S.L.R. v. State
| Decision Date | 07 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-1081,94-1081 |
| Citation | 652 So.2d 978 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D857 S.L.R., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Sean K. Ahmed, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
The police, who had the motel room of Antwon Green under surveillance for suspected drug activity, observed S.L.R. enter the room at around 11:00 p.m. and leave about one minute later. She was approached in the parking lot as she was leaving by two agents who identified themselves as narcotics officers, one of whom asked if he could ask her a few questions. She agreed.
The arresting officer testified that the following then took place:
I told her at that point we were conducting a surveillance on Room 219; and that the individual in that room was a black male known as Antwon Green, he was suspected of dealing in narcotics, specifically crack. I advised her that we had just observed her enter into the room and leave about a minute later. I then advised her it's against the law to possess crack cocaine or any type of controlled substance and if she had any controlled substance on her person, I would like her to give it to me.
S.L.R. answered "yeah" and produced a ziplock bag containing crack cocaine. At her juvenile trial, she was found guilty but adjudication was withheld and she was placed on community control.
S.L.R. urges that the trial court erred in admitting the cocaine because the consensual stop became a "seizure" based on the conduct of the officers. It appears to be her position that when the officer stated that he would like her to give him any controlled substance that she might have, it was "a show of authority" which restrained her freedom of movement. She maintains that she turned over the cocaine only because she thought she had to comply with his request.
The issue before us is whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that S.L.R. voluntarily agreed to comply with the officer's request that she turn over any "controlled substance" that she might have in her possession. In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), the Supreme Court stated:
[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting an individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual ... and request consent to search ... as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their request is required.
In the instant case, the officers' initial contact with the appellant when they approached her in the parking lot and asked if they could speak with her was consensual. Their actions and her agreement to answer their questions was an appropriate police/citizen encounter. Moreover, defense counsel conceded at trial that there was nothing wrong with the initial stop. But did the officer's subsequent request that S.L.R. turn over any controlled substance cross the line?
The United States Supreme Court faced a similar issue in Bostick and defined "the appropriate inquiry" as "whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 429, 111 S.Ct. at 2383. In discussing whether a defendant's cooperation with the police is voluntary, the court stated:
"Consent" that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they are coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to refuse.
Id. at 438, 111 S.Ct. at 2388. In the instant case, S.L.R. does not contend that her path was blocked or that she was in any way prevented from merely walking away. So where is the intimidation, the harassment, or the coercion in this case?
The court in Thames v. State, 592 So.2d 733,...
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