Ajootian v. Providence Redevelopment Agency of City of Providence
Decision Date | 11 August 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 2122,2122 |
Citation | 80 R.I. 73,91 A.2d 21 |
Parties | AJOOTIAN v. PROVIDENCE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al. Equity |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
George Ajootian, Providence, pro se.
Matthew E. Ward, Providence, for Providence Redevelopment Agency.
William E. McCabe, City Sol., Francis D. McManus, Asst. City Sol., Providence, for City of Providence.
William E. Powers, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Coogan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
This bill in equity was brought by the complainant, as owner of certain real estate in the city of Providence, against said city, a municipal corporation, and against the Providence Redevelopment Agency, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as the agency. The bill, which contains a prayer for injunctive relief, was answered by the respondents. When the cause came before the superior court for hearing the parties raised certain constitutional questions of doubt and importance affecting the case which thereupon were certified to this court for determination under the provisions of general laws 1938, chapter 545, § 6, as amended by public laws 1940, chap. 941, sec. 2.
Among other things it appears from the pleadings that the complaint is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of real estate consisting of a two-family dwelling house and two lots of land on South street in Providence; that respondents had taken the necessary steps under the provisions of P.L.1950, chap. 2574, known as the 'Slum clearance and redevelopment act,' hereinafter termed the act, for the agency to acquire under its power of eminent domain or otherwise all property within a certain area known as the Point Street Project Area D2-R which area had been found and determined by the proper authority and in the proper manner to be a slum blighted area within the meaning of section 2(A) and 7(A) of the act; that it is the purpose of the agency, in pursuance of its redevelopment plan for said area, to clear all structures except five from the acquired land, to widen certain streets, and thereafter under the powers given the agency by the act, to sell or lease the improved land for heavy, commercial and general industrial purposes; and that the complainant's real estate is located within the boundaries of the above-described Point Street Project Area D2-R. The complainant's bill alleges that he is in imminent danger of having his property taken from him without his consent or approval and therefore asks that the respondents be enjoined from further proceeding with their plans under chap. 2574.
As to the said project area, it also appears from the pleadings that, excluding streets, 46 per cent of the land is used for industrial or commercial purposes; that the streets are narrow and congested; that of the 125 dwelling units, which are contained in 49 structures and are occupied by about 400 people, 110 have been surveyed; that 84 per cent of these were built before 1900; that 71 per cent have no central heating; that 63 per cent have no inside hot water; that 62 per cent have no private bath; that 97 per cent are inadequate because of hazardous and unsanitary conditions; that 85 per cent have serious deterioration; and that all dwellings are predominantly of wood construction, built close together and constitute fire hazards. It is further alleged that because of such conditions, the incidence of juvenile delinquency, aid to dependent children, tuberculosis and other diseases are disproportionately high.
The act went into effect April 25, 1950. It contains many sections, makes certain legislative findings, defines terms used in the act, deals with various problems and conditions relative to different types of blighted areas, and the manner and procedure to be followed in acquiring and removing structures and financing the redevelopment of such areas. One of the legislative findings appearing in sec. 2(A) reads as follows:
'It is hereby found and declared that there exist in many communities in this state
'(1) Slum blighted areas (as hereinafter defined) that constitute a serious and growing menace and are injurious and inimical to the public health, safety and welfare of the people of the state generally; (2) that such areas present difficulties and handicaps which are beyond remedy and control solely by regulatory process in the exercise of the police power; (3) that they contribute substantially and increasingly to the problems of, and necessitate excessive and disproportionate expenditures for, crime prevention, correction, prosecution and punishment, the treatment of juvenile delinquency, the preservation of the public health and safety and the maintaining of adequate police, fire, and accident protection and other public services and facilities; (4) that this menace is becoming increasingly direct and substantial in its significance and effect; and (5) that the benefits which will result from the remedying of these conditions will accrue to the inhabitants and property owners of the communities in which they exist and to the inhabitants of this state generally.'
Excluding all consideration of arrested blighted areas as defined in sec. 7(B), the slum blighted area with which we are solely concerned in the instant case is defined in sec. 7(A) of the act as follows:
* * *
Under the pleadings herein no issue of fact is raised. It is admitted by the parties that all necessary preliminary steps, including the passing by the city of proper ordinances and resolutions and the holding of required hearings, have been duly and correctly taken so that the respondents, if they desire, are prima facie authorized to acquire title to the realty in the area in question either by purchase or by the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The questions as framed and certified to us as questions of doubt and importance in this case are comprehensive. Apparently they attempt to cover the constitutionality of all parts of the act. But on such a certification our duty is to test the constitutionality of the act only insofar as the questions asked relate to the disposition of the actual case presently before the court. In Blais v. Franklin, 30 R.I. 413, at page 421, 75 A. 399, at page 403, the court stated: 'Although the statute provides that the superior court shall forthwith certify the question to this court for hearing and determination whenever the constitutionality of any act is brought is question upon the record, we do not consider it to be the intent of the Legislature that this court shall pass upon the question of the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly that is not germane to the case in which it is raised, or in a case which is clearly without standing in court, or when the determination of the question is entirely unnecessary.' In First National Stores, Inc. v. Lewis, 51 R.I. 448, at page 451, 155 A. 534, at page 536, the court cited Sackett v. Paine, 46 R.I. 439, 128 A. 209, and Wells v. Perry, 50 R.I. 427, 148 A. 317, stating: 'These cases are authority for the position that we now take that we are not bound to...
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