Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cnty.
| Citation | 538 F.Supp.3d 1243 |
| Decision Date | 11 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:16cv93-MW/GRJ |
| Parties | SABAL TRAIL TRANSMISSION, LLC, Plaintiff, v. 18.27 ACRES OF LAND IN LEVY COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Bruce M. Harris, Felecia Grossman Ziegler, Gordon Huie Harris, Edgar Lopez, Harris Harris Bauerle Ziegler Lopez, Kurtis T. Bauerle, Gray Harris & Robinson PA, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff.
Andrew Prince Brigham, Christopher C. Bucalo, Edward Scott Copeland, Trevor S. Hutson, Brigham Property Rights Law Firm, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendants Lee A. Thomas as Successor Sole Trustee of the Trust Agreement for Lee A. Thomas Dated October 1 2003, Lee A. Thomas as Successor Sole Trustee of the Trust Agrement for Beverly J. Thomas Dated October 1 2003, Ryan B. Thomas.
Kimberly Anne Lopez, Akerman LLP, Orlando, FL, for Defendant PNC Bank National Association.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 1
This Court previously held that state substantive law governs the measure of compensation in eminent domain cases brought by private parties against private property owners under the Natural Gas Act. Accordingly, Florida's full compensation measure applies here, which includes reasonable attorney's fees. See Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const. () (emphasis added); Joseph B. Doerr Trust v. Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth. , 177 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2015) ().
Several courts have reached the same conclusion—that state substantive law governs the measure of compensation—both before and after this Court conducted its analysis. See, e.g., Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement , 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019) ; Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement , 962 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1992) ; Sabal Trail Transmission LLC v. Real Estate , 2018 WL 2305768 (M.D. Ga. May 21, 2018) ; Equitrans LP v. Real Estate , 2017 WL 1455023 (N.D.W.V. Apr. 21, 2017).
Without waiving its argument that this Court decided this issue incorrectly, Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ motion for costs and fees, asserting, among other things, that Defendants improperly seek additional fees beyond the "benefits-achieved" amount allowed under Florida law, and that federal law—not Florida law—provides the governing standard for awarding reasonable costs.2 This Court will address fees and costs in turn, beginning with a discussion of how Florida law determines the amount of attorney's fees as a component of "full compensation" pursuant to section 73.092, Florida Statutes, and the amount of fees to which Defendants are entitled.
In eminent domain proceedings, Florida law provides "the measure to set an award of fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client." City of North Miami Beach v. Reed , 863 So. 2d 351, 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 73.092(1)(a) defines "benefits" as "the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney." § 73.092(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The statute sets a sliding scale, taking into consideration the "benefits achieved," to calculate attorney's fees. Eligible fee awards include 33% of any benefit up to $250,000, plus 25% of any portion of the benefit between $250,000 and $1 million. See § 73.092(1)(c) 1.- 2., Fla. Stat.
" Section 73.092 is intended to promote settlements and deter litigation." Seminole Cnty. v. Coral Gables Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 691 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Accordingly, when "the condemning authority acknowledges there has been a taking from the outset," it may preserve a statutory right to limit the landowner's attorney's fee award by making a written offer of settlement. Reed , 863 So. 2d at 354. Thus, the higher the last written offer of settlement relative to the final judgment, the lower the potential "benefit" and resulting fee award.
Finally, additional fees may be awarded in cases where the opposing party has dragged the property owner through "excessive litigation." See Doerr , 177 So. 3d at 1219 (). However, this is not Defendants’ position. ECF No. 283 at 21-27.
As an initial matter, the parties have agreed upon the calculation, based on the statutory sliding scale, and the amount of "benefits achieved" fees totaling $220,391 . This is based on a benefit achieved totaling $801,564 (the difference between the final judgment of $861,264 and the last written offer before Defendants hired an attorney of $59,700). Applying the statutory sliding scale to this "benefit achieved" yields $82,500 (33% of $250,000) plus $137,891 (25% of ($801,564 - $250,000 = $551,564)) for a total "benefits achieved" fee award of $220,391. See ECF No. 281 at 3 n.1. Accordingly, based on the parties’ agreement and the application of section 73.092(1)(c), Florida Statutes, Defendants’ motion, ECF No. 283, is GRANTED as to the amount of "benefits achieved" attorney's fees totaling $220,391 as a component of Defendants’ full compensation.
This Court will not pass on the issue of whether Defendants are entitled to additional fees under section 73.092(2) due to "excessive litigation," because Defendants do not claim to have been the victims of such tactics. Instead, as will be explained in more detail below, Defendants seek to squeeze this exception to the statutory percentage cap on fees into a different box with a different label, claiming they are entitled to fees for "supplemental proceedings" that were actually just a part of the original action. This Court is impelled to reiterate that the corollary, under Florida law, to allowing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings is that the condemning authority has a statutory right to limit that recovery by engaging in good faith settlement negotiations and providing a written settlement offer. Section 73.092(1) applies in this case because Plaintiff made a written offer of settlement—effectively limiting the amount of fees Defendants can recover. As this Court has already explained, Defendants are entitled to fees based upon the "benefits achieved," which encompasses the success obtained in the original proceeding, and all work that Defendants put into litigating their case—including early matters regarding choice of law and whether this case would be tried by a jury. Such matters are not "supplemental proceedings." They are simply the natural result of Defendants’ well-fought defense of this case.
Aside from the "benefits achieved" award under section 73.092(1)(c), a landowner may also pursue "fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for ...." § 73.092(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). This is where the parties’ agreement ends in this case. Defendants do not seek fees incurred for defeating an order of taking or for apportionment. Instead, Defendants seek additional fees for "pre-trial supplemental proceedings," totaling $27,610, and fees for "post-trial supplemental proceedings," totaling $84,107.50. Both amounts are the result of an hourly lodestar calculation taking into consideration factors set out in section 73.092(2).3
Defendants assert the "pre-trial supplemental proceedings" relate to counsel's work in successfully litigating two issues for their clients; namely, whether this case would proceed to trial before a commission or a jury, and whether federal or state substantive law controls the measure of compensation. ECF No. 281 at 4 n.2. Defendants note that when attorney's fees are incurred for required proceedings that do not result in a monetary benefit upon which to base a fee award, section 73.092(2) applies to determine the "reasonable amount of attorneys’ [fees] for the primary fee or additional supplemental fees." ECF No. 283 at 22. Defendants claim the best support for their position that this pre-trial work is separately compensable is the language of section 73.092(2).
Plaintiff opposes any pre-trial fee award under section 73.092(2) on the basis that this pre-trial work is already accounted for under the "benefits achieved" award. Plaintiff argues that "supplemental proceedings" in eminent domain actions generally "occur post-judgment and address rights resulting from the judgment, such as apportionment of the compensation." ECF No. 290 at 9. Moreover, Plaintiff claims, the two pre-trial issues that Defendants rely on for an award of supplemental proceeding fees were a "fundamental part of the proceedings that led to the final order of taking," and thus are not additionally compensable. Id. (quoting Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Shea , 86 So. 3d 582, 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ). As alluded to earlier, this Court agrees with Plaintiff.
The question is whether pre-trial litigation in the original eminent domain action concerning the issue of trial by jury and the law governing the measure of compensation can be construed as "supplemental proceedings" for which fees are "not otherwise provided" under Chapter 73, Florida Statutes. The answer is no. To reach this answer, this Court looks to how Florida courts have interpreted this statute in determining...
To continue reading
Request your trial