Sadek v. Weber
| Decision Date | 16 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20220155 |
| Citation | 2023 ND 14 |
| Parties | John Sadek and Tammy Sadek, as surviving parents of Andrew Sadek on behalf of all heirs-at-law, and the Estate of Andrew Sadek, Plaintiffs and Appellants v. Jason Weber, individually and as a Richland County Sheriff's Deputy and Task Force Officer of the South East Multi County Agency Narcotics Task Force, and Richland County, North Dakota, a political subdivision, Defendants and Appellees |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Richland County, Southeast Judicial District, the Honorable Jay A. Schmitz, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Kristin A. Overboe, Fargo, ND, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jenna R. Bergman, Minneapolis, MN, and Corey J. Quinton (on brief) Fargo, ND, for defendants and appellees.
[¶1] John and Tammy Sadek appeal from orders denying their post-judgment motion and sanctioning their attorney under N.D.R.Civ.P. 11. Nearly two years after we affirmed a judgment of dismissal, the Sadeks' counsel argues the case should be decided in their favor. The Appellees moved for sanctions on appeal. We affirm the district court's orders and grant the Appellees' motion for sanctions.
[¶2] We described the background of the case in Sadek v Weber, 2020 ND 194, 948 N.W.2d 820 (Sadek I). Weber was a Richland County sheriff's deputy. Id. at ¶ 2. Andrew Sadek acted as a confidential informant for Weber. Id. at ¶¶ 3-5. Sadek was later found in the Red River with a gunshot wound to his head and a backpack full of rocks tied to his body. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Sadek's parents sued Weber and Richland County alleging Weber deceived Sadek by telling Sadek he faced a lengthy prison sentence. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. They also alleged Weber negligently caused Sadek's death by failing to adequately train and protect him. Id. at ¶ 9. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Weber and Richland County. Id. at ¶ 8. The court held the misrepresentation underlying the deceit claim was a prediction of a future event and therefore not actionable as deceit as a matter of law. Id. at ¶ 8. As to the negligence claim, the court held fact issues existed as to whether Weber and Richland County owed a duty to Sadek. Id. at ¶ 9. The court nonetheless granted summary judgment holding there was no evidence to establish Weber's conduct was the proximate cause of Sadek's death. Id. A judgment of dismissal was entered, and the Sadeks appealed. Id. at ¶ 10.
[¶3] On appeal in Sadek I, the Sadeks argued a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Weber's conduct caused Andrew Sadek's death. 2020 ND 194, ¶ 21. This Court rejected their argument explaining: Id. at ¶ 28. Justice VandeWalle dissented explaining he believed a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning causation. Id. at ¶ 35 (VandeWalle, J., dissenting). Our mandate affirming the dismissal judgment was issued on October 7, 2020.
[¶4] On February 27, 2022, the Sadeks filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment." Their brief cited N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) but requested relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56. The Sadeks argued the district court made a mistake by relying on "bad faith" representations by Weber who "successfully hoodwinked [the district court] and obtained a Judgment of Dismissal." Yet the Sadeks claimed they were entitled to summary judgment because "no triable issue of fact exists as to whether Defendants owed a duty of care to Andrew under the Statute." The brief was accompanied by a list of signatures "verifying" they agree with Justice VandeWalle's dissent. Weber and Richland County filed a response arguing the Sadeks' motion was untimely, it failed to state particular grounds for relief, and it was generally unsupported and improper. Weber and Richland County also moved for sanctions under N.D.R.Civ.P. 11. The district court entered an order denying the Sadeks' post-judgment motion holding "there is no case, claim, or cause of action pending before this court." The court characterized the Sadeks' arguments as "baffling and bizarre." The court also entered an order issuing sanctions in the amount of $1,750 against the Sadeks' attorney, Kristin Overboe. The Sadeks appeal from the district court's orders.
[¶5] The Sadeks assert their post-judgment motion was brought under both N.D.R.Civ.P. 56 and 60. They make arguments on appeal under both rules. We address each in turn.
