Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400

• Decision Date: 31 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. S085736.,S085736.
• Citation: 23 P.3d 1143,25 Cal.4th 763,107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Marianne SAELZLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ADVANCED GROUP 400 et al., Defendants and Respondents.

107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617

25 Cal.4th 763

23 P.3d 1143

Marianne SAELZLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ADVANCED GROUP 400 et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S085736.

Supreme Court of California.

May 31, 2001.

Law Offices of Theodore Wolfberg, Daniel B. Wolfberg, Santa Monica, Andrew D. Wolfberg; Law Offices of Michael Paul Thomas and Michael Paul Thomas, Newport Beach, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Early, Maslach, Price & Baukol and Priscilla F. Slocum, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents.

Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Barbara W. Ravitz and Barbara Springer Perry, Beverly Hills, for Building Owners and Managers Association of Greater Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Stephan, Oringher, Richman & Theodora, Harry W.R. Chamberlain II, Efrat M. Cogan; Robie & Matthai and Pamela E. Dunn, Los Angeles, for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Gordon & Rees, Michael T. Lucey and David Collins, San Francisco, for Association of Defense Counsel of Northern California and Nevada as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for the Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Horvitz & Levy, Frederic D. Cohen, Andrea M. Gauthier, Encino, and Orly Degani, San Francisco, for the University of Southern California, the University of California, California State University, the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, California Institute of Technology, Loma Linda University, Pepperdine University, Sutter Health, State Farm General Insurance Company, Truck Insurance Exchange, Fire Insurance Exchange, Mid-Century Insurance Company, Civic Property and Casualty Company, Exact Property and Casualty Company and Neighborhood Spirit Property and Casualty Company as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

CHIN, J.

We granted review in this case to consider important issues concerning the liability of apartment owners and other business enterprises to persons injured on their premises by the criminal acts of others, a liability based solely on the business owners' negligent failure to provide adequate security measures to protect those who enter their property. The difficulty in resolving these issues is enhanced by the need to balance two important and competing policy concerns: society's interest in compensating persons injured by another's negligent acts, and its reluctance to impose unrealistic financial burdens on property owners conducting legitimate business enterprises on their premises. In this case, we attempt to balance these interests consistent with prior case precedent. As will appear, we conclude (contrary to the Court of Appeal below) that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendants based on plaintiffs failure adequately to demonstrate that defendants' negligence was an actual, legal cause of her injuries. Here, plaintiff alleged she was assaulted on defendants' premises by unknown assailants after she attempted to deliver a package to an apartment resident. Although plaintiffs evidence raised triable issues as to whether defendants owed her a duty of care and breached that duty by failing to provide additional security guards or functioning, locked security gates, her evidence was insufficient to show, as a triable factual issue, that defendants' asserted breach of duty actually caused her injuries. Plaintiff acknowledges that her assailants were never apprehended and their identity remains unknown to her. Accordingly, she is unable to prove they would not have succeeded in assaulting her if defendants had provided additional security precautions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because plaintiff appeals from an order granting defendants summary judgment, we must independently examine the record to determine whether triable issues of material fact exist. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, 100 Cal. Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089 (Guz); Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1181, 1188, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 35, 989 P.2d 121 (Sharon P.); Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673-674, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207 (Ann M.).) We stated in Sharon P., involving a similar negligence claim resolved on summary judgment, that "To prevail on her action in negligence, plaintiff must show that defendants owed her a legal duty, that they breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of her injuries. (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 673, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207.) Since defendants obtained summary judgment in their favor, `we review the record de novo to determine whether [they have] conclusively negated a necessary element of the plaintiffs case or demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of trial.' (Id. at pp. 673-674, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207.)" (Sharon P., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1188, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 35, 989 P.2d 121.)

We recently observed in Guz that amendments to the California summary judgment statute may have modified the foregoing traditional rule by clarifying that "a moving defendant could obtain summary judgment solely by showing after opportunity for discovery, that the opposing plaintiff had failed to present triable evidence crucial to his case [citation]." (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 335, fn. 7, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089; see also id. at pp. 372-374, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089 (cone. opn. of Chin, J.); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2) [if defendant shows element of plaintiffs case cannot be established, burden shifts to plaintiff to show triable issue of fact, a showing supported by "specific facts," not mere "allegations or denials of its pleadings"]; Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal. App.4th 472, 482, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 785 (Leslie G.).)

We agree that the amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c have modified the rule recited in Sharon P. As stated in Scheiding v.Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 70, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 (Scheiding), "We begin by observing that the nature of summary judgment in California has changed dramatically over the last 10 years. The shifting of the burden of producing evidence that lies at the heart of this appeal could not have occurred under the summary judgment law as it previously existed. Formerly, a moving defendant had to affirmatively negate a cause of action and could not attempt to rely on a plaintiffs vague or otherwise insufficient responses to discovery. Prior to the amendments of section 437c, the burden of proof rested entirely on the moving party to establish a right to summary judgment by demonstrating the negative proposition that the opposing party could not prevail. [Citations.] In most cases, this was a burden impossible to bear." (Italics added.)

Scheiding continued, pointing out that "The 1992 and 1993 amendments ... did not change the fundamental requirement that the moving party prove its right to summary judgment, but did adopt the federal mechanism of burden shifting. The new statute expressly provided that the burden does not shift to a responding party until the moving party (in this context, as usual, a defendant or cross-defendant) has been able to `show' that a cause of action has no merit `because an element of the claim cannot be established or there is a complete defense.' Thus, the amended language of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 437c, like its counterpart Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56 (28 U.S.C.), now places the initial burden on the moving party, and shifts it to the opposing party upon a `showing' that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established. [Citation.]" (Scheiding, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 71-72, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360, italics added; see also Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 581-592, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 653 [legislative history of 1992 and 1993 amendments].)

Therefore, we must determine whether defendants in the present case have shown, through the evidence adduced in this case, including security records and deposition testimony, that plaintiff Saelzler has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish, a prima facie case of causation, a showing that would forecast the inevitability of a nonsuit in defendants' favor. If so, then under such circumstances the trial court was well justified in awarding summary judgment to avoid a useless trial. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 374, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089 (cone. opn. of Chin, J.).)

In performing our de novo review, we must view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff as the losing party (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107, 252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46), liberally construing her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants' own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiffs favor. (Marshak v. Ballesteros (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1517, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 1; Kaplan v. LaBarbera (1997) 58 Cal. App.4th 175, 179, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 903.) We have concluded that, even giving plaintiff the benefit of these favorable rules of construction, her submission in opposition to summary judgment lacked specific facts showing that defendants' alleged negligence was an actual, legal cause of her injuries. In other words, defendants have shown that plaintiff has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish, a prima facie case of causation.

FACTS

On March 15, 1996, plaintiff Marianne Saelzler was an employee of Federal Express. Defendants were owners of the Sherwood Apartments, a 28-building, 300-unit apartment complex located on a several-acre site in Bellflower. Plaintiff came to the complex in midafternoon to deliver a package to a resident. As she...