Ajootian v. Providence Redevelopment Agency of City of Providence

Decision Date11 August 1952
Docket NumberNo. 2122,2122
Citation80 R.I. 73,91 A.2d 21
PartiesAJOOTIAN v. PROVIDENCE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al. Equity
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

George Ajootian, Providence, pro se.

Matthew E. Ward, Providence, for Providence Redevelopment Agency.

William E. McCabe, City Sol., Francis D. McManus, Asst. City Sol., Providence, for City of Providence.

William E. Powers, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Coogan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BAKER, Justice.

This bill in equity was brought by the complainant, as owner of certain real estate in the city of Providence, against said city, a municipal corporation, and against the Providence Redevelopment Agency, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as the agency. The bill, which contains a prayer for injunctive relief, was answered by the respondents. When the cause came before the superior court for hearing the parties raised certain constitutional questions of doubt and importance affecting the case which thereupon were certified to this court for determination under the provisions of general laws 1938, chapter 545, § 6, as amended by public laws 1940, chap. 941, sec. 2.

Among other things it appears from the pleadings that the complaint is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of real estate consisting of a two-family dwelling house and two lots of land on South street in Providence; that respondents had taken the necessary steps under the provisions of P.L.1950, chap. 2574, known as the 'Slum clearance and redevelopment act,' hereinafter termed the act, for the agency to acquire under its power of eminent domain or otherwise all property within a certain area known as the Point Street Project Area D2-R which area had been found and determined by the proper authority and in the proper manner to be a slum blighted area within the meaning of section 2(A) and 7(A) of the act; that it is the purpose of the agency, in pursuance of its redevelopment plan for said area, to clear all structures except five from the acquired land, to widen certain streets, and thereafter under the powers given the agency by the act, to sell or lease the improved land for heavy, commercial and general industrial purposes; and that the complainant's real estate is located within the boundaries of the above-described Point Street Project Area D2-R. The complainant's bill alleges that he is in imminent danger of having his property taken from him without his consent or approval and therefore asks that the respondents be enjoined from further proceeding with their plans under chap. 2574.

As to the said project area, it also appears from the pleadings that, excluding streets, 46 per cent of the land is used for industrial or commercial purposes; that the streets are narrow and congested; that of the 125 dwelling units, which are contained in 49 structures and are occupied by about 400 people, 110 have been surveyed; that 84 per cent of these were built before 1900; that 71 per cent have no central heating; that 63 per cent have no inside hot water; that 62 per cent have no private bath; that 97 per cent are inadequate because of hazardous and unsanitary conditions; that 85 per cent have serious deterioration; and that all dwellings are predominantly of wood construction, built close together and constitute fire hazards. It is further alleged that because of such conditions, the incidence of juvenile delinquency, aid to dependent children, tuberculosis and other diseases are disproportionately high.

The act went into effect April 25, 1950. It contains many sections, makes certain legislative findings, defines terms used in the act, deals with various problems and conditions relative to different types of blighted areas, and the manner and procedure to be followed in acquiring and removing structures and financing the redevelopment of such areas. One of the legislative findings appearing in sec. 2(A) reads as follows:

'It is hereby found and declared that there exist in many communities in this state

'(1) Slum blighted areas (as hereinafter defined) that constitute a serious and growing menace and are injurious and inimical to the public health, safety and welfare of the people of the state generally; (2) that such areas present difficulties and handicaps which are beyond remedy and control solely by regulatory process in the exercise of the police power; (3) that they contribute substantially and increasingly to the problems of, and necessitate excessive and disproportionate expenditures for, crime prevention, correction, prosecution and punishment, the treatment of juvenile delinquency, the preservation of the public health and safety and the maintaining of adequate police, fire, and accident protection and other public services and facilities; (4) that this menace is becoming increasingly direct and substantial in its significance and effect; and (5) that the benefits which will result from the remedying of these conditions will accrue to the inhabitants and property owners of the communities in which they exist and to the inhabitants of this state generally.'

Excluding all consideration of arrested blighted areas as defined in sec. 7(B), the slum blighted area with which we are solely concerned in the instant case is defined in sec. 7(A) of the act as follows:

"Slum blighted area' means any area in which there is a predominance of buildings or improvements, either used or intended to be used for living, commercial, industrial or other purposes, or any combination of such uses, which by reason of (1) dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, (2) inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, open spaces and recreation facilities, (3) high density of population and overcrowding, (4) defective design or insanitary or unsafe character or condition of physical construction, (5) defective or inadequate street and lot layout, (6) mixed character or shifting of uses to which they are put, or any combination of such factors and characteristics, are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency and crime, injuriously affect the entire area and constitute a menace to the public health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the community and of the state generally. A slum blighted area need not be restricted to, or consist entirely of, lands, buildings, or improvements which of themselves are detrimental or inimical to the public health, safety or welfare, but may consist of an area in which such conditions predominate and injuriously affect the entire area.'

It is also specifically provided by sec. 87 of the act that public laws 1946, chap. 1802, known as the 'Community redevelopment act' and the acts in amendment thereof are repealed provided, however,

'that such repeal shall not affect the existence or continuance of any redevelopment agency, created in a community by such chapter or chapters, which heretofore has been authorized to transact business and exercise powers thereunder. Any such redevelopment agency shall be and constitute the redevelopment agency for such community within the meaning of this act and shall have all of the rights, powers, duties, and exemptions provided for a redevelopment agency hereunder and, notwithstanding any other provision of this act, no other redevelopment agency shall be created for such community. * * *

'All ordinances, resolutions, official acts and determinations and all other actions and proceedings heretofore taken or purporting to have been taken under and pursuant to chapter 1802 of the public laws of 1946, as amended, by the city of Providence, by the Providence Redevelopment Agency * * * or by any other community or redevelopment agency are hereby ratified, confirmed, and declared legal in all respects and shall continue in effect under the provisions of this act. The creation, establishment, and organization of the Providence Redevelopment Agency * * * and any other redevelopment agency authorized, or purporting to have been authorized, to transact business and exercise powers under chapter 1802 of the public laws of 1946, as amended, are hereby ratified, confirmed, and declared legal in all respects.'

Under the pleadings herein no issue of fact is raised. It is admitted by the parties that all necessary preliminary steps, including the passing by the city of proper ordinances and resolutions and the holding of required hearings, have been duly and correctly taken so that the respondents, if they desire, are prima facie authorized to acquire title to the realty in the area in question either by purchase or by the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

The questions as framed and certified to us as questions of doubt and importance in this case are comprehensive. Apparently they attempt to cover the constitutionality of all parts of the act. But on such a certification our duty is to test the constitutionality of the act only insofar as the questions asked relate to the disposition of the actual case presently before the court. In Blais v. Franklin, 30 R.I. 413, at page 421, 75 A. 399, at page 403, the court stated: 'Although the statute provides that the superior court shall forthwith certify the question to this court for hearing and determination whenever the constitutionality of any act is brought is question upon the record, we do not consider it to be the intent of the Legislature that this court shall pass upon the question of the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly that is not germane to the case in which it is raised, or in a case which is clearly without standing in court, or when the determination of the question is entirely unnecessary.' In First National Stores, Inc. v. Lewis, 51 R.I. 448, at page 451, 155 A. 534, at page 536, the court cited Sackett v. Paine, 46 R.I. 439, 128 A. 209, and Wells v. Perry, 50 R.I. 427, 148 A. 317, stating: 'These cases are authority for the position that we now take that we are not bound to...

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