled rule that nonexpert witnesses may testify to their opinions concerning the sanity or insanity of a given person, it appearing that in each instance where objection was made to testimony of this kind the witness had stated sufficient reasons as the foundation of his opinion to render it proper for the same to be heard and passed upon by the jury.

8. When a juror who has qualified upon his voir dire is put upon the judge as a trior, the latter, in the absence of any extrinsic evidence impeaching or attacking the juror's competency, is not required to enter upon an investigation as to the same; and in no event is the court bound to ask, or to permit counsel to ask, the juror any question the answer to which would tend to incriminate or disgrace him. The scope of the inquiry in such matters is to be left largely in the discretion of the trial judge.

9. The court in some of its instructions referred to the homicide as "the act which the accused had committed," and thus at least intimated an opinion that the killing was done by him; and, although many of the requests to charge practically conceded that this was true, yet, as it was not distinctly admitted that the accused did commit the homicide, expressions embracing such language as that above quoted should not have been used.

10. The instructions as to the law of insanity were, in the main, correct, and appropriate, and the charge as a whole, except as above indicated, was free from material error.

11. Whether this court has the power so to do or not, it is not now essential to deal with the court's action upon the motion for a change of venue, for the reason that the circumstances and surroundings when the accused is again put upon trial may be essentially different.

12. Except as pointed out in the preceding notes, there was no substantial error at the trial relating to any matter or question which can arise when the case is tried again, and therefore it is unnecessary to deal specifically with a large majority of the 72 grounds of the motion for a new trial.

Error from superior court, Talbot county; W. B. Butt, Judge.

W. L. Ryder was convicted of murder, and brings error. Reversed.

J. H. Worrill, A. A. Carson, Dupont Guerry, J. J. Bull, and C.J. Thornton, for plaintiff in error.

S. P. Gilbert, Sol. Gen., J. M. Terrell, Atty. Gen., and J. H. Martin, for the State.

COBB J.

W. L. Ryder was indicted for the offense of murder. His defense was that he did not commit the homicide charged in the indictment, and that, if he did, he was insane at the time the killing was done.

1, 2 3. When the case of the accused was called for trial, he made a motion for a continuance on account of the absence of four witnesses. His motion complied strictly with the law regulating such matters. Pen. Code, § 962. And the only matters about which there could be any question were whether the facts sought to be proven by the absent witnesses were material to the defense, and whether or not he could prove the same facts as well by other witnesses. It was claimed that the accused was subject to fits of insanity, produced by a chronic disease of the ear, which originated at an early period of his life; and that, when suffering from the effects of this disease, he was, and had been at various times in his life, insane,...