Sadiqq v. Bramlett

• Decision Date: 04 March 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. C82-10A.
• Citation: 559 F. Supp. 362
• Parties: Abdullah Amin SADIQQ, a/k/a Oliver Lee Green, Plaintiff, v. Webb BRAMLETT and Jack Ozment, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

559 F. Supp. 362

Abdullah Amin SADIQQ, a/k/a Oliver Lee Green, Plaintiff, v. Webb BRAMLETT and Jack Ozment, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. C82-10A.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

March 4, 1983.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Abdullah Amin Sadiqq, pro se.

Frank H. Jones, Wright, Morgan & Jones, Rome, Ga., for defendants.

ORDER

ROBERT H. HALL, District Judge.

This is a civil rights suit, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff is a state prisoner, currently incarcerated at the Rivers North Unit in Hardwick, Georgia. The plaintiff's pro se complaint and request to proceed in forma pauperis were received in the clerk's office on January 5, 1982, and were approved by Magistrate Dougherty the same day. On July 15, 1982, Magistrate Dougherty allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint to name as the sole defendants Webb Bramlett and Jack Ozment. These defendants subsequently filed the motion for summary judgment presently pending before this court.¹

On May 9, 1972, plaintiff Sadiqq was arrested, charged with murder and armed robbery, and placed in the Floyd County Jail. On May 17, 1972, he was indicted on both offenses. On July 14, 1972, Sadiqq entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The armed robbery charge was apparently dropped as part of his plea bargain. Sadiqq alleges that defendants Bramlett and Ozment, who were both employed by the identification department of the Floyd County (Georgia) Police Department at the time of Sadiqq's arrest, indictment, plea and incarceration, were responsible for the transmission of incorrect information regarding his crime and the disposition of his case to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.² Specifically, Sadiqq contends that his F.B.I. criminal file shows, or implies, that he was convicted of both murder and armed robbery rather than murder alone.³ This, says Sadiqq, "has damaged his character and reputation and caused him to be denied parole," and he contends that he is entitled to recover damages from the persons responsible for this purported violation of his constitutional rights.⁴

Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

The statutory language itself indicates the primary elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case under § 1983. The requirement that the defendants must have committed the challenged conduct "under color of state law" has clearly been met here and merits no further elaboration. It is also necessary, however, that a defendant's actions be a cause of the plaintiff's constitutional deprivation. In other words, plaintiff Sadiqq must demonstrate that the defendants owed him a duty arising under the Constitution, that the defendants breached this duty, and that this breach was a cause in fact of Sadiqq's constitutional deprivation.

In determining whether Sadiqq has stated a prima facie case under § 1983, then, the threshold inquiry concerns the existence of a constitutional duty running from the defendants to Sadiqq. This question is apparently one of first impression, in that no court has ever held local law enforcement record-keeping officials liable under § 1983 for misinformation ultimately appearing in an F.B.I. criminal file. It is true that several courts have recognized a limited duty on behalf of the F.B.I. to assure the accuracy of the criminal records it disseminates. Crow v. Kelley, 512 F.2d 752 (8th Cir.1975); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C.Cir.1974); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C.Cir.1974). While the parameters of this duty are as yet not fully clear, it is beyond dispute that although the F.B.I. does not and cannot guarantee the accuracy of information contained in its criminal files, "the F.B.I.'s function of maintaining and disseminating criminal identification records and files pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 534 carries with it as a corollary the responsibility to discharge this function reliably and responsibly and without unnecessary harm to individuals whose rights have been invaded." Menard, supra, 498 F.2d at 1026. Thus it has been held that a district court has the inherent power to order expungement of all or part of a subject's F.B.I. criminal record in those cases where F.B.I. retention of such information or records would present a harsh or unique situation with potential for harm to the subject. See, e.g., United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536 (2nd Cir.1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 1456, 55 L.Ed.2d 499 (1978); United States v. Benlizar, 459 F.Supp. 614 (D.D.C.1978). Generally, courts will order expungement of arrest or conviction information appearing in F.B.I. files in order to remedy constitutional injuries sustained by reason of such arrests or convictions. Tarlton, supra, 507 F.2d 1116. Expungement has been ordered in cases in which no probable cause existed for the subject's arrest, thus rendering the arrest unconstitutional. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 880, 94 S.Ct. 162, 38 L.Ed.2d 125 (1973); Tarlton, supra; United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.1967); and in cases in which the subject claims illegitimate police motive or purposeful harassment. Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F.Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C.1969), vacated on other grounds 401 U.S. 987, 91 S.Ct. 1219, 28 L.Ed.2d 524 (1971). However, mere acquittal standing alone is not in itself sufficient to warrant expungement of an F.B.I. arrest record, largely because of the practical administrative problems a duty of this sort would create for federal recordkeeping officials. See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 836, 96 S.Ct. 63, 46 L.Ed.2d 55 (1975); Coleman v. United States Department of Justice, 429 F.Supp. 411 (N.D.Ind. 1977); United States v. Dooley, 364 F.Supp. 75 (E.D.Pa.1973).

At minimum, these cases teach that each case alleging an F.B.I. duty with respect to criminal records maintained by it must be considered in light of its particular facts and circumstances. Those courts that have thus far recognized any duty on the part of the F.B.I. to assure the accuracy of information entered in its criminal files have primarily been concerned about the inevitable dissemination of these F.B.I. files to numerous other agencies and entities, including prospective employers. The deleterious effect of having an arrest or conviction record—even one on which an acknowledgment of acquittal has been entered—is undisputed. Persons with criminal records may be much more vulnerable to police scrutiny concerning suspected involvement in later criminal activity, Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo.1972); and may be subject to decreased employment opportunities, Menard v. Saxbe, supra, 498 F.2d 1017, Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C.Cir.1970); as well as to the general "social stigma" attached to such records, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973). To the extent that the F.B.I.'s maintenance and dissemination of criminal records which inaccurately reflect a person's past criminal involvement can be said to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the constitutionally protected rights at stake seems to involve one's rights to privacy and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by means that comport with due process. And yet, the fact that courts have been willing in some cases to allow potential administrative burdens to override expunction of an arrest record after the arrestee has been acquitted strongly suggests that this "constitutional right," if it exists at all, is not absolute.

All of these cases have focused upon the F.B.I.'s own responsibility for records it keeps, and have largely ignored the substantial role played by the local law enforcement agencies that transmit arrest and conviction data to the F.B.I. in the first place. Yet, in Menard v. Saxbe, supra, 498 F.2d at 1025 & n. 22, the court stated "we think sound principles of justice and judicial administration dictate that in general actions to vindicate constitutional rights, by expungement of arrest records maintained notwithstanding release of the person and absence of probable cause for arrest, be maintained against the local law enforcement agencies involved ... this includes the agencies and officials with responsibility for making the arrest, initiating an arrest record, maintaining an arrest record, and determining appropriate disposition .... If more than one agency is involved there may be multiple defendants; indeed it may be that a single action may be maintainable against state and federal officials as well as the initiating local agency" (emphasis added). And in Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C.Cir.1975), the plaintiffs brought suit against the District of Columbia Chief of Police and the Director of the Central Records Division of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, challenging on both constitutional and statutory grounds the Police Department's policy of routinely transmitting to the F.B.I. the fingerprint cards and identifying data of any individual arrested in the District.

The Utz court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the declaratory and injunctive relief requested, based on its interpretation of the local ordinance that established the guidelines controlling dissemination of arrest records within the District of Columbia. For the purposes of the instant inquiry, however, the more significant aspect of the Utz opinion involves the tremendous attention...