S.E.C. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 04-2315 (WHW). |
| Parties | SECURITIES and EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC., Nina Aversano, Jay Carter, Alice Leslie Dorn, William Plunkett, John Bratten, Deborah Harris, Charles Elliot, Vanessa Petrini, Michelle Hayes-Bullock, and David Ackerman, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Mauro Michael Wolfe, Office of the United States Attorney, Newark, NJ, for Movant and Intervenor Plaintiff.
Mark A. Adler, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Edward T. Kole, Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, Esqs., Woodbridge, NJ, Donna L. Gordon, Leboeuf, Lamb, Greene & Macrae, L.L.P., New York, NY, Barry H. Evenchick, Walder, Hayden & Brogan, P.A., Sheila A. Sadighi, Lowenstein Sandler PC, Roseland, NJ, Claudia A. Costa, Stryker, Tams & Dill, Newark, NJ, Wilfred P. Coronato, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed LLP, Jersey City, NJ, for Defendants.
Defendants Jay Carter and Michelle Hayes-Bullock move separately to dismiss certain claims in the Complaint. The Court will address all of these motions in this opinion.
The Complaint alleges the following: Lucent Technologies Inc. ("Lucent") fraudulently and improperly recognized revenue and pre-tax income in violation of generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") during its fiscal year 2000. As a result, Lucent improperly overstated its pre-tax income that fiscal year by sixteen percent. Lucent prematurely recognized $511 million of revenue and $91 million in pre-tax income in quarterly results during Lucent's fiscal year 2000. The remaining $637 million in revenue and $379 million in pre-tax income should not have been recognized at all during Lucent's fiscal year 2000. Lucent's violations of GAAP were due to the fraudulent and reckless actions of the other named defendants who were officers, executives and employees of Lucent. The GAAP violations were also the result of deficient internal controls that led to numerous accounting errors by others.
Defendant Jay Carter was president of Lucent's AT & T customer business unit from July 1997 to September 2000, with global responsibility for sales and marketing of Lucent's products to AT & T. Defendant Michelle Hayes-Bullock was a Lucent finance director with chief financial officer ("CFO") responsibilities for the AT & T customer business unit from January 2000 to January 2001; she reported to Jay Carter.
Starting in the summer of 1999, Lucent and AT & T Wireless Services, Inc. ("AWS") began to negotiate a new business model known as Voice Path Pricing ("VPP"). Under VPP, AWS would no longer pay Lucent according to a conventional pricing model which entailed sales of individual pieces of equipment that make up a telecommunications network. Instead, AWS would pay a price for each voice path — in essence pay for each data/voice connection that could be handled on the finished network. The parties initially anticipated that VPP would take effect April 1, 2000, but the new contract was not ultimately signed until August 2000. While continuing to negotiate the VPP agreement, Carter authorized his subordinates to enter into an oral agreement with their AWS counterparts that VPP would be retroactively applied to products purchased by AWS between April 1, 2000 and the date the VPP agreement was finally reached (the "interim period"). As part of this oral agreement, any pricing differential between VPP and conventional pricing for products purchased during this interim period would be adjusted through credits via a "true-up" process once the VPP agreement was finalized. In effect, the parties agreed to have VPP commence on April 1, 2000.
Hayes-Bullock was aware of this oral agreement because she had been explicitly told about it, both by a subordinate in the finance division and by at least one of the sales executives who made the agreement on behalf of Lucent. As finance director with CFO responsibilities for the AT & T customer business unit, she was responsible for ensuring that Lucent's financial statements complied with GAAP for transactions originating within that unit.
During the interim period, Lucent provided AWS with switching equipment valued at $53 million under conventional pricing. The switching equipment was provided to AWS without a purchase order, and, as a result, appeared in certain internal Lucent reports as inventory that had been shipped but not invoiced. In order to recognize revenues on the switches, Carter instructed his subordinates to obtain a purchase order from AWS for the switches. AWS provided a purchase order at the end of Lucent's third quarter of fiscal year 2000 with the expressed understanding that-in conformity with the original oral understanding — Lucent would provide a credit for that invoiced amount and that AWS would ultimately pay the VPP price for the equipment.
On June 30, 2000, at the end of Lucent's third quarter of its fiscal year, the switching equipment was invoiced under conventional pricing and Lucent violated GAAP by recognizing revenue and operating income in the amount of $53 million. Carter and Hayes-Bullock knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that Lucent's recognition of the revenue and operating income violated GAAP. And, so plaintiff alleges, Carter and Hayes-Bullock also took affirmative steps to mislead Lucent's chief accountant about the existence and nature of the oral agreement with AWS. More specifically, Hayes-Bullock drafted, and/or assisted in drafting, a letter to the chief accountant that falsely suggested that there were no credit agreements with AWS. Carter executed versions of that letter on September 8 and September 26, 2000. In the September 8, 2000 letter, Carter falsely represented that the June 30, 2000 invoice to AWS was "payable when due and that any credits earned will be applied against future purchase for wireless products." In the September 26, 2000 letter, Carter wrote that "[i]f as in the past, Lucent were to offer AT & T credits in return for future volume purchases, they would be earned by AT & T when the volume commitments were achieved," falsely suggesting that Lucent had not offered AWS an opportunity to earn credits.
Under GAAP as summarized by FASB Concepts Statement No. 5 ("CON 5"), before Lucent can recognize revenue in a given transaction, the revenue must be both realized and earned. To be realizable, collection of the sales price must be reasonably assured. Moreover, notwithstanding the delivery and transfer of title to the equipment, FASB Statement No. 48 ("FAS 48") requires that the price AWS will ultimately pay be fixed and determinable.
The result of the oral agreement authorized by Carter was that the price AWS would ultimately pay was not fixed and determinable because the ultimate VPP price had not yet been determined. In addition, the Complaint charges, Lucent could have no expectation that it would collect $53 million for the switching equipment because the parties had orally agreed that AWS would receive an offsetting credit. This meant that the collection of the sales price was not reasonably assured, and the criteria for recognizing revenue under CON 5 were not satisfied.
The Complaint further alleges that both Carter and Hayes-Bullock knowingly or recklessly engaged in this fraudulent conduct, as a result of which, Lucent materially overstated pre-tax income by $53 million in its financial statements filed with the SEC in Form 10-Q for its third quarter of fiscal year 2000. It also charges that both Carter and Hayes-Bullock knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that, as a result of their fraudulent conduct, Lucent filed materially false financial statements.
Based on these allegations, plaintiff alleges four counts against Carter and Hayes-Bullock: Count One of the Complaint alleges that Carter and Hayes-Bullock violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), Rule 10b-5, and that they are also liable for aiding and abetting Lucent in violating such laws. Count Three alleges that Carter and Hayes-Bullock aided and abetted Lucent in violating Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, Rules 12b-20, 13a-11 and 13a-13 by causing Lucent to file materially false and misleading financial statements in the fiscal year 2000. Count Four alleges that Carter and Hayes-Bullock aided and abetted Lucent in violating Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act by causing Lucent's books and records to be inaccurate and by assisting in Lucent's failure to maintain sufficient internal accounting controls. Count Five alleges that Carter and Hayes-Bullock violated Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act by knowingly circumventing Lucent's system of internal accounting controls and knowingly falsifying, or causing to be falsified, Lucent's books and records.
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a court is required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and to view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir.2002). The question is whether the claimant can prove any set of facts consistent with his or her allegations that will entitle him or her to relief, not whether that person will ultimately prevail. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).
While a court will accept well-plead allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, it will not accept unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegation. See Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 27 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977). Moreover, the claimant must set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claims or...
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