S. J. C., In re

Decision Date19 March 1975
Docket NumberNo. 6429,6429
Citation521 S.W.2d 286
PartiesIn the Matter of S.J.C.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Trenchard, Davis & Hardwick, Clifford J. Hardwick, Odessa, for appellant.

Bill McCoy, County Atty., Alex LeFeuvre, Mike Atkins, Asst. County Attys., Odessa, for appellee.

OPINION

STEPHEN F. PRESLAR, Chief Justice.

Appellant was found by the Court, sitting without a jury, to be a juvenile delinquent and was committed to the care, custody and control of the Texas Youth Council. The verdict that he engaged in delinquent conduct is based entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, so the question presented is whether the Appellant can be found delinquent on the testimony of an accomplice in view of Vernon's Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.14.

The case against Appellant arose out of an armed robbery of a business establishment in which $125.00 cash was taken. The only evidence linking Appellant to the armed robbery is that of the testimony of the accomplice witness, who was in fact found by the Court to be an accomplice witness. The trial Court also found as a fact that there was no evidence which corroborated the testimony of the accomplice witness, and the trial Court found as a matter of law that corroboration of the accomplice's testimony is not required in order to adjudicate a child guilty of having engaged in delinquent conduct. It is this matter of law that is the sole point of error in this case. We are of the opinion that the trial Court's order should be affirmed.

Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a conviction may not follow unless there is corroboration of accomplice testimony, and such corroborating evidence must link the accused to the crime. It is also well established by the case law of Texas that in a criminal proceeding where the testimony of an accomplice is uncorroborated by evidence connecting the defendant with the commission of the crime, then the defendant must be acquitted. Colunga v. State, 481 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Rainey v. State, 401 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.Cr.App.1966); O'Neal v. State, 421 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) . Appellant strongly urges the unfairness, that solely because of an age differential, a juvenile may be found to have engaged in delinquent conduct based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice witness. He cites the basis of the rule requiring corroboration as being that the testimony of an accomplice is considered to be inherently untrustworthy for the reason that he may testify against the defendant in the hope of obtaining clemency for himself. VII Wigmore on Evidence § 2057 (1940, Supp. 1972). Of this we have seen much in the so-called Watergate trials of recent times. Unfair it may be, but it is not violative of the essentials of due process and fair treatment required by the Constitution of this State or the United States. The Legislature of this State in its wisdom has seen fit to set up a statutory procedure to determine whether or not a juvenile is delinquent and if so to provide for his disposition. By other statutes it has prescribed a different procedure for adults in purely criminal trials. What Appellant is asking this Court to do is to let him have the benefits of the juvenile proceedings yet reach into the criminal proceedings and apply Article 38.14 thereof to his case. This we cannot do without changing what the Legislature has done and thus violate the principles of separation of powers. Title 3 of the Texas Family Code and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure exclusively govern all juvenile delinquency proceedings in Texas. Title 3 of the Family Code provides:

'Except when in...

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2 cases
  • S. J. C., Matter of, B--5330
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • January 28, 1976
    ...equal protection. This court of civil appeals did not agree with this contention and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 521 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Civ.App.1975). On August 14, 1974, an armed robbery occurred at a restaurant in Odessa, Texas. An employee on duty at the time of the offense re......
  • M.R.R. v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 17, 1995
    ...1980, no writ). The legislature incorporated fundamental due process rights into Title 3 of the Family Code. In re S.J.C., 521 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1975), aff'd, 533 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.1976) (reviewing other issues), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835, 97 S.Ct. 101, 50 L.Ed.2d 100 (1......

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