S. A. v. D. G.

Citation232 A.3d 1110,198 Conn.App. 170
Decision Date16 June 2020
Docket NumberAC 42594
CourtAppellate Court of Connecticut
Parties S. A. v. D. G.

D. G., self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Mark S. Zamarka, with whom, on the brief, was Edward B. O'Connell, New London, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Prescott, Moll and Eveleigh, Js.

PRESCOTT, J.

The defendant, D. G., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting an application for a civil protection order filed pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-16a1 by the plaintiff, S. A., an executive assistant to the first selectman of a Connecticut town. In her application, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant stalked her and caused her to fear for her safety at work and at home. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) excluded evidence on the ground of lack of relevance, (2) issued the protection order despite the fact that the defendant was not arrested for violating any of the statutory provisions set forth in General Statutes § 54-1k,2 (3) issued the protection order partly on the basis of the defendant's having videotaped the plaintiff performing her duties as a public employee, which did not constitute stalking, (4) issued the protection order on the basis of actions that implicated the defendant's exercise of free speech and his right to access public records, and (5) engaged in ex parte communications with the plaintiff. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history.3 The defendant is a town resident. On at least two occasions, once on an unspecified date in the summer of 2018, and again on December 26, 2018, the defendant visited the office of the town's first selectman where the plaintiff worked. The second visit ended with a call to the police, who arrested the defendant for breach of the peace.4

The next day, on December 27, 2018, the plaintiff filed with the court an application for a civil protection order. The affidavit accompanying the application averred that the plaintiff had been working at the office of the first selectman on December 26, 2018, when the defendant presented himself seeking documentation related to a proposed public safety complex in the town. He asked the plaintiff to issue him "a waiver of fees so that he could go to various town departments and request information without being charged the standard fee for copies or taking pictures/scanning information." When the plaintiff informed the defendant that she was not authorized to issue such a waiver but that she would have the first selectman contact him to discuss the matter, the defendant continued to demand the waiver.

The plaintiff began to "feel harassed and then threatened" by the defendant. She asked the defendant to leave, but he became "very agitated," and began yelling, swearing, and pointing at the plaintiff in an aggressive manner. He called the plaintiff a "fucking retard" or said she was "fucking retarded" approximately one dozen times. The plaintiff became frightened and pushed a "panic button" on her desk, which alerted the police department that there was a problem at the town hall.

Employees in a nearby office heard the defendant yelling and called 911. When the defendant realized that the plaintiff had summoned the police, he became "even more agitated, yelling louder and continuing to call [the plaintiff] names and pacing and moving aggressively toward [the plaintiff]," pointing at her and telling her that "it was over for [her]" and that he would treat her in the same manner in the future. The defendant eventually left the office, but the plaintiff was unsure whether he remained elsewhere in the building and was frightened due to the defendant's "increasingly violent behavior."

The plaintiff stated in her affidavit that the defendant had been in her office "many times in the past couple of years." She indicated that she and her coworkers felt nervous and uncomfortable every time the defendant visited the building. She further indicated that she was scared that he would discover her home address and would come to her home because he had done so in the past to other town employees in order to demand information about town business. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant previously had "gotten in trouble" for allegedly assaulting an elderly town employee. Although the plaintiff was unsure whether the defendant owned any weapons, she averred that "he has spoken of the fact that he is a huge supporter of the [second] amendment so I am scared that he does have weapons and that he will use such weapons against me."

The court, Hon. Emmet L. Cosgrove , judge trial referee, conducted a hearing on the application on January 7, 2019. The plaintiff was represented by counsel, and the defendant appeared as a self-represented party. The court first heard the testimony of the plaintiff in support of the allegations in her application. The defendant was permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff, although the court required him to direct his questions to the court, which then posed them to the plaintiff. The defendant did not object to this procedure.

The plaintiff called as additional witnesses both the first selectman and V, an employee of the tax collector's office located down the hall from the first selectman's office. V, who had been working at the time of the December 26, 2018 incident, indicated that she knew of the defendant because she had seen him at the town hall on multiple occasions, including one time when she had spotted him videotaping the activities of the tax collector's office. She testified that, on December 26, 2018, she heard the defendant cursing and screaming at the plaintiff from down the hallway and was concerned enough that she called 911.

