Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart

• Decision Date: 26 May 1978
• Docket Number: C,NEST-KAR,S.F. 23596
• Citation: 146 Cal.Rptr. 550,579 P.2d 441,21 Cal.3d 322
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 579 P.2d 441 SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Cross-complainant and Respondent, v.ross-defendant and Appellant.

Page 550

146 Cal.Rptr. 550

21 Cal.3d 322, 579 P.2d 441

SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Cross-complainant and Respondent, v. NEST-KART, Cross-defendant and Appellant.

S.F. 23596.

Supreme Court of California.

May 26, 1978.

Robert E. Lee and Robert F. Price, San Francisco, for cross-defendant and appellant.

Burt Pines, City Atty., Los Angeles, John T. Neville, Asst. City Atty., Daniel U. Smith, Deputy City Atty., Ruston, Nance & DiCaro, Donald A. Ruston, Tustin, Donald K. King, Gerald H. Genard, Grace, Neumeyer & Otto, Eugene R. Grace, Richard A. Neumeyer, Arthur Paul Berg, Los Angeles, John W. Wade, Robert A. Seligson, Jacques M. Adler, Roger S. Poore, San Francisco, Haight, Dickson, Brown, Bonesteel & Rigg and Roy G. Weatherup, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of cross-defendant and appellant.

Hoge, Fenton, Jones & Appel, Philip Young and H. R. Lloyd, Jr., San Jose, for cross-complainant and respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

This is the latest in a series of recent cases in which our court has been called upon to determine the effect that our seminal comparative negligence decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, should have on a variety of related areas of California tort law. In American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 143 Cal.Rptr. 692, 574 P.2d 763, we have determined that principles of comparative negligence, applied in Li to apportion responsibility between a negligent plaintiff and a negligent defendant, should be utilized as the basis for apportioning liability among multiple negligent tortfeasors pursuant to a comparative indemnity doctrine. In Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 we have concluded that comparative fault principles should be applied to apportion responsibility between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent plaintiff in a product liability action.

In the instant case, we confront an issue which in some respects represents a synthesis of the issues presented in American Motorcycle and Daly. The issue raised here is whether the comparative fault principle of Li should be utilized as the basis for apportioning liability between two tortfeasors, one whose liability rests upon California's strict product liability doctrine and the other whose liability derives, at least in part, from negligence theory.

We have determined that, in light of our holdings in American Motorcycle and Daly, liability in the instant case can and should appropriately be apportioned between the two tortfeasors in conformity with the comparative fault findings rendered by the jury at trial. Because the trial court's decision in this case was based on its belief that apportionment on such a comparative fault basis was not possible under present California law, we conclude that the challenged order must be reversed.

1. The facts.

In January 1972, plaintiff Rita Elliot was injured in a Safeway supermarket when the shopping cart she was using broke and fell on her foot, causing serious injuries requiring surgery. Plaintiff brought suit against Safeway (the owner of the shopping cart who had made it available for customers' use), Nest-Kart, a division of Folding Carrier Corporation (the manufacturer of the cart), and Technibilt Corporation (a company that, on occasion, had repaired some of Safeway's shopping carts), alleging that the various defendants were liable for her injuries under both strict product liability and negligence principles; defendants, in response, claimed that the plaintiff's own negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. At trial, the jury absolved both plaintiff and Technibilt of any responsibility for the accident, and returned a verdict for plaintiff of $25,000 against both Safeway and Nest-Kart.

