A.S. v. Pa. State Police

Decision Date07 March 2014
Citation87 A.3d 914
PartiesA.S., Petitioner v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, Respondent.
CourtPennsylvania Commonwealth Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Anthony J. Petrone, Philadelphia, for petitioner.

Sue Ann Unger, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Philadelphia, for respondent.

BEFORE: PELLEGRINI, President Judge, and McGINLEY, Judge, LEADBETTER, Judge, COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, LEAVITT, Judge, BROBSON, Judge, and McCULLOUGH, Judge.

OPINION BY President Judge PELLEGRINI1.

Before the Court are the cross-motions for summary judgment of A.S. and the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) filed pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1035.22 with respect to A.S.'s Petition for Review in the Nature of a Complaint in Mandamus (Petition) 3 seeking to compel PSP to change his sexual offender registration status under the former Section 9795.1 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1,4 from a lifetime registrant to a ten-year registrant. For the reasons that follow, we grant A.S.'s cross-motion for summary relief and the mandamus relief sought in the Petition and we deny PSP's motion for summary relief.

This action arose out of the interactions between A.S., who was 21 years old at the time of the incident, and a 16–year–old female minor who engaged in consensual sexual relations. Because the age of consent in Pennsylvania is 16, the consensual sex between those individuals was not a crime. SeeSection 3122.1 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1. While it is not a crime to have sex with a 16–year–old minor, somewhat anomalously, it is a crime to photograph or cause to be photographed a 16-year-old having consensual sex and causing a minor to take photographs of herself engaging in the sexual acts. A.S. admitted that he met the victim online, developed a relationship with her which led to consensual sex, and that he persuaded the victim to take photographs of herself in various sexual positions with her digital camera. He also used the minor's digital camera to photograph the two engaging in sexual relations.

As a result of this conduct, A.S. pled guilty in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) to one count of violating Section 6312(b) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(b) (sexual abuse of children), one count of violating Section 6318(a)(5), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(5) (unlawful contact with a minor), and one count of violating Section 6301, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301 (corruption of minors). (Guilty Plea Colloquy, attached to PSP's Memo as Exhibit D4).5 As a result of his guilty pleas, the trial court sentenced A.S. to two concurrent 5– to 23–month terms of imprisonment and a consecutive 5–year probationary term. (Trial/Plea/Sentence Form, attached to PSP's Memo as Exhibit D7; N.T. 2/28/02 6 at 66–67, attached to PSP's Memo as Exhibit D6).

As a collateral consequence of his guilty plea to those charges, the former Section 9795.3 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.3, required the trial court to inform offenders at the time of sentencing of their registration requirements as a sex offender.7 At A.S.'s sentencing, the trial court advised him that he would be subject to the reporting requirements set forth in the former Section 9795.1 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1. (N.T. 2/28/02 at 59–60). The trial court also noted that it did not find A.S. to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) as assessed under the former Section 9795.4, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.4, who were subject to a lifetime registration requirement under the former Section 9795.1(b)(3), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(3).

The sentencing hearing transcript establishes that the trial court, the prosecuting attorney, and A.S. all believed that he would be subject to a ten-year and not a lifetime registration requirement under the former Section 9795.1 of the Sentencing Code. At the hearing, A.S.'s mother testified on his behalf stating, “My son made a mistake, a terrible, terrible error in his life that's affected him. He's been punished. He will be punished. He has a ten-year reporting component to this punishment. (N.T. 2/28/02 at 29–30 (emphasis added)). To this, the trial court responded, “I know.” ( Id. at 30). This statement by A.S.'s mother also supports his contention that, at the time of sentencing, he believed that the collateral consequence of his guilty pleas under Megan's Law II was a ten-year and not a lifetime registration requirement. In addition, while presenting the Commonwealth's position on sentencing, the Assistant District Attorney stated, He's now facing a ten-year registration for Megan's Law. That's true. But why is he facing this ten-year registration? He is because what he did is a serious offense.” ( Id. at 45 (emphasis added)). No appeals were filed.