[¶6] The Sadeks appear to argue they have proven the negligence claim that we held was properly dismissed in Sadek I. Because the Sadeks advance arguments under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56, we recite the standard for obtaining summary judgment:
Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56 is a procedural device for the prompt resolution of a controversy on the merits if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. Summary judgment is appropriate if the issues in the case are such that the resolution of any factual disputes will not alter the result.
Vic Christensen Mineral Trust v. Enerplus Res. (USA) Corp., 2022 ND 8, ¶ 8, 969 N.W.2d 175 (quoting Hild v. Johnson, 2006 ND 217, ¶ 6, 723 N.W.2d 389).
[¶7] To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove the existence of "a duty on the part of an allegedly negligent person to protect the plaintiff from injury, a failure to discharge the duty, and a resulting injury proximately caused by the breach of the duty." Sadek I, 2020 ND 194, ¶ 22 (emphasis in original) (quoting Diegel v. City of West Fargo, 546 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1996)). Along with the elements of duty, breach, and injury, the plaintiff must prove proximate causation:
If from the plaintiff's evidence it is as probable that the injury and damage of which the plaintiff complains resulted from a cause for which the defendant is not responsible as it is that such injury and damage resulted from a cause for which the defendant would be responsible, a prima-facie case of proximate cause has not been made and the plaintiff cannot recover, since plaintiff's recovery must be based upon more than mere speculation.
Barbie v. Minko Constr., Inc., 2009 ND 99, ¶ 11, 766 N.W.2d 458 (cleaned up) (quoting Inv'r Real Estate Trust v. Terra Pacific Midwest, Inc., 2004 ND 167, ¶ 9, 686 N.W.2d 140).
[¶8] The Sadeks mischaracterize our holding in Sadek I as somehow determining the evidence proved Weber caused Andrew Sadek's death, and they argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether Weber and Richland County owed a duty to Andrew Sadek. To support their argument, they quote a sentence from our decision, which states: "On this record, insufficient evidence establishes that the Defendant's conduct proximately caused the death of Andrew Sadek." Sadek I, 2020 ND 194, ¶ 28. The Sadeks paraphrase this sentence as meaning: "the evidence, even if insufficient, establishes proximate cause."
[¶9] Although the sentence is not a model of clarity, the Sadeks' argument ignores our lengthy explanation of why the evidence was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to the causation element. See Sadek I, 2020 ND 194, ¶¶ 29-31. We summarized our reasoning as follows:
Because so little is known about the circumstances of Andrew Sadek's death, the possibilities as to how and when he died and who may be responsible for his death are manifest. Due to the lack of available evidence to suggest how, when, or even where Andrew Sadek died, a conclusion that his death was proximately caused by Defendants' acts or omissions would be based on speculation.
Id. at ¶ 31. We plainly held: "The district court did not err in dismissing the Sadeks' negligence claims as a matter of law." Id. at ¶ 32. The Sadeks' suggestion that our decision is the opposite of what we said is, in the words of the district court, "baffling and bizarre." To the extent the Sadeks claim they are entitled to summary judgment, we hold their argument is meritless. Nothing we have said here should be read to indicate N.D.R.Civ.P. 56 is available as a means of obtaining relief after a final judgment has been entered without the court otherwise granting relief from judgment.
[¶10] North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides an avenue for obtaining post-judgment relief. The Sadeks specifically request relief under Rule 60(b), which allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment for the following reasons:
N.D.R.Civ.P 60(b). A party requesting relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of establishing sufficient grounds for relief. Allery v. Whitebull, 2022 ND 140, ¶ 7, 977 N.W.2d 726. Rule 60 movants must provide "specific details" underlying their claim for relief. DCI Credit Servs., Inc. v. Plemper, 2021 ND 215, ¶ 8, 966 N.W.2d 904. We review decisions on Rule 60(b) motions for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 2021 ND 24, ¶ 5, 955 N.W.2d 117. ...
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