O.S.T ex rel. G.T. v. Blueshield
Citation | 335 P.3d 416,181 Wash.2d 691 |
Decision Date | 09 October 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 88940–6.,88940–6. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | O.S.T, by and through his parents, G.T. and E.S.; and L.H., by and through his parents, M.S. and K.H., each on his own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Respondents, v. Regence BLUESHIELD, a Washington corporation, Appellant. |
Timothy James Parker, Jason Wayne Anderson, Gregory Mann Miller, Carney Badley Spellman PS, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
Eleanor Hamburger, Richard E. Spoonemore, Sirianni Youtz Spoonemore Hamburger, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Today's controversy arises from the enactment of two laws: the neurodevelopmental therapies mandate, RCW 48.44.450, and the mental health parity act, RCW 48.44.341. In 1989, the Washington Legislature mandated coverage for neurodevelopmental therapies (neurodevelopmental therapies or NDT) (speech, occupational, and physical therapy) in employer-sponsored group plans for children under age seven (the neurodevelopmental therapies mandate or NDT mandate). RCW 48.44.450. In 2005, the legislature enacted the mental health parity act, which mandates coverage for “mental health services.” RCW 48.44.341. We hold that the statutes do not conflict—neurodevelopmental therapies may constitute “mental health services” if the therapies are medically necessary to treat a mental disorder identified in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th rev. ed.2000) (DSM–IV–TR). Therefore, the blanket exclusions of neurodevelopmental therapies in the plaintiffs' health contracts are void and unenforceable.
The two named plaintiffs in this case are O.S.T. and L.H. O.S.T. was six years old at the time this law suit commenced. When he was just six months old, he began having difficulties feeding and was diagnosed with a feeding disorder. Problems with O.S.T.'s health worsened as he got older. “He went from having normal language development to nearly no language at all.” By his third birthday, therapists believed that O.S.T. was autistic. Between 2006 and 2008 he received speech, physical, and occupational therapy from Boyer Children's Clinic.1 After leaving the Boyer Children's Clinic, he continued to receive neurodevelopmental therapies from Children's Communication Corner; the Hearing, Speech and Deafness Center; and Seattle Children's Hospital. In 2009, the autism
diagnosis was confirmed following an evaluation with Seattle Children's Hospital.
The second named plaintiff, L.H., was two years old when this suit began. He is diagnosed with expressive language disorder
, myotubular myopathy, profound hypotonia, and severe hydrocephalus. He receives speech, occupational, and physical therapy from Boyer Children's Clinic.
Both plaintiffs either are or have been insured under health policies issued by Regence BlueShield that contain blanket exclusions for neurodevelopmental therapies. Regence BlueShield did not cover O.S.T.'s therapies, so O.S.T.'s parents paid for the services. It is unclear whether Regence BlueShield denied any of L.H.'s claims.
The plaintiffs filed a class-action complaint, alleging breach of contract; declaratory relief; violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW; and seeking injunctive relief. Judge Erlick granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on December 12, 2012. He held that “any provisions contained in Regence BlueShield policies issued and delivered to Plaintiffs O.S.T. and L.H. on or after January 1, 20082 that exclude coverage of neurodevelopmental therapies regardless of medical necessity are declared invalid, void and unenforceable by Defendant and its agents.” He further certified the order for interlocutory review under RAP 2.3(b)(4). The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review, and we accepted transfer.
We hold the neurodevelopmental therapies mandate and the mental health parity act do not conflict. The mental health parity act requires insurers to provide NDT coverage in individual plans when the therapies are medically necessary to treat mental disorders recognized in the DSM–IV–TR if the insurance contract covers medical and surgical services.3 We also affirm the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment.
We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We use that same standard to review grants of summary judgment. Camicia v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 179 Wash.2d 684, 693, 317 P.3d 987 (2014).
Our fundamental goal in statutory interpretation is to “discern and implement the legislature's intent.” State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). If a statute's meaning is plain on its face, we “give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.”Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d at 9–10, 43 P.3d 4. We derive the plain meaning from the language of the statute and related statutes. Id. “When the plain language is unambiguous—that is, when the statutory language admits of only one meaning—the legislative intent is apparent, and we will not construe the statute otherwise.” State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). However, when the statute is ambiguous or there are conflicting provisions, “we may arrive at the legislature's intent by applying recognized principles of statutory construction.” Id.
We begin with an analysis of the plain language of the NDT mandate. The legislature passed the mandate in 1989. Laws of 1989, ch. 345; RCW 48.44.450. It provides:
RCW 48.44.450 (emphasis added).
The plain language of the mandate suggests legislative intent to expand coverage for therapies, but to do so in a limited way. It mandated expanded coverage only for group insurance plans and, within those plans, only for children under age seven. Id.
Sixteen years later, the legislature enacted another mandate, which requires health insurers to provide coverage for “mental health services.” See RCW 48.44.341. The legislature passed the mandate after finding that the cost of leaving mental disorders untreated is significant. See Laws of 2005, ch. 6, § 1. Costs include:
The mental health parity act provides:
RCW 48.44.341. The legislature defined “mental health services” as “medically necessary outpatient and inpatient services provided to treat mental disorders covered by the diagnostic categories listed in the most current version of the diagnostic and statistical manual of disorders....” RCW 48.44.341(1).7
The language of the mental health parity act evidences legislative intent to require health insurers to cover treatment for mental health disorders and to do so in parity with the medical and surgical services it covers. Expressive language disorder and autistic disorder
are mental disorders recognized in the DSM–IV–TR at pages 58–61 and 70–75. By the plain language of the mental health parity act, the legislature did not create an exception for autism (or expressive language disorder ) or the neurodevelopmental therapies that treat these disorders. See RCW 48.44.341(1). Therefore, under the language of the statute, the mental health parity act requires coverage for medically necessary neurodevelopmental therapies if they are used to treat a mental disorder recognized in the DSM–IV–TR.
The NDT mandate and mental health parity act are unambiguous and do not conflict.8 The scope of each is different. One statute addresses neurodevelopmental therapies generally and does not require that they be used to treat a mental disorder recognized in the DSM–IV–TR. See RCW 48.44.450. The other broadly mandates coverage for all medically necessary treatment for mental disorders recognized in the DSM–IV–TR, except as expressly excluded (provided the contract covers medical and surgical services). See RCW 48.44.341(1), (2).
Under the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the NDT mandate creates a minimum level of required coverage for neurodevelopmental therapies. However, when neurodevelopmental therapies are medically necessary to treat mental disorders in the DSM–IV–TR, the mental health parity act requires additional coverage. Insurers must meet the requirements of both acts.9
Regence BlueShield makes several failing arguments. It first argues that neurodevelopmental therapies are an exception to the mental health parity act. It arrives at this conclusion using the statutory maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Applying this maxim, Regence BlueShield argues that the NDT mandate has both positive and...
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