S. H. Oil & Royalty Co. v. Texas & New Orleans R. Co.

Decision Date20 September 1956
Docket NumberNo. 6048,6048
Citation295 S.W.2d 227
CourtTexas Court of Appeals
PartiesS. H. OIL & ROYALTY COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. TEXAS & NEW ORLEANS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.

Lawler, Childress & Crady, Strong, Baker & Compton, Houston, for appellants.

Baker, Botts, Andrews & Shepherd, Houston, for appellee.

ANDERSON, Justice.

The suit, in form of trespass to try title, was brought by the Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company against S. H. Oil & Royalty Company and Thomas J. Haberle to recover title to and possession of 1.7 acres of land in Chambers County, a part of the William Bloodgood Survey. The defendants answered by pleas of not guilty. The plaintiff prevailed in a trial before the court, and the defendants appealed. As was proper in the circumstances, the appeals were originally perfected to the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals, and the case was then transferred to this court by the Supreme Court.

The land that is involved lies within the boundaries of appellee's railroad right of way and the real matter in issue is that of whether appellee owns that land in fee or only has an easement in and over it. The answer to the question is dependent upon the manner in which a deed in the common chain of title of the parties is construed.

Both the plaintiff and the defendants claim title under an agreed common source, A. M. Fisher, who, under date of July 10, 1917, conveyed to R. S. Sterling by general warranty deed 11.4 acres of land, of which the land in controversy is a part. R. S. Sterling, in turn, by deed dated November 8, 1919, conveyed the same 11.4 acres to Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Company, representing in his deed of conveyance that legal title to the land had been acquired and held by him in trust for the grantee railway company. In each of the mentioned deeds, appropriate reference having been first made to the survey in which it was situated, the land was described by metes and bounds as follows:

'Commencing at the NE corner of the A. M. Fisher tract; Thence South 79 deg. 48 min. W. along the north line of the Bloodgood survey 426.7 feet to a point on the westerly right of way line of the D. & G. C. R. R., said point being 50 feet from the center line of said railroad measured at right angles thereto; Thence South 5 deg. E. 50 feet from and parallel to said center line 1011.7 feet to a point on the south line of the A. M. Fisher tract; Thence north 79 deg. 36 min. E. with the south line of the A. M. Fisher tract 553.2 feet to she SE corner of the A. M. Fisher tract; Thence North 12 deg. 18 min. W. 1008 feet to the place of beginning, containing 11.4 acres.'

Two days after acquiring the deed from R. S. Sterling, or under date of November 10, 1919, Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Company executed and delivered to Humble Oil & Refining Company an oil, gas and mineral lease on the entire 11.4 acres, the land being described as it was in the aforesaid deeds. The lease was an ordinary commercial-type lease that provided for payment in kind of an oil royalty of one-sixth of all oil produced and saved, and for payment in money for all gas produced and sold. For want of production of oil, gas or other minerals in the meantime, the lease lapsed under its own terms at the expiration of the five-year primary term for which it was granted. It was formally released of record by Humble Oil & Refining Company under date of May 15, 1950.

After the aforesaid lease had come into being and while it was still in force, Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Company, under date of January 10, 1922, executed and delivered to R. S. Sterling the deed the effect of which is now in dispute. The deed contained conventional granting and habendum clauses, and, insofar as material here, described the premises conveyed by it as follows:

'All that certain tract of land out of the William Bloodgood Survey, bounded and described as follows, viz.: Beginning at the north-east corner of the A. M. Fisher tract; thence South 79 degrees 48 minutes West along the North line of the Bloodgood Survey 326.3 feet to a point on the East line of the right of way, of D. G. C. Railway track, which point lies 50 feet East of and at right angles to the center line of the main line of said railway; thence South 5 degrees East along the said East line of the right of way of said railway and 50 feet distant from the center line of said main line, 1011.7 feet to corner on the south line of the said A. M. Fisher tract; thence North 79 degrees 36 minutes East with the South line of the said A. M. Fisher tract 452.8 feet to corner; thence North 12 degrees 18 minutes East 1008 feet to the place of beginning, and containing nine and 7/10 (9.7) acres of land, and being all that certain tract conveyed to R. S. Sterling by A. M. Fisher by deed recorded in Vol. 8, page 93, et seq., Deed Records of Chambers County, Texas, save and except the 100 foot right of way of said railway off the west side of said tract, which right of way 100 feet wide is reserved by said railway and is not hereby conveyed.'

The deed also contained the following provision, the effect of which is disputed:

'The said Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Company has heretofore executed an oil, gas and mineral lease upon the above described premises to the Humble Oil & Refining Company, and said Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Company hereby conveys to the said R. S. Sterling, Grantee, all of its royalties, rights, interests and estates in or under said lease, hereby transferring to the said R. S. Sterling all and every right which it has in or under said lease.'

Appellee Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company owns whatever title Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Company retained to the land in controversy after making the deed of January 10, 1922, to R. S. Sterling, having acquired it by deed dated June 30, 1934. Appellants claim through or under R. S. Sterling, and we shall assume for present purposes that between them they own whatever title Sterling acquired to the land by the aforesaid deed of January 10, 1922.

For what it is worth, the parties stipulated that from the time he acquired legal title to the land from A. M. Fisher on July 10, 1917, until he received from Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Company the deed of January 10, 1922, R. S. Sterling was president of Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Company and the owner of all of its stock, and was at the same time chief executive officer of Humble Oil & Refining Company, either as president of the company or as chairman of its board of directors.

Appellants make three contentions on appeal: (1) That as a matter of law, though not in fact, the specific or metes-and-bounds description in the deed from Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Company to R. S. Sterling included the land that was in the right of way, as a result of which the deed vested in the grantee fee simple title to the land, burdened with only an easement in favor of the grantor. (2) That, in the alternative, the general description by which the land that was the subject of conveyance was described in the deed as being 'all that certain tract conveyed to R. S. Sterling by A. M. Fisher by deed recorded in Vol. 8, page 93, et seq., Deed Records of Chambers County, Texas, save and except the 100 foot right of way of said railway off the west side of said tract,' should be given controlling effect over the specific or metes-and-bounds description, and that on this basis the deed should be held to have conveyed the fee in the entire 11.4 acres of land described in the Fisher-Sterling deed, subject to an easement in the right of way. (3) That, irrespective of how other portions of the deed are...

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2 cases
  • Greenwood v. Lee
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • September 28, 2012
    ...either a right of passage or the right-of-way strip of land itself.” Id. (citing S.H. Oil & Royalty Co. v. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co., 295 S.W.2d 227, 230–31 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Therefore, the court concluded, the only reasonable reading of “easement and right......
  • Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 4, 1988
    ...meaning: it may denote either a right of passage or the right-of-way strip of land itself. S.H. Oil & Royalty Co. v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co., 295 S.W.2d 227, 230-31 (Tex.Civ.App.1956). However, an easement does not convey the property itself. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 1 S.W.2d at 600......

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