Sackett v. Paine

• Decision Date: 19 March 1925
• Docket Number: No. 659.,659.
• Parties: SACKETT et al. v. PAINE et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

128 A. 209

SACKETT et al.

v. PAINE et al.

No. 659.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 19, 1925.

Case Certified from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties.

Bill by Henry W. Sackett and others, trustees under the will of Daniel Paine, deceased, against John F. Paine and others. Certified from Superior Court under Gen. Laws 1923, c. 339, § 35. Decree in accordance with opinion.

Edwards & Angell, Edward P. Jastram, and Walter A. Edwards, all of Providence, for complainants.

Gardner, Moss & Haslam and William W. Moss, all of Providence, for respondent John F. Paine.

Walling & Walling, Everett L. Walling, and Lester S. Walling, all of Providence, for respondent executor and trustees.

STEARNS, J. This is a bill in equity brought by the complainants, the present trustees, under the will of Daniel Paine, deceased, for instructions in regard to the disposition to be made by the trustees of a certain share of the real estate and the proceeds of the sale of other real estate subject to the trusts created by the will.

Daniel Paine, a resident of Providence, died in 1866. He left a will, which was duly probated, by which he gave the residue of his estate to certain trustees in trust to hold equally for the benefit of his three children, Martha E Griswold, Emma L. Paine (later Emma L. Sackett), and Charles E. Paine, to pay to each child" upon written request from time to time such sums as each might desire on account of such child's portion of the residue, not exceeding for each daughter one-half and for his son three-fourths of the portion of each. The particular clause of the will in question is as follows:

"They" (the trustees) "shall hold the remainder of the property and estate herein devised to each of my said children after payment to them of the sums called for as aforesaid, and pay to each of them the rents, profits and income of his or her portion of said property and estate during his or her natural life and at his or her death shall transfer and convey the same to his or her lineal descendants if any there be, and if there be no lineal descendants then equally to the survivors of my said children, or to their lineal descendants, if any there be, the descendants of any child to have the portion which their parent if living would have taken."

Martha E. Griswold died in 1884, leaving two sons; Emma L. Paine Sackett died in 1922, leaving a daughter and two sons; Charles E. Paine died intestate August 12,

1923, leaving as his only heirs a son, the respondent John F. Paine, and a daughter, Louisa P. Tingley.

In 1913 Eliza T. Paine, wife of Charles E. Paine, brought an action at law against her son, John F. Paine, to recover certain sums of money alleged to be due, and attached all the right and interest of John F. Paine in the real estate held in trust for the benefit of Charles E. Paine by the trustees of Daniel Paine. Eliza T. Paine recovered a judgment, and thereafter the interest of John F. Paine was levied upon under an execution and was sold to her at execution sale and conveyed to her by a sheriff's deed in 1918. After the commencement of said action at law, a portion of said real estate was sold by the trustees of Daniel Paine, and the proceeds are now held by the complainants, trustees. Eliza T. Paine died February 12, 1923, leaving a will which was duly probated.

It is admitted that whatever right, title, or interest, if any, Eliza T. Paine received by the sheriff's deed passed by her will to the respondents, the executor and trustees under her will; and that if they have not the right to receive the one-half interest in question, the respondent John F. Paine has.

The sole question, except as between the executor and the trustees under the will of Eliza T. Paine, is whether the respondent John F. Paine during his father's lifetime had any property right in the trust estate, under the will of Daniel Paine, which was subject to attachment and sale on execution.

The answer to this question is dependent upon the construction of the clause of the will above quoted. The legal effect of this clause has already been twice decided by this court in proceedings in which all parties in Interest were represented. The question was first decided in 1905, in Paine v. Sackett, 27 R. I. 300, 61 A. 753. In that case Charles Edward Paine, who was then one of the trustees under the will of Daniel Paine, brought a bill in equity against his cotrustees and all other persons interested in the trust estate. The facts, so far as they are pertinent to the present inquiry, are as follows: In August, 1903, Charles Edward Paine conveyed by deed to his wife, Eliza T. Paine, all of his interest in the trust estate, describing the real estate by metes and bounds and stating his intention to bar the entail in his portion of the real estate held in trust under the terms of the will of Daniel Paine. The complainant, Charles Edward Paine, alleged that Eliza T. Paine had requested the trustees to convey said portion of the trust real estate to her in fee simple free from all trusts; that complainant was willing to do this, but that the other trustees declined to do as requested. The prayer of the bill was that the trustees be directed to convey the legal title of his portion of the trust estate to the said Eliza T. Paine. On demurrer it was held that the estates given to the children of Daniel Paine were equitable estates tail, and that the deed of Charles Edward Paine to his wife did not bar the entail. Both of the issues thus decided by the court were fully briefed and argued by the adversary parties. The decision was rested on the two issues jointly, and the judgment is conclusive on both. 15 R. C. D. 454. The rule of law is thus stated by Chief Justice Waite in Railroad Companies v. Schutte, 103 D. S. 118, 143 (25 L. Ed. 605):

"It cannot be said that a case is not authority on one point because, although that point was properly presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the cause, something else was found in the end which disposed of the whole matter."

In the second case, Green v. Edwards, 31 R. I. 1, 77 A. 188, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 41, decided in 1910, the question at issue was whether the complainant Green had acquired a fee-simple interest in the share of Emma L. Sackett in the trust estate, under a deed from her purporting to convey to Green in fee simple all of her interest in the trust property and stating therein her intention to bar the entail. The proceeding was by a bill in equity; the relief sought was that the trustees be directed to convey to Green in fee simple the legal title, free from the trust. It was earnestly argued by counsel that the decision in Paine v. Sackett, that the estates of the children of Daniel Paine were estates tail, was not res judicata: (1) For the reason that the determination of that question was not necessary to the final determination of the cause; (2) because no final decree had ever been entered therein. Thereafter a reargument by order of the court was had. Three questions were raised for decision:

(1) Was the decision in Paine v. Sackett, that the estates of the children were estates tail, res judicata?

(2) If not, were the estates of the children of Daniel Paine equitable estates tail or life estates?

(3) That, even if the estates of these children were estates tail, nevertheless the complainant Green was not entitled to receive a conveyance from the trustees because the statute permitting a previously existing equitable estate tail to be barred was unconstitutional.

This court held that the opinion in Paine v. Sackett was res judicata for all parties interested under the will, although no decree had been entered therein, and again decided that the interests of the children of Daniel Paine were equitable estates tail. One of the justices, in a separate opinion, held that it was unnecessary to determine the question of res judicata; another justice, in a separate opinion,...