S.O. v. Carlisle School District, No. 8-917/07-2096 (Iowa App. 3/11/2009)
| Decision Date | 11 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 8-917/07-2096,8-917/07-2096 |
| Parties | S.O., J.O., and E.O., by and through their father, J.O. Sr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CARLISLE SCHOOL DISTRICT, VALERIE McCHAUGHEY and DR. TOM LANE, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Peter A. Keller, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's ruling granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' action was barred by the statute of limitations.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Ron Danks and Phillip H. Myers of Myers, Myers & Danks, Pleasantville, and Brett J. Beattie of Beattie Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Amy R. Teas and Patrick D. Smith of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Doyle, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's ruling granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' action was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in holding that: (1) plaintiffs' claims premised upon the civil liability provisions of Iowa Code section 232.75(2) (2005) were barred by the limitations period set forth in chapter 670; (2) the continuing tort doctrine did not apply to defendants McChaughey and Lane's alleged failure to report; and (3) chapter 670 does not violate the Iowa and United States equal protection clauses when read to omit the minor tolling provision of section 614.8(2). Upon our review, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.
On November 30, 2006, plaintiffs S.O., J.O., and E.O., minors and siblings (collectively hereinafter "plaintiffs"), filed suit by and through their father, J.O. Sr., against the Carlisle School District ("School District") and two of its employees: Valerie McChaughey, a licensed teacher, and Dr. Tom Lane, a principal and licensed administrator (collectively hereinafter "defendants"). Plaintiffs' petition alleged the following facts: During the 2001-02 school year, plaintiff S.O. was a kindergartner in McChaughey's class in the school district. While under McChaughey's supervision, S.O. was repeatedly involved in improper sexual contact with another kindergartner during naptime. The improper sexual contact was reported to Lane by the foster mother of the other student involved in the contact, and McChaughey subsequently learned of the report. Lane and McChaughey failed to investigate the improper sexual contact and failed to report the contact to S.O.'s parents. S.O. did not disclose the improper sexual conduct he was subjected to in kindergarten until approximately eighteen months after Lane and McChaughey learned of the contact (approximately September 2003). As a result of the sexual activity engaged in while S.O. was a student in McChaughey's classroom, S.O. experienced severe emotional, social, and educational difficulties.
Based upon these alleged facts, plaintiffs' petition specifically asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty (Count I) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III) against defendants, and a claim of negligent supervision (Count II) against the School District. Plaintiffs sought punitive damages for each of these claims. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged McChaughey and Lane were civilly liable pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.75(2) for damages proximately caused by their failure to report the alleged abuse as required under chapter 232.1
On September 13, 2007, defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. Defendants argued that plaintiffs' claims were governed by Iowa Code chapter 670 and its corresponding statute of limitations, as clarified by the Iowa Supreme Court in Rucker v. Humboldt Community School District, 737 N.W.2d 292, 293 (Iowa 2007). Because plaintiffs did not provide timely written notice of their claims, defendants argued that plaintiffs had two years from the date of S.O.'s injury to file their suit. Since plaintiffs alleged S.O.'s injuries occurred during the 2001-02 school year, but did not file suit until 2006, defendants asserted that plaintiffs' suit was barred by the statute of limitations.
On September 28, 2007, plaintiffs filed their resistance, arguing that their suit was not barred by the statute of limitations. Regarding their section 232.75 claims, plaintiffs first asserted that the statute of limitations provisions of chapter 670 were not applicable to chapter 232. Plaintiffs further argued that even if chapter 670 applied to their section 232.75 claims, McChaughey's and Lane's failure to report the alleged sexual conduct constituted a continuing wrongful tort, and consequently, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until McChaughey and Lane reported the conduct. Additionally, plaintiffs maintained that the School District was vicariously liable for its employees' failure to meet their duties under Chapter 232 under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Regarding all of their claims, plaintiffs argued that chapter 670 violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Iowa and United States Constitutions unless it was interpreted to include the minor tolling provision of Iowa Code section 614.8(2).
On November 14, 2007, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded chapter 670 governed actions against a school district and its employees brought under chapter 232, and therefore chapter 670 provided the requisite statute of limitations, as interpreted by case law. The court determined defendants' failure to report the alleged conduct was not a continuous tort. The court further held the minor tolling provisions of chapter 614 did not apply to plaintiffs' claims and such holding was constitutional. The court concluded that because plaintiffs' alleged injury occurred sometime during 2001-02 and plaintiffs became aware of the injury sometime in 2003, yet did not file their action until 2006, their action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs appeal.
We review the district court's summary judgment rulings for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Alliant Energy-Interstate Power & Light Co. v. Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); Walderbach v. Archdiocese of Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Iowa 2007). A fact question arises if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved. Walderbach, 730 N.W.2d at 199. "No fact question exists if the only dispute concerns the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts." McNertney v. Kahler, 710 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs first argue that the district court erred in holding that their claims against McChaughey and Lane premised upon the civil liability provisions of Iowa Code section 232.75(2) were barred by the limitations period set forth in chapter 670. Plaintiffs maintain chapter 670 is inapplicable to their section 232.75 claims because McChaughey and Lane are personally liable for failure to report the alleged abuse. Plaintiffs further argue that their chapter 232 claims are outside the scope of chapter 670. For the following reasons, we disagree.
"Iowa Code chapter 670 is the exclusive remedy for torts against municipalities and their employees." Rucker, 737 N.W.2d at 293 (citing Iowa Code § 670.4; City of Cedar Falls v. Cedar Falls Cmty. Sch. Dist., 617 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Iowa 2000)) (emphasis added). The School District is a "municipality" as defined by Iowa Code section 670.1(2). Claims asserted against School District employees acting in their capacity as School District employees are subject to Iowa Code chapter 670. See id. (citing Iowa Code § 670.2).
Section 670.12 provides that employees can be personally liable for claims that are not exempted by section 670.4.2 However, as stated above, if the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment or duties, the claim is subject to chapter 670. Rucker, 737 N.W.2d at 293 (citing Iowa Code § 670.2). There is no provision in chapter 670 that removes claims asserted personally against municipal employees from the scope of chapter 670, if the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment. Thus, if the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment or duties, the claim is subject to chapter 670, even if the employee can be personally liable. The relevant question here is not whether the claims were personal to McChaughey and Lane. Rather, the question is whether McChaughey and Lane were acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly failed to report the alleged sexual abuse.
To protect children from abuse, chapter 232 sets forth requirements for child abuse reporting, assessment, and rehabilitation. See Iowa Code § 232.67; McCracken v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 595 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Iowa 1999). "[T]he provisions relating to child abuse reporting, investigation, and rehabilitation—sections 232.67 through 232.77—are remedial in nature and deserve from us a liberal construction." McCracken, 595 N.W.2d at 784.
Section 232.69 sets forth mandatory reporting requirements for:
Any of the following persons who, in the scope of professional practice or in their employment responsibilities, examines, attends, counsels, or treats a child and reasonably believes a child has suffered abuse:
. . . .
(4) A licensed school employee, certified para-educator, holder of a coaching authorization issued under section 272.31, or an instructor...
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