On August 2, 2002, upon his release from imprisonment, A.S. registered with PSP as a sex offender as required by Megan's Law II. Following the expiration of the ten-year period in August 2012, A.S. sought to have his name removed from the registry. PSP refused to do so, claiming that because A.S. pled guilty to one count each of violating Sections 6312(b) and 6318(a)(5) of the Crimes Code, which are each listed offenses requiring a ten-year registration period under the former Section 9795.1(a)(1) of the Sentencing Code, the former Section 9795.1(b)(1) required a lifetime registration because A.S. was “an individual with two or more convictions of ... the offenses set forth in subsection (a).” Based on PSP's refusal to remove his name from the registry, A.S. filed the instant Petition in this Court and the parties filed cross-petitions for summary relief.8

A.S. argues that he is entitled to summary relief because the offenses to which he pled guilty stemmed from a single criminal act, criminal episode or course of conduct, i.e., causing the photographing of a minor in a sexual act and only require a ten-year registration under the former Section 9795.1(a)(1). He contends that the enhancement provision of the former Section 9795.1(b)(1), requiring lifetime registration for multiple offenses, only applies to those convicted of separate acts of misconduct that lead to more than one criminal conviction, i.e., repeat offenders and recidivists. A.S. claims that the former Section 9795.1(b)(1) should not apply to individuals who only engage in a single act of misconduct that, by statute and prosecutorial discretion, results in multiple criminal charges and convictions. He asserts that his guilty pleas to the two enumerated offenses in the former Section 9795.1(a)(1) should be treated as a single conviction and not as two or more convictions for purposes of the former subsection (b)(1). As a result, A.S. argues that it is improper for PSP to classify him as a lifetime registrant. He asserts that to hold otherwise would violate the Equal Protection Clause because disparate registration classifications would emerge for similarly-situated defendants based solely on the charging decisions made by prosecutors.

In opposition to A.S.'s motion and in support of its own, PSP argues that it properly designated A.S. as a lifetime registrant under the former Section 9795.1(b)(1). PSP claims that the language of the former subsection (b)(1) is clear and that A.S. is subject to its provisions because he is “an individual with two or more convictions of any of the offenses set forth in subsection (a).” PSP asserts that the acts underlying the crimes are of no consequence; if the defendant is convicted of two or more crimes set forth in subsection (a)(1), he or she is a lifetime registrant under subsection (b)(1). Because A.S. is such a defendant, PSP contends that he cannot show a clear right to have his lifetime registrant designation changed and is, therefore, not entitled to mandamus relief.

The question here is whether A.S.'s guilty pleas to two separate crimes involving photographs of the same minor were one or two convictions for the purpose of the sex offender registration requirements contained in the former Section 9795.1 of the Sentencing Code. If the guilty plea is considered to be one conviction for this purpose, then under that provision, A.S. is only required to register as a sex offender for ten years under the former subsection (a)(1), but if they are considered to be two convictions, he would be subject to the lifetime registration requirement of the former subsection (b)(1).

In Commonwealth v. Gehris, 618 Pa. 104, 54 A.3d 862 (2012), a defendant, Patrick Gehris, began corresponding with what he believed to be a 19-year-old female in an internet chat room in October 2006. The female was actually a PSP officer trained to pose as a teenager to collect evidence and investigate sexual predators. In early 2007, Gehris's exchanges included requests to meet younger girls 11– to 13–years old that the PSP officer might know and that he fantasized about having sex with the two girls. Gehris wrote that he wanted to talk to the younger girl on the phone and asked the PSP officer to send him pictures of the younger girl. Gehris e-mailed the PSP officer photos of his face and shoulders and sent a digital camera containing pictures of his penis to an address that he had been given. About ten days later, Gehris called a number that he had been given and spoke with the PSP officer posing as the 19–year–old and another officer posing as a 13–year–old girl. During the conversation, Gehris asked for a picture of the younger girl's breasts and arranged a meeting at a motel approximately 200 miles from his residence with both of the girls to take place on February 19, 2007. Gehris suggested to the younger girl that she have some alcohol beforehand to relax herself. Gehris arrived at the motel at the arranged date and time, but turned his vehicle around in the parking lot and attempted to leave when he was arrested by PSP.

In April 2007, Gehris was charged with six crimes:

• unlawful contact with a minor to engage in involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in violation of Section 6318(a)(1) of the...

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