S.C. v. G.C.
| Citation | 175 N.H. 158,281 A.3d 990 |
| Decision Date | 11 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-0194 |
| Court | Supreme Court of New Hampshire |
| Parties | S.C. v. G.C. |
Argued: February 10, 2022
7th Circuit Court-Dover Family Division
Wiberg Law Office, PLLC, of Portsmouth (Sven D. Wiberg on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff.
Hanlon & Zubkus, of Rochester (Mark D. Hanlon on the brief and orally), for the defendant.
The plaintiff, S.C., appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Foley, R., approved by Gardner, J.) denying her request for a domestic violence protective order against the defendant, G.C. See RSA 173-B:5 (Supp 2021). The trial court concluded that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving a credible present threat to her safety based upon her admitted presence in the defendant's home during the timeframe of the alleged abuse. See RSA 173-B:5, I; see also RSA 173-B:1, I (Supp. 2021). On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court erred as a matter of law when it relied on her in-person contact with the defendant as the sole basis for its decision. She also contends that the court erred when it made certain evidentiary, trial management, and other rulings that deprived her of a fair hearing and violated her due process rights. We agree that it was legal error for the court to rely solely on the plaintiff's contact with the defendant in denying her petition, and we therefore vacate and remand.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. The parties are former spouses who have one minor child. In late June 2019, when the parties were married and residing together, an altercation occurred. The defendant was charged with several domestic-violence-related crimes arising from that incident. In September 2019, he pleaded guilty to one domestic-violence-related criminal threatening charge and admitted to the conduct underlying one charge of domestic violence simple assault in order to enter a diversion program on that charge.
On May 8, 2020, the parties were living together and another altercation occurred. The parties would later recount different versions of the altercation, each accusing the other of instigating the conflict. In early July 2020, the plaintiff informed the defendant that she wanted a divorce and, on July 10, she filed a domestic violence petition against him. At some point between July and December, the plaintiff moved out of the home and filed a divorce petition.
There is no evidence in the record that, as of early December, a final hearing on the July 10 petition had been scheduled. On December 8, using the docket number for the July 10 petition, the plaintiff filed a motion for ex parte emergency relief, which requested, among other things, that the defendant be prohibited from having contact with her and the parties' child. The court denied the motion and set the matter for a hearing.
On December 18, following a hearing on the plaintiff's request for ex parte relief, the court entered a consolidated order in both the divorce and domestic violence dockets regarding custody and visitation of the parties' child. The order provided that the parties have joint decision-making responsibility and joint physical custody of the child and that the plaintiff pay child support to the defendant. The court also entered a civil restraining order, enjoining the defendant from having any contact or communication with the plaintiff "with the exception of polite electronic communication, which is child focused." See RSA 461-A:10, I (2018) (authorizing entry of restraining orders after the filing of a petition regarding parental rights and responsibilities). The court did not, however, schedule a final hearing on the July 10 petition. See RSA 173-B:3, VII (2014) ("The court shall hold a hearing within 30 days of the filing of a petition under this section . . . ."). Following the December 18, 2020 civil restraining order, the parties had contact by phone, text, and in person over the next several months, including in-person contact over the Christmas holiday - some of which was not child-related.
On February 25, 2021, the plaintiff filed the domestic violence petition that is the subject of this appeal. In the petition, the plaintiff recounted the events that occurred in June 2019 and May 2020. She alleged that, notwithstanding the defendant's domestic-violence-related conviction, the plaintiff's July 10, 2020 domestic violence petition, and the December 18, 2020 civil restraining order that remained in effect, the defendant continued to "abuse, manipulate and threaten" her. That same day, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the February 25 petition.
On March 15 and April 6, 2021, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which both parties testified and offered exhibits. The court heard evidence regarding the defendant's 2019 domestic-violence-related conviction, the May 8, 2020 incident, and testimony from both parties regarding the extent of their in-person contact and communication since the December 18, 2020 civil restraining order. The defendant testified that the plaintiff spent time at his house with him and the parties' child on multiple occasions in late 2020 and early 2021, including Thanksgiving day, a three-night visit over the Christmas holiday, and multiple occasions in January and February. The plaintiff testified that she was at the defendant's home for part of the day on Thanksgiving and Christmas, but denied staying overnight. She explained that she visited the defendant's home over the holidays so that she could spend time with her child, and that she was present in the home on other occasions when the defendant was not there in order to pick up or drop off the child.
After the first day of the hearing, the plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate the July 10, 2020 and February 25, 2021 petitions together with a motion to amend both petitions to add allegations contained in an attached affidavit. On April 6, the second day of the hearing, the court orally denied both motions because the parties were already "halfway through the hearing."
On April 7, the trial court denied the plaintiff's request for a domestic violence protective order. The narrative portion of the court's order states in its entirety:
Plaintiff failed to establish a credible fear to her safety, based upon her acknowledged presence in Defendant's home in the midst of her allegations, on numerous occasions.
The plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which the court granted in part: It reconsidered its denial of the plaintiff's motion to amend, permitted her to amend the July 10, 2020 petition, and ordered that a final hearing be scheduled on that petition. The court otherwise denied the motion. This appeal followed. As of February 10, 2022, the date of oral argument in this court, a final hearing on the amended July 10, 2020 petition had not been held and was not then scheduled.
On appeal, the plaintiff raises a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the trial court's determination that she failed to establish a credible present threat to her safety as required by RSA 173-B:5, I.[1] She argues that the court erred as a matter of law when it reached that conclusion based solely on her presence in the defendant's home during the time period when she alleges that she was being abused by the defendant. The defendant counters that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's decision and contends that, in light of the fact that the plaintiff "frequently and voluntarily went to [the defendant's] house alone," her behavior "was not that of a person who was fearful." We agree with the plaintiff.
In an appeal from an order on a domestic violence petition, the trial court's "findings of facts shall be final," and we undertake de novo review of "questions of law." RSA 173-B:3, VI (2014). We review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law, upholding the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are lacking in evidentiary support or tainted by error of law. Achille v. Achille, 167 N.H. 706, 715 (2015); see RSA 173-B:3, VI.[2] When preforming this review, we accord considerable weight to the trial court's judgments on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given testimony. Achille, 167 N.H. at 715-16. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party - here, the defendant. See id.
To obtain relief under RSA chapter 173-B, a plaintiff must show "abuse" by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 716; RSA 173-B:5, I. "Abuse" has two elements: (1) commission or attempted commission of one or more of the enumerated criminal acts by a family or household member or a current or former sexual or intimate partner; and (2) a finding that such misconduct "constitute a credible present threat to the [plaintiff's] safety." RSA 173-B: 1, I; see Achille, 167 N.H. at 716. The statute further provides that the court may consider evidence of the enumerated criminal acts "regardless of their proximity in time to the filing of the petition, which, in combination with recent conduct, reflects an ongoing pattern of behavior which reasonably causes or has caused the [plaintiff] to fear for his or her safety or well-being." RSA 173-B:l, I.[3]
As to the first element of "abuse," it is undisputed that, in September 2019, the defendant pleaded guilty to one of the criminal acts that may support a finding of abuse criminal threatening arising out of the incident in June of 2019. See RSA 173-B:1, 1(b); see also RSA 173-B:5, III ("[T]he court shall not deny the plaintiff protective orders based solely on a lapse of time between an act of domestic violence and the filing of a petition, provided that the underlying act presents a credible threat to the plaintiff's current safety."). However, the trial court's...
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S.A. v. J.C.
...a matter of law, upholding the trial court's findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are tainted by legal error. S.C., 175 N.H. at 162. trial court found that the defendant committed an act of abuse when, on April 10, 2022, he hit the plaintiff with his hands on her fac......