S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Georgia B.
| Decision Date | 24 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | 2007-UP-044 |
| Parties | South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent, v. Georgia B., Willie R., Marcus B., and B. R., DOB: 03/09/02 D. B., DOB: 12/22/00, Defendants, of whom Willie R. is Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted December 1, 2006
Appeal From Aiken County Dale Moore Gable, Family Court Judge
Amy Patterson Shumpert and Clarke W. McCants, III, both of Aiken for Appellant.
Dennis M. Gmerek, of Aiken, for Respondent.
Willie R. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights (TPR) to B.R. (Child). Georgia B. (Mother) was also a defendant in the underlying TPR action but does not join in this appeal. Specifically, Father contends the family court erred in granting TPR because the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father did not remedy the conditions which caused the removal of Child, and the court improperly allowed evidence regarding Mother's criminal history and prior involvement with DSS. [1] We affirm. [2]
In February 2003, DSS initiated an investigation surrounding the care of Child. At the time of DSS's investigation, Father was in prison for driving under suspension and Mother was the sole caregiver for Child; Mother and Father (collectively Parents) have never been married. DSS determined Child had been abandoned and subjected to physical neglect. DSS removed Child from Mother's care and placed Child in foster care.
In April 2003, DSS and Parents entered into a consent order for removal which placed custody of Child with DSS. In addition the order approved a treatment plan for Parents. Father was ordered to: (1) successfully complete parenting classes; (2) successfully complete an alcohol/drug treatment program; (3) complete a psychological evaluation; (4) visit his daughter regularly; and (5) provide financial support for his daughter. In addition, Father was instructed to obtain and maintain safe housing and employment for at least six consecutive months.”
Initially Father made steady progress under the treatment plan. Specifically, Father completed parenting classes, completed a psychological evaluation, obtained housing, obtained employment, and enrolled in an alcohol/drug treatment program. However, Father only submitted to fifteen out of twenty-seven requested drug screens and tested positive for alcohol on one test.
In October 2003, prior to a Judicial Review hearing, DSS and Parents entered into another consent order. The consent order amended Father's treatment plan to require Father to: (1) refrain from the use of alcohol; and (2) develop a specific plan for transportation of [Child] to and from medical appointments and therapy sessions.” The order also provided that all adults living in Father's home must submit to drug screens and background checks.
In February 2004, the family court issued an order granting a six month extension for reunification to allow Parents to work on their treatment plans. The order provides [i]t is clearly not in [Child's] best interests for SCDSS to initiate termination of parental rights at this time because [Parents] have made some progress towards removing risk of harm to [Child].” However, the order also notes Father has yet to provide a plan for transportation of Child to her medical appointments, to maintain a stable home, or to secure adequate housing for Child. In addition, the order notes concerns about Father's alcohol environment.” The order amends the treatment plan to require Father to submit to drug screens three times a week.
In June 2004, the family court held a permanency planning hearing. The court found Father has not provided drug screens as requested” and has not been able to provide transportation for [Child] for her therapy appointments.” Therefore, the Court held Child should not be returned to Father because it would cause an unreasonable risk of harm to child's life, physical health or safety, or mental well-being....” The court authorized DSS to pursue TPR.
DSS initiated the present TPR action in August 2004, and a TPR hearing was held in September 2005. At trial, DSS presented testimony Father did not appear for all of his drug screenings, Father only attended four of Child's weekly therapy sessions in over two years, and Child has been in Foster care for about thirty (30) months. In addition, witnesses testified Child suffered from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and was developmentally delayed but was making tremendous progress at her therapy sessions. Also, over objection, DSS introduced testimony regarding the termination of Mother's parental rights as to three other children and Mother's criminal record.
On September 23, 2005, the family court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights on the grounds that: (1) Child has lived outside of the home for a period of at least six (6) months; (2) Father failed to remedy the conditions which caused the removal of Child or to rehabilitate; (3) Child has been in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months; and (4) Father failed to supply Child with the appropriate health care and it is unlikely that the home can be made safe within twelve months. In addition, the court found TPR was in Child's best interest. This appeal followed.
In a TPR case, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. Doe v. Baby Boy Roe, 353 S.C. 576, 579, 578 S.E.2d 733, 735 (Ct. App. 2003). The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights conflict.” S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1578 (Supp. 2005). Before parental rights can be forever terminated, the alleged grounds for the termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. S.C. Dept. of Social Services v. Headden, 354 S.C. 602, 608-09, 582 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2003).
On appeal, this court may review the record and make its own determination whether the grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence. S.C. Dept. of Social Services v. Cummings, 345 S.C. 288, 293, 547 S.E.2d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2001). Despite this broad scope of review, however, we are not required to disregard the findings of the family court, and we note the family court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and assign weight to their testimony. Hooper v. Rockwell, 334 S.C. 281, 297, 513 S.E.2d 358, 367 (1999).
Father argues the family court erred in granting TPR because DSS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence Father has not remedied the conditions which caused the removal of Child. We affirm on other grounds.
Pursuant to section 20-7-1572 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2005), the family court may terminate parental rights upon finding at least one of eleven statutory grounds has been met and that termination is in the best interest of the child. The paramount consideration in a TPR case is the best interests of the child or children. S.C. Dept. of Social Services v. Richardson, 298 S.C. 130, 133, 378 S.E.2d 601, 603 (Ct. App. 1989).
The record indicates statutory grounds for termination exist. Section 20-7-1572(8) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2005) allows for TPR when the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.” On February 26, 2003, Child was taken into protective custody. In April of 2003, Parents signed a consent order to place custody of...
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