Rye Beach Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Rye
| Decision Date | 04 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96–192.,96–192. |
| Citation | 143 N.H. 122,719 A.2d 623 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | RYE BEACH COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v. TOWN OF RYE. |
Casassa and Ryan, Hampton (John J. Ryan on the brief and orally), for plaintiff.
Michael L. Donovan, Concord, by brief and orally, for defendant.
The Town of Rye (town) appeals the decision of the Superior Court (Goode , J.) granting Rye Beach Country Club, Inc.'s, now known as Abenaqui Country Club, Inc. (taxpayer), petition for abatement, and the decision of the Superior Court (McHugh , J.) denying its motion for reconsideration. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The parties stipulated to the following facts. The taxpayer's property consists of an eighteen hole golf course with related buildings and improvements. This litigation focuses solely on that part of the taxpayer's property which is located within the recreational zone of the Rye Beach Village District. The recreational zone specifically prohibits residential use.
In 1989, the town assessed the taxpayer's property in the amount of $3,434,150 based upon the results of the town's 1986 uniform property revaluation. Although the 1989 assessment included both the taxpayer's land and buildings, the taxpayer sought an abatement only on the value of the land. The taxpayer filed inventories with the town for 1989 and 1992–1995. A separate petition for abatement of the taxpayer's 1991 taxes was dismissed by the trial court for failure to file a 1991 inventory. In the action at issue, the board of selectmen denied the abatement, but the trial court reversed and granted the abatement for 1989 and 1991–1995. The Superior Court (McHugh , J.) denied the town's motion for reconsideration, which presented evidence that the taxpayer did not file an inventory for 1991.
At trial, Alfred B. Ikeler testified for the town. As a staff appraiser, he assisted in the 1986 revaluation with appraisal supervisor, Richard Young, Sr. The parties stipulated, and the trial court incorporated into its decree, that the town's valuation was based on the following methodology:
The trial court rejected the comparable sales approach used by the town in favor of the income approach proposed by the taxpayer. Referring also to Young's deposition testimony, the trial court concluded that the town's appraiser erroneously assessed the taxpayer's property as if it were residentially zoned and used rather than commercially zoned and used.
Using the income approach, the trial court concluded that the equalized value of the taxpayer's land as of April 1, 1989, was $891,650, and ordered an abatement. Pursuant to the "subsequent years statute," RSA 76:17–c (Supp.1997), the trial court also abated the taxpayer's 1991–1995 taxes.
The superior court may grant tax abatements as justice requires. See RSA 76:17 (1991) (amended 1991, 1994, 1995). In order to be granted an abatement, however, the taxpayer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is paying more than his proportional share of taxes. See City of Manchester v. Town of Auburn , 125 N.H. 147, 154, 480 A.2d 60, 65 (1984).
This case involves an interplay between RSA 74:7–a, which penalizes a taxpayer for failure to file an inventory, and RSA 76:17–c, commonly referred to as the "subsequent years statute," which obviates the need for taxpayers to file separate petitions for abatement for subsequent years. The town argues that RSA 74:7–a barred the trial court from ordering an abatement pursuant to the subsequent years statute for a year in which the taxpayer did not file an inventory of taxable property. The taxpayer contends that application of the subsequent years statute is not conditioned upon the filing of inventory forms.
"This court, of course, is the final arbiter of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of [each] statute considered as a whole." Pope v. Town of Hinsdale , 137 N.H. 233, 237, 624 A.2d 1360, 1362 (1993). "We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, and therefore, we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include." Petition of Walker , 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994). Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Appeal of Ashland Elec. Dept. , 141 N.H. 336, 340, 682 A.2d 710, 712 (1996).
We begin by examining the language found in the statutes themselves. Town of Wolfeboro v. Smith , 131 N.H. 449, 452, 556 A.2d 755, 756 (1989). RSA 74:7–a provides in pertinent part:
In the instant case, the taxpayer concedes that it failed to file a 1991 inventory in accordance with RSA 74:7. Because the taxpayer did not satisfy the condition precedent of filing an inventory, RSA 74:7–a penalizes the taxpayer by removing its right to appeal the 1991 assessment. See Bartlett , 77 N.H. at 478, 93 A. at 797. Because the taxpayer lost its right to appeal, the town cannot be ordered to abate the 1991 assessment.
The taxpayer nevertheless argues that because the subsequent years statute controls once an abatement petition is properly lodged, it would be contrary to the plain meaning of the statute to hold that the failure to file an inventory form in a later year removes that year from the statute's application. The subsequent years statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
The subsequent years statute does not apply in any year when the taxpayer fails to comply with RSA 74:7–a in that year. The purpose of the subsequent years statute is to provide relief to taxpayers who receive subsequent tax bills during the pendency of their original appeal and to eliminate the need to file separate appeals. Appeal of Newmarket , 140 N.H. 279, 283, 665 A.2d 1088, 1091–92 (1995). The...
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