Sacramento Homeless Union v. Cnty. of Sacramento

Decision Date28 July 2022
Docket Number2:22-cv-01095-TLN-KJN
PartiesSACRAMENTO HOMELESS UNION, a local of the CALIFORNIA HOMELESS UNION/STATEWIDE ORGANIZING COUNCIL, on behalf of itself and those it represents; BETTY RIOS; DONTA WILLIAMS; FALISHA SCOTT and all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a political subdivision of the State of California; CITY OF SACRAMENTO, a municipal corporation; and DOES 1-100, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
ORDER

Troy L. Nunley United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Sacramento Homeless Union (the Union), Betty Rios (Rios), Donta Williams, and Falisha Scott's (Scott) (collectively Plaintiffs) Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 2.) Defendants County of Sacramento (the County) and City of Sacramento (the City) (collectively, Defendants) have filed oppositions. (ECF Nos. 6, 19.) Plaintiffs have filed replies. (ECF Nos. 11, 20.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Factual and Procedural Background[1]

The instant case arises from Defendants' alleged failure to discharge their duties during Sacramento's triple-digit heat wave to protect the unhoused, one of society's most vulnerable populations. (See ECF No. 1.) The first day of summer, Tuesday, June 21, 2022, brought tripledigit heat to the City and County of Sacramento and more triple-digit temperatures are forecasted in the summer ahead. (Id. at 1-2.) Exposure to extreme heat has a disproportionate and frequently deadly impact on the unhoused. (Id. at 2.) The majority of the visibly unhoused reside in encampments shaded by freeway overpasses trees, and vegetation, and these encampments include makeshift habitations with covers that offer some defense against extreme heat. (Id.)

The City's official estimate of its unhoused residents is 3,900. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiffs allege the City's code enforcement officials and members of the police department's “Impact Team” continue to destroy dozens of existing encampments while providing no alternative shelter. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs therefore allege the City's eviction of the unhoused from these locations onto the unprotected streets and sidewalks or into sweltering tents atop heat-absorbing asphalt surfaces at “Safeground” parking lots is affirmatively increasing the risk of harm to the unhoused. (Id.) At the Miller Park “Safeground” encampment - established by the City last year - temperatures inside tents placed on an asphalt parking lot approached 120 degrees Fahrenheit and residents went for hours without water or food. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege the County announced the provision of only three cooling centers, none of which would be open and available to the unhoused until 4:00 pm, hours after the hottest time of the day. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that as the first day of the summer came to an end and reports were received by the Union of widespread heat-related suffering, Plaintiffs' counsel provided Defendants with a set of measures the Union believes necessary to protect the unhoused and which the Union believes Defendants are already under a statutory and constitutional duty to enact. (Id. at 3.) On June 22, 2022, the County replied to Plaintiffs and defended its decision not to declare a local emergency by claiming that [a]ccording to the National Weather Service, the type of heat the County is experiencing is moderate and can be considered to be normal climate conditions that occur seasonally.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that on the same day at 2:08 pm, the National Weather Service in Sacramento issued an “Urgent Weather Message” with a “Heat Advisory” for the entire Sacramento Valley that warned of [h]ot temperatures with highs 100 to 108 in the Valley” and a “locally high heat risk.” (Id.) The City replied with a list of four cooling centers, one of which was a City-established center with a maximum capacity of 50 and three of which were unavailable until 4:00 pm. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege the City has otherwise failed to address their concerns and has failed to dispute it was destroying encampments and otherwise increasing the risk of unprotected exposure to the extreme temperatures. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiffs contend extreme heat events are almost sure to recur over the course of the summer and the population most vulnerable to high temperatures is the unhoused, who are frequently chronically dehydrated and have no respite from the heat. (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiffs filed this case on June 24, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking injunctive relief on the same day. (ECF No. 2.) The case was reassigned to this Court on July 15, 2022.2 (ECF No. 16.) The Court noted that in light of the fact that the City was recently served, it provided the City with adequate opportunity to respond to the instant motion by July 20, 2022, and Plaintiffs with an opportunity to reply to the City's response by July 25, 2022. (ECF No. 17.)

II. Standard of Law

Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); see also Costa Mesa City Emps. Ass n v. City of Costa Mesa, 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305 (2012) (“The purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo until a final determination following a[2] trial.”); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The status quo ante litem refers not simply to any situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but instead to the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”).

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test to obtain a preliminary injunction. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, a district court may weigh the plaintiff's showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction even where the plaintiff shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, plaintiffs must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in [p]laintiffs' favor in order to succeed in a request for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134-35.

“A preliminary injunction can take two forms. A prohibitory injunction prohibits a party from taking action and preserves the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits. A mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to take action.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co. (Marlyn), 571 F.3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction. (See ECF No. 2.)

“A mandatory injunction goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo . . . [and] is particularly disfavored.” Marlyn, 571 F.3d at 879 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A district court should deny a mandatory injunction, “unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass'n v. Mortimer Howard Trust (Park Vill.), 636 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001). “In general, mandatory injunctions are not granted unless extreme or very serious damage will result[,] and are not issued in doubtful cases or where the injury complained of is capable of compensation in damages.” Marlyn, 571 F.3d at 879 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740.

III. Analysis

Plaintiffs move the Court for a mandatory injunction requiring Defendants to:

(a) Declare a local emergency pursuant to California Government Code § 8558(c) whenever temperatures reaching or exceeding 90 degrees Fahrenheit are forecasted[;] (b) During said local emergencies, keep all designated cooling centers open on a 24-hour basis and increase the number of cooling centers to a total of at least 20 located close to significant concentrations of unhoused persons and of sufficient maximum capacity such that nobody is turned away for lack of space[;] (c) During said local emergencies, assign[] County and/or City personnel as needed, to go to all locations where [unhoused] persons are found and, using public address equipment and other means of mass communication, inform unhoused persons where they should gather in order to be provided transportation to an appropriate cooling center[;] (d) While canvassing areas where un[housed] persons are found, provide cold, potable water to those who request it, in sufficient quantities to insure that they are fully hydrated for the duration of the local emergency[; and] (e) Provide three nutritional meals per day, potable water, and cold-storage facilities at all “Safeground” sites to insure on days where the temperature is forecasted to be 90 degrees
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