Ryder v. State

Decision Date25 May 1970
Docket NumberNo. 45167,No. 3,45167,3
Citation121 Ga.App. 796,175 S.E.2d 882
PartiesM. N. RYDER v. The STATE
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Cecil G. Hartness, Robert K. Ballew, Blue Ridge, for appellant.

C. B. Holcombe, Dist. Atty., Canton, Herman J. Spence, Bobby C. Milam, Blue Ridge, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

EVANS, Judge.

The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of involuntary manslaughter with an automobile while engaged in the unlawful acts of speeding, driving on the wrong side of the road, and driving while intoxicated. He was sentenced to three years' confinement in the State Penal System. The appeal is from the judgment of conviction and sentence after motion for new trial was filed and denied. Error is enumerated on (1) the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict; (2) the failure of the court to charge without request Code § 38-109, where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence alone; and (3) the failure to charge the applicable principle of law without request, found in Code § 26-1010 as to the punishment for involuntary manslaughter, both in the commission of an unlawful act, and in the commission or performance of a lawful act where there has not been observed necessary discretion and precaution which shall be punished as for a misdemeanor. Held:

1. It is never error to fail to charge on circumstantial evidence absent a request in writing therefor, where there is direct evidence sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. Nobles v. State, 127 Ga. 212(5), 56 S.E. 125; Hegwood v. State, 138 Ga. 274, 75 S.E. 138; Bowen v. State, 181 Ga. 427(4), 182 S.E. 510; Green v. State, 210 Ga. 745(2), 82 S.E.2d 703.

2. In this case the defendant admitted he was driving the car which was involved in the fatal collision. He was in a state of intoxication or semi-intoxication which he contends resulted from his drinking intoxicants after the collision, and which may have been the truth of this phase of the matter. Deputy Sheriff Walter Porter testified that he was on patrol duty after midnight on this particular occasion, with a member of the State Highway Patrol, and that the GTO Pontiac automobile of defendant left a drive-in in the town of McCaysville at a considerable rate of speed and the patrol car gave pursuit. They attained the speed of 75 mph but the front car kept gaining; they attained the speed of 115 mph and when they saw they were not going to overtake the Pontiac, they decided to 'back off' which meant to slow down. This witness testified as follows: 'Q. Well, from the time you first saw this Pontiac spurting out of the driveway into the highway at the restaurant, until you came up on the scene, how many times did you lose sight of the automobile? A. We didn't lose sight of it, at all, that I recall, only just a second when it went around the Volkswagen and we hesitated until we could get around it. Q. You mean you kept the car in your sight all the time, from the time you saw him? A. Yes, sir. Q. And it never did get out of your sight? A. No sir. Q. Well, I misunderstood your whole line of testimony a minute ago. A. No, sir. Q. You stayed right behind this car all the way up to the crest of the hill? A. We wasn't right behind it, no, sir. Q. I mean you stayed where you could see it. A. Yes, sir. Q. And you never lost sight of it. A. No, sir.' The distance from the place where the Pontiac turned into the highway and where the pursuant began by the officers' car to the point of impact was approximately two miles. In fairness, let it be said that other portions of the testimony of this witness could have been construed as meaning the front vehicle was lost to his sight temporarily, but it was within the province of the jury to determine which version of the testimony to believe, if indeed there was such contradiction. See: Code Ch. 38-18; Wallis v. Watson, 184 Ga. 38, 41, 190 S.E. 360; Rowe v. State, 68 Ga.App. 161(2), 22 S.E.2d 210; Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 90 Ga.App. 791(5), 84 S.E.2d 696. From this statement of facts it appears there is ample direct evidence to support...

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10 cases
  • Bentley v. State, 48573
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 7, 1974
    ...light to the prevailing party, . . . for every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict.' (Cits.)' Ryder v. State, 121 Ga.App. 796, 798, 175 S.E.2d 882. 2. 'A person commits aggravated assault when he assaults . . . (b) with a deadly weapon.' Code Ann. § 26-1302. Assault is defi......
  • Anderson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 20, 1974
    ...F.2d 1402(1), cert. den. 401 U.S. 908, 91 S.Ct. 865, 27 L.Ed.2d 805; Johnson v. State, 231 Ga. 138(1), 200 S.E.2d 734; Ryder v. State, 121 Ga.App. 796(3), 175 S.E.2d 882; Lester Colodny Const. Co. v. Allen, 129 Ga.App. 545, 199 S.E.2d Consequently, we must construe the evidence on appeal, t......
  • Sanford v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 29, 1973
    ...must draw every inference and presumption in favor of the verdict. Taylor v. State, 128 Ga.App. 13, 195 S.E.2d 294; Ryder v. State, 121 Ga.App. 796(3), 175 S.E.2d 882. It should also be noted that after the colloquy defendant's counsel commented about the charge on recent possession but mad......
  • Roberts v. State, 69350
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 7, 1985
    ...See also Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417, 265 S.E.2d 553, 558(11); Hannah v. State, 212 Ga. 313, 316, 92 S.E.2d 89; Ryder v. State, 121 Ga.App. 796, 798(4), 175 S.E.2d 882. We conclude the appellant has misconstrued the tenor of those decisions. The Mitchell case, supra, merely holds that whe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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