Joseph B. Doerr Trust v. Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth.
Decision Date | 05 November 2015 |
Docket Number | No. SC14–1007.,SC14–1007. |
Citation | 177 So.3d 1209 |
Parties | JOSEPH B. DOERR TRUST, et al., Petitioners, v. CENTRAL FLORIDA EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY, et al., Respondents. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Craig B. Willis and Joe W. Fixel of Fixel & Willis, Tallahassee, FL; and Major Best Harding of Ausley & McMullen, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioners.
Beverly A. Pohl of Broad and Cassel, Fort Lauderdale, FL; Richard Nash Milian and Edgar Lopez of Broad and Cassel, Orlando, FL, for Respondents.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Orlando/Orange County Expressway v. Tuscan Ridge, LLC (Tuscan Ridge II), 137 So.3d 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). In the decision, the district court ruled upon a question that it certified to be of great public importance. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Article X, section 6, of the Florida Constitution governs eminent domain. Subsection (a) of that provision states that "[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner."
This case involves an award of attorney's fees in an eminent domain proceeding. The award of such fees is governed by section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2014),1 which provides, in pertinent part:
The Orlando–Orange County Expressway Authority, now the Central Florida Expressway Authority (the Authority),2 began a condemnation proceeding to acquire 9.81 acres of land identified as Parcel 406. Orlando/Orange Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. Tuscan Ridge, LLC (Tuscan Ridge I ), 84 So.3d 410, 411 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Parcel 406 was owned by Joseph B. Doerr, as Trustee of The Joseph B. Doerr Revocable Living Trust dated 9/9/94 (Doerr). Id. In December 2005, Doerr conveyed fifteen percent of the Trust's interest in the land to Ministry Systems, Inc. (Ministry), but the transfer was not recorded until July 31, 2006. Id.
On June 5, 2006, the Authority submitted to Doerr a presuit written offer to purchase Parcel 406 for $4,914,221. Id. Doerr rejected the offer, and in August 2006, the Authority filed an action to condemn the property. Id.3 In February 2008, a jury trial was held to determine the value of Parcel 406. Id. at 412. The jury found that the land had a fair market value of $5,744,830. Id.
Thereafter, Doerr and Ministry (collectively the Landowners) filed a motion for attorney's fees. Id. The Authority sought to limit the fees to the benefits achieved formula under section 73.092(1), which generated an award of $227,652.25. Id. On the other hand, the Landowners asserted that they were entitled to attorney's fees under section 73.092(2), which requires a trial court to consider qualitative and quantitative factors in determining the amount of a fee award. Id. The trial court awarded fees under subsection (2) because it concluded that the Authority's presuit written offer was insufficient to calculate the benefits achieved by each Landowner in the final judgment so as to permit a fee award under subsection (1). Id. at 414. Applying the factors listed in section 73.092(2), the trial court awarded the Landowners $816,000 in attorney's fees for the proceedings that involved the valuation of Parcel 406. Id. at 412–13.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed. Id. at 411. The district court concluded that the presuit offer was not so indefinite that the benefits achieved by the Landowners could not be determined. Id. at 416. In its decision, the Fifth District noted that this case had been over-litigated, and the parties blamed each other for the significant attorney's fees incurred:
Id. at 413. Although the Fifth District concluded that the attorney's fees for the valuation proceedings were limited to those allowed by section 73.092(1), it remanded to the trial court for consideration of the Landowners' claim that the application of the benefits achieved formula violated their constitutional right to full compensation because the Authority caused excessive litigation.Id. at 418–19.
On remand from the Fifth District, the trial court found that the Authority had engaged in a "clear pattern" of excessive litigation. The first source of excessive litigation was described as follows:
The trial court also found that the Authority caused excessive litigation by spending twice as much time deposing the Landowners' experts as the Landowners spent deposing the Authority's experts.
The trial court noted that all of the attorney's fees expert witnesses who testified as to what would constitute a reasonable fee, including the Authority's expert, agreed that it would be unreasonable, given the circumstances of this case, to limit the Landowners to the $227,652.25 capped fee that the benefits achieved formula in section 73.092(1) generated.4 The court explained:
Applying this Court's conclusion that...
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