Sadler v. New Castle County
| Decision Date | 23 September 1986 |
| Citation | 524 A.2d 18 |
| Parties | Kenneth Lee SADLER and Violet Sadler, Plaintiffs, v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY, James D. McCarnan, Harry Connor, Eric Cannon, Richard Hegelund, Professional Ambulance Service, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Talleyville Fire Company, a Delaware corporation, the Mayor and Council of Wilmington, Carmen Maiorano, Edward Hojnicki and Ronald Anderson, Defendants. . Submitted: |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Upon defendants New Castle County, et al. and Professional Ambulance Service, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. Granted in part.
Upon defendants City of Wilmington, et al.'s motion for summary judgment. Granted.
Upon defendant Talleyville Fire Company's motion for summary judgment. Granted.
Morton R. Kimmel, and Paul H. Spiller, of Kimmel, Spiller & Weiss, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.
John G. Mulford, of Theisen, Lank, Mulford & Goldberg, P.A., Wilmington, for defendants New Castle County, et al. and Professional Ambulance Service, Inc.
Wayne N. Elliott, and Michael P. Kelly, of Prickett, Jones, Elliott, Kristol & Schnee, Wilmington, for defendant Talleyville Fire Co.
Jeffrey S. Goddess, of Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, Wilmington, for defendants City of Wilmington, et al.
Presently before the Court are motions for summary judgment by New Castle County and the named county paramedics ("County"); the Professional Ambulance Service, Inc. ("Professional"); Talleyville Fire Company ("Talleyville"); and the Mayor and Council of Wilmington together with named city fire department officials ("City"). For the reasons set forth herein, summary judgment is granted as to New Castle County, Talleyville Fire Company, the Mayor and Council of Wilmington, and the named city fire department officials. Summary judgment is denied with respect to the named county paramedics.
On July 31, 1983, plaintiff Kenneth Sadler and three friends were floating down the Brandywine River on logs. As they approached the Brandywine falls, they got off the logs in order to wade toward the river bank. Plaintiff, standing near the lip of the falls, slipped and fell headfirst over the falls and struck his head on the rocks six to eight feet below. One of plaintiff's companions jumped over the falls and dragged plaintiff to the shore, where he began to administer CPR.
Defendants James D. McCarnan and Eric Cannon, two of the named county paramedics, arrived at the scene roughly ten minutes after they were notified. McCarnan parked his emergency vehicle on the edge of Alapocas Drive and proceeded to the river, which was approximately 1/4 mile away down a rocky embankment. Cannon followed, carrying with him a cardiac box, a long backboard, a cervical collar, and an oxygen unit. He was followed by two or three Talleyville Fire Company personnel.
Upon their arrival, plaintiff was lying on his left side, was breathing on his own, and was demonstrating mild seizure activity. McCarnan and Cannon placed plaintiff in a cervical collar and took his vital signs. At this time the plaintiff was started on an I.V. injection of dextrose and given nasal oxygen.
Plaintiff was then placed on an orthopedic stretcher, which is designed to maintain complete or straight alignment of the body. Plaintiff's head was taped to the stretcher to keep it immobilized. The stretcher was placed in a Stokes basket and secured to the basket with straps. McCarnan radioed Dr. Jay Feldstein, the doctor on call at the emergency room of the Wilmington Medical Center. McCarnan advised Dr. Feldstein that plaintiff was unconscious, that he had dove or fallen into the river, that he had a laceration on his head, that he was unresponsive and demonstrating some movement and seizure-like activity, and that they had applied a cervical collar and performed basic spinal immobilization.
The paramedics and fire company personnel considered several alternatives for removing plaintiff from the scene. Overhanging trees and an inadequate landing area precluded the use of a helicopter. A rubber boat was requested but was unavailable. Finally, they concluded that it would be too dangerous to both the plaintiff and rescue personnel to attempt to haul the plaintiff over the rocky terrain back up to the Alapocas Drive parking area. Consequently the rescuers decided to transport plaintiff across the river below the falls in the Stokes basket. Dr. Feldstein agreed with the decision.
