Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC

• Decision Date: 31 March 1981
• Docket Number: 81-1174,Nos. 81-1138,A,AFL-CIO-CL,AFL-CIO-CLC,s. 81-1138
• Citation: 645 F.2d 1114,207 U.S.App.D.C. 189
• Parties: 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2942, 207 U.S.App.D.C. 189, 91 Lab.Cas. P 12,696 Edward SADLOWSKI, Jr., et al. v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,ppellant, F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor. Edward SADLOWSKI, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1114

645 F.2d 1114

106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2942, 207 U.S.App.D.C. 189,

91 Lab.Cas. P 12,696

Edward SADLOWSKI, Jr., et al. v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO-CLC, Appellant, F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor.

Edward SADLOWSKI, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO-CLC, et al.

Nos. 81-1138, 81-1174.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 3, 1981.

Decided March 31, 1981.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil Action No. 79-02953).

Michael Gottesman, Washington, D. C., with whom Robert M. Weinberg, Gary L. Sasso and David M. Sieberman, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC appellant in No. 81-1138 and appellee in No. 81-1174.

Joseph A. Yablonski, Washington, D. C., with whom Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., John Silard and Daniel B. Edelman, Washington, D. C., were on brief for Sadlowski, Jr., et al., appellees in No. 81-1138 and cross/appellants in No. 81-1174. Charles R. Both, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for Sadlowski, Jr., et al., appellees in No. 81-1138 and cross/appellants in No. 81-1174.

Jason Kogan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Charles F. C. Ruff, U. S. Atty. and Kenneth M. Raisler, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., were on motion for summary affirmance.

Before MacKINNON and ROBB, Circuit Judges and AUBREY E. ROBINSON, Jr., ^* United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:

The appellees, Sadlowski, Jr., et al., attack Article V, Section 27 of the Constitution of the United Steelworkers of America (Union) which prohibits a candidate for Union office from receiving any campaign contributions from persons who are not members of the Union. In the hotly contested election for International President of the United Steelworkers of America in 1977, Edward Sadlowski, Jr., the defeated candidate, received substantial financial support from nonmembers and made a very substantial run against the candidate supported by the incumbent leadership. Shortly thereafter the Union amended its Constitution in Article V, Section 27 to prohibit absolutely any outside financial contributions. Sadlowski and others then brought this action to invalidate the "outsider" rule, claiming that the rule violated their rights under the First Amendment, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168, and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531. On cross-motions for summary judgment the district court held the outsider rule violated rights of union members protected by the right to sue provision in the Bill of Rights for Union members included in the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4), and declared Section 27 invalid in its entirety. The Union filed this appeal and, since the next election for international officers is scheduled for May 28, 1981, the case has been given expedited consideration. We affirm, with one minor exception, the order declaring Article V, Section 27 invalid and enjoining the Union from enforcing it.

I. BACKGROUND

In the 1977 election for International President of the United Steelworkers of America which has some 1.3 million members Edward Sadlowski, Jr., opposed Lloyd McBride in a heated campaign to succeed the retiring I. W. Abel. McBride enjoyed the support of the Union's incumbent leadership; Sadlowski was the insurgent challenger. ¹

] Sadlowski received substantial campaign contributions from sources outside the Union, and McBride received most of his financial support from the staff of the Union.

Sadlowski received 249,281 votes to McBride's 328,861 and the other members of his insurgent slate were also defeated. He contested the validity of the election, but the Secretary of Labor refused to initiate legal proceedings to overturn the announced result, and a legal challenge to the Secretary's refusal failed. See Sadlowski v. Marshall, 464 F.Supp. 858 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem., No. 79-1461 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905, 100 S.Ct. 2987, 64 L.Ed.2d 854 (1980).

The next biennial convention of the Union in 1978 enacted Article V, Section 27 (set forth as an Appendix to this opinion) as an amendment to the Union Constitution. In addition to imposing a blanket prohibition on campaign contributions by persons other than union members (with an exception for volunteered time), Section 27 empowered the International Executive Board to promulgate implementing regulations and created the Campaign Contribution Administrative Committee "to administer and enforce" the outsider rule. The rule represents the first attempt by an American labor union to so restrict financial support for candidates for union office. ²

Sadlowski and others ³ brought suit in late 1979 to challenge the validity of the outsider rule. The Union and the Secretary of Labor were named as defendants. Plaintiffs complained that the outsider rule violated the First Amendment rights of both members and nonmembers; the National Labor Relations Act since it must be read consonant with the First Amendment; the right to sue provision of the LMRDA; and section 401(g) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 481(g), which prohibits candidates for union office from receiving campaign contributions from employers or union funds. After various motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were filed and argued, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their right to sue claim and the Secretary's motion to dismiss the case as to him for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' remaining motions were denied and the Union's remaining countermotions were granted. The Union and the plaintiffs have appealed those parts of the district court's order that were adverse to them.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Right to Sue

The district court held the outsider rule violated section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4), the so-called No candidate (including a prospective candidate) for any position set forth in Article IV, Section 1, ( ⁴ and supporter of a candidate may solicit or accept financial support, or any other direct or indirect support of any kind (except an individual's own volunteered personal time) from any nonmember.

right to sue provision. The outsider rule attempts to accomplish its purpose of outlawing outside campaign contributions in a single sentence, which provides:

The right to sue provision, found in the Bill of Rights for Union Members ⁵ section of the LMRDA, states:

No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency ... or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with any legislator ....

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4).

We have no difficulty in ruling that the outsider rule on its face violates this right to sue provision. The language of the rule prohibiting candidates from receiving any financial support is all-encompassing and absolute. It prohibits the solicitation or acceptance of "financial support, or any other direct or indirect support of any kind" from a nonmember, except for time volunteered by an individual. This blanket prohibition, inter alia, would stop a candidate from using outside money to pay for a lawyer's services, from accepting the services of a lawyer for a reduced rate, or from accepting the donated services of a lawyer if the lawyer's typist, secretary or other helper contributed to the product. One need look no further than the 1977 election for International President to see the crucial role that a lawyer's advice and other services play in an insurgent's quest for office against candidates supported by entrenched incumbents. Prior to the election Sadlowski filed several lawsuits and defended others. He also filed suits after the election. This background strongly indicates that restricting a member's right to sue was one of the Union's purposes in prohibiting outside financial support.

The Union claims that a construction of the outsider rule by the Campaign Contribution Administrative Committee (Administrative Committee) demonstrates the outsider rule does not affect the rights protected by section 101(a)(4). Shortly after plaintiffs filed this lawsuit the Union's lawyer requested the Administrative Committee to issue an advisory opinion concerning the impact of the outsider rule on the right to sue. The Committee cast the question before it as

whether direct or indirect support by nonmembers to finance a lawsuit asserting candidates' legal rights in connection with elections constitutes support for the purpose of influencing an election.

Union's Brief at A-3 (emphasis added). The Committee concluded that the outsider rule did not prohibit contributions to finance litigation, stating:

This limitation on candidacy support cannot be interpreted so broadly. An intention to limit one's access to the judicial system, a province which is so fundamental to the structure of government, cannot be inferred. It would have to be established by clear and convincing expressions Id. at A-4. We have difficulty accepting this formulation of the issue or this construction of the expansive prohibition stated in the outsider rule. ⁶ We need not determine whether this construction saves the rule, however, because the Administrative Committee later confused the matter in an attempt to explain the limits of the opinion and in responding to a supplemental question. The opinion continued,

of intent. This is not the case here.

This opinion is, of course, confined to services which are in fact legal services customarily performed by lawyers. The Committee recognizes the possibility that any ruling which it makes in general terms and in response...