Sadler v. State, No. 10-07-00323-CR (Tex. App. 4/29/2009)
| Decision Date | 29 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-07-00323-CR.,10-07-00323-CR. |
| Parties | MICHAEL SHAWN SADLER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the 220th District Court, Bosque County, Texas, Trial Court No. 14104.
Affirmed.
Before Cheif Justice GRAY, Justice REYNA, and, Justice DAVIS.
A jury convicted Michael Shawn Sadler of murder and assessed his punishment at thirty years' imprisonment. Sadler argues on appeal that the court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of an extraneous offense; (2) permitting the State to impeach his fiancé on a collateral issue; (3) admitting various hearsay statements which did not qualify under exceptions for excited utterances, statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, or dying declarations; (4) admitting a videotaped interview of the victim in violation of Sadler's right of confrontation; and (5) admitting a prior written statement which was not inconsistent with his testimony. We will affirm.
Sadler, Luis Castillo, and others were attending a gathering on a Saturday night at the apartment of Rachel Byrd. At some point, an argument arose between Sadler and Castillo which involved some pushing and shoving. The party ended around 1:30 or 2:00 in the morning. When Sadler left, he called Byrd and told her that Castillo was injured and lying in the parking lot. Byrd and Larry Whatley went out and found Castillo lying on the ground, injured badly, and unable to move his arms or legs. Castillo told them that Sadler had assaulted him. He did not want to seek medical attention so they carried him into Byrd's apartment.
Around 8:00 or 8:30 that morning, Byrd called for an ambulance, and Castillo was taken to the local hospital in Clifton. Because of the extent of his injuries, he was later transported to Scott & White Hospital in Temple. The treating physician at Scott & White testified that Castillo essentially suffered a broken neck. He was placed on a ventilator within a few hours after his arrival at Scott & White.
Clifton Police Chief Rex Childress received a call from Scott & White on Wednesday advising that Castillo was about to be taken off the ventilator at his own request and that he may not survive for long afterward. Childress went to the hospital to conduct a videotaped interview that afternoon. During the interview, Castillo indicated that Sadler had assaulted him.
With limited treatment options available, Castillo was taken off the ventilator. He died about two weeks after the assault.
Sadler contends in his first point that the court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that Whatley and he had smoked methamphetamine in Byrd's apartment.
Sadler arrived at Byrd's apartment around 11:30 that night. Byrd testified over objection that Sadler asked her for a piece of tin foil and that Whatley and Sadler then went into the bathroom and closed the door. Although she did not see what they did with the foil, she testified over objection that she assumed they used the foil to smoke methamphetamine. At some point thereafter, Sadler got into the argument with Castillo. Byrd and Whatley estimated that Sadler called Byrd around 1:30 in the morning to tell her that Castillo was lying in the parking lot. Castillo's treating physician at Scott & White testified that a person who uses methamphetamine "can exhibit irrational and volatile type behavior."
The court admitted Byrd's and Whatley's testimony as relevant to Sadler's state of mind under article 38.36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, at Sadler's request, provided a limiting instruction to the jury both at the time the evidence was admitted and again in the charge. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36(a) (Vernon 2005) ().
Sadler contends that this evidence is inadmissible under the reasoning of Lopez v. State. 928 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In that case, the State offered evidence that a murder defendant had used drugs on a different occasion1 and argued that this evidence was relevant to show the defendant's motive. Id. at 530-32. The Court held that this evidence was irrelevant because there was no evidence that Lopez was under the influence of drugs when the murder occurred. Id. at 532.
Sadler's case is different. He used methamphetamine within one and one-half or two hours before Castillo was assaulted. The doctor testified that methamphetamine use can lead to "irrational" or "volatile" behavior. Thus, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence on the issue of Sadler's state of mind at the time of the offense. See Saxer v. State, 115 S.W.3d 765, 776-79 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. ref'd) (). Sadler's first point is overruled.
Sadler argues in his second point that the court abused its discretion by permitting the State to cross-examine his fiancé about a collateral issue. The State responds that this issue has not been preserved for our review.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the fiancé whether Sadler was a violent person or whether he had ever been violent toward her. She said no to both questions. When she conceded that she had once reported him to the police, the prosecutor showed her the sworn statement she had given on that occasion and discussed several of the things she said in the statement. The court admitted the statement in evidence over Sadler's objection that it violated the best evidence rule. When the prosecutor started reading the statement, Sadler made a relevance objection which was implicitly overruled because the prosecutor was allowed to continue reading. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A). In the statement, the fiancé told of an argument during which Sadler had threatened to "beat the hell out of [her] and any cops that get in [his] way."
The standards of procedural default . . are not to be implemented by splitting hairs in the appellate courts. As regards specificity, all a party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a complaint on appeal is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.
Rivas v. State, 275 S.W.3d 880, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (1992)).
Though we are not to "split hairs," Sadler's general relevance objection is not sufficiently specific to preserve this issue for appellate review. See Barnard v. State, 730 S.W.2d 703, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Marcel v. State, No. 01-00-1140-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 8590, at *5-6 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 27, 2001, pet. ref'd) ().2 Sadler's second point is overruled.
Sadler contends in his third point that the court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of six witnesses regarding hearsay statements Castillo made to them identifying Sadler as his assailant. Specifically, Sadler argues that these statements are not admissible as excited utterances because they were made in response to questioning and because there is nothing to suggest that Castillo was still under the stress of excitement caused by his assault. Here, we will limit our discussion to the testimony of four witnesses whose testimony is either admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule or not at all.
Byrd and Whatley went out to find Castillo after receiving Sadler's phone call. Whatley testified over objection that Castillo told him "Michael beat me" when Whatley found him in the parking lot. According to Whatley, Castillo also said, Byrd testified over objection that Castillo said "Michael tried to kill me." According to Byrd, he said, "Oh help me" when they first got to him. She testified, without objection, that Castillo repeated this statement after they took him inside her apartment. Byrd testified that Castillo was "suffering" and "moaning" as he lay in her apartment.
Byrd's friend Tammy Rhodes came over after daylight the next morning. Rhodes testified without objection that Castillo said "Michael tried to kill me." Rhodes repeated the statement a few moments later over Sadler's objection. Rhodes later repeated the statement a third time without objection. Rhodes did not offer any testimony regarding Castillo's emotional state that morning. Because Sadler failed to object two of the three times Rhodes testified about Castillo's statement, we hold that Sadler failed to preserve his complaint with regard to Rhodes's testimony.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).
Castillo's friend Misty Bronstad came to see him in the emergency room around noon on Sunday. She testified that he "was visibly in pain," appeared to be under the stress of "being beaten up," and "was in shock." Over objection, she testified that Castillo told her that Sadler "tried to kill me" when she asked him what had happened.
Rule of Evidence 803(2) defines an excited utterance as "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." TEX. R. EVID. 803(2).
To determine whether a statement is an excited utterance, trial courts should determine "whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event or condition" when the statement is made. Factors that the trial court may consider include the length of time between the occurrence and the statement, the nature of the declarant, whether the statement is...
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