Cannon swam to the far bank to assist the rescue personnel in bringing a 250 foot hemp line across the river. The line was secured by Talleyville on the Alapocas side and by the Wilmington Fire Department on the city side. The Stokes basket was secured to the line with leather belts. Paramedics Cannon and Hegelund, three members of Talleyville, and Hojnicki and Maiorano of the Wilmington Fire Department then proceeded to move plaintiff across the river.
The parties' versions of the trip across the river are in conflict. Plaintiff contends that the rescue party had difficulty maintaining footing on the river bottom and that plaintiff's head and body was submerged several times. Defendants assert that while plaintiff's back and lower body may have become wet, his upper body and head never submerged. All parties agree, however, that upon reaching the city side of the river, the paramedics ascertained that plaintiff had a loss of sensation from the nipple down. Cannon informed the emergency room of the loss of sensation and advised the ambulance driver to drive slowly to the hospital.
Plaintiff, a quadriplegic as a result of the incident, has alleged that the defendants engaged in wanton misconduct in extricating him from the accident scene and that such conduct caused his quadriplegia.
In support of their motions for summary judgment, New Castle County, the named county paramedics, and the Talleyville Fire Company rely on immunity protections provided under several statutes.
First, the defendants assert the immunity provided by the County and Municipal Tort Claims Act ["Act"], 10 Del.C. §§ 4010-4013. 1 The Act protects all governmental entities and their employees from suit on any and all tort claims in which recovery of damages is sought. See § 4011(a). Employees, but not the governmental entity itself, may be held personally liable for acts or omissions causing property damage, bodily injury, or death where their acts were performed with wanton negligence. See § 4011(c). Governmental entities, but not their employees, may be held liable for negligent acts causing property damage, bodily injury, or death under the circumstances set forth in § 4012.
County and Talleyville also rely on the immunity provided by the emergency care statute found at 16 Del.C. § 6801. 2 This statute protects, among others, certified emergency medical care attendants and technicians rendering emergency medical treatment, unless their acts or omissions amount to gross negligence or wilful or wanton misconduct.
Plaintiff argues in response that the defendants demonstrated wanton misconduct in their attempts to extricate him from the accident scene and that they are therefore not protected by the statutory immunities. Plaintiff offers the affidavit of John E. Hocutt, M.D., who avers that within reasonable medical probability the conduct of the defendants was reckless in choosing to risk further injury to the plaintiff by taking him across the river rather than up the ground path. Dr. Hocutt indicates that a quick examination of the river conditions should have revealed to the rescuers that the Stokes basket containing plaintiff could not have received any significant support from the rescuers or the hemp line. Knowing full well that stability of the head and neck in such cases is of crucial importance, the affiant suggests, the rescuers nonetheless proceeded to transport a patient suffering from a spinal cord injury in a motion-packed, unstable method.
Defendants rely on the affidavit of William Kraut, M.D., who avers that the rescue personnel exercised the appropriate standard of care in the manner and method of immobilizing plaintiff in preparation for transport, in rendering medical treatment at the scene, and in transporting plaintiff from the scene to the emergency room at the Wilmington Medical Center. Dr. Kraut posits that plaintiff's quadriplegia resulted from the dive or fall over the Brandywine falls and not from any action taken by the rescuers.
Wanton conduct occurs when a person, with no intent to cause harm, performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he either knows or should know that there is an imminent likelihood of harm which can result. Yankanwich v. Wharton, Del.Supr., 460 A.2d 1326, 1331 (1983). It is manifest in an "I don't care" attitude that demonstrates a conscious indifference to the consequence of one's actions. McHugh v. Brown, Del.Supr., 125 A.2d 583, 586 (1956).
The existence of negligence in any degree is normally a question for the finder of fact. Whether the plaintiff has presented evidence that is legally sufficient to take the issue to the jury, however, is a matter for the Court to decide. Submission is required if there is any evidence, however slight, tending to prove that the defendants acted with the degree of negligence pleaded by the plaintiff. Only when one conclusion can be drawn from undisputed material facts may such questions be determined as a matter of law. Caine v. New Castle County, Del.Supr., 379 A.2d 1112, 1116 (1977).
As is required in summary judgment cases, the Court has examined the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver Incorporated, Del.Super., 312 A.2d 322, 325 (1973). Upon reflection, the Court is not convinced that reasonable minds could not differ with respect to the quality of the defendant's conduct. The Court is particularly impressed in this regard with the...
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