The first selectman testified that the defendant was a frequent visitor to the town hall and to town meetings and that "there's an ongoing conflict between [the defendant] and the town no matter what the business is." The first selectman also testified that the plaintiff was frightened of the defendant because of the December 26, 2018 altercation and confirmed that the defendant previously had engaged in a "pushing/shoving match" with another town employee at the town community center. The defendant cross-examined both V and the first selectman.

The defendant waived his privilege against self-incrimination5 and testified briefly on his own behalf but did not call any other witnesses. During his direct testimony, the defendant also sought to play and to admit into evidence audio and/or video recordings of interactions that he purportedly had with the first selectman and with other town employees. The court, after hearing the defendant's offer of proof regarding the content of these recordings and his reasons for offering them, concluded that the recordings involved matters unrelated to the issues before the court and, thus, they were not relevant to its adjudication of the protection order application. The court also declined to admit into evidence a purported transcript that the defendant had created of an audio recording he had made of the December 26, 2018 incident. The court, nevertheless, permitted the defendant to play the recording in open court.6

On cross-examination by the plaintiff, the defendant admitted that he had videotaped town employees in the past, and it was "quite possible" this included the plaintiff. He acknowledged having been asked to leave the town hall on previous occasions. He also stated that he understood the town's policy with respect to copying fees and knew that the plaintiff did not have the authority to grant him a waiver.

In his closing summation, the plaintiff's counsel argued that all statutory requirements for the issuance of a protection order had been met and asked the court to order that the defendant not behave in any physically abusive or threatening manner toward the plaintiff and to stay away from her residence. Recognizing that the town hall was a public building, counsel asked that any protection order issued by the court require the defendant to call and "make an appointment with a specific person or department so that an escort can be arranged to make sure that the visit goes smoothly, and that [the defendant] does not violate, accidentally, any orders that the court might fashion."

The defendant argued in his closing summation that he read § 54-1k as limiting the court's authority to issue a protection order to those instances in which a person has been arrested for violating one of the statutes enumerated in § 54-1k, which he noted did not include an arrest for breach of the peace. Further, he argued that he believed that his interactions with the plaintiff fell "under the umbrella of free speech" or, alternatively, did not constitute either a threat of actual physical harm or stalking, which he asserted was a prerequisite for the issuance of a protection order.

On the basis of its review of the application and accompanying affidavit, and after hearing from the parties, the court found that the requirements of § 46b-16a (a) had been satisfied. See footnote 3 of this opinion. The court then issued the following protection order effective for a period of one year: "[Y]ou will have to surrender any licenses that you hold to own or possess a firearm, or to surrender any firearms that you possess or control. ... [Y]ou may not threaten, harass, stalk, interfere with, [or] abuse the [plaintiff]. ... You must stay away from her home, or anywhere that she may reside .... In light of the fact that she works in a public building ... before you enter the town hall, you must have an appointment set up with an individual in [the] town hall ahead of time [so] that you may be escorted to that particular town hall office. You may contact the first selectman's office in writing or by e-mail or by telephone .... If you violate this order ... it is a separate crime that's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • L. H.-S. v. N. B.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • December 15, 2021
    ...under General Statutes § 46b-15. See, e.g., C. A. v. G. L. , 201 Conn. App. 734, 738–39, 243 A.3d 807 (2020) ; S. A. v. D. G. , 198 Conn. App. 170, 179, 232 A.3d 1110 (2020) ; Kayla M. v. Greene , 163 Conn. App. 493, 504, 136 A.3d 1 (2016). "Thus, we will not disturb a trial court's orders ......
  • Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • May 10, 2022
    ...the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) S. A. v. D. G. , 198 Conn. App. 170, 183, 232 A.3d 1110 (2020).In Bruneau , the plaintiff, who was injured in a motor vehicle crash, offered a letter from her treating physician to her......
  • L. L. v. M. B.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • November 29, 2022
    ...for witnesses). Each provision contains its own set of specific requirements and procedures." (Footnote added.) S. A. v. D. G. , 198 Conn. App. 170, 186, 232 A.3d 1110 (2020).As the plaintiff recognizes in her brief, with respect to the categories of relationships set forth in § 46b-38a, on......
  • Rosario v. Rosario
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • June 16, 2020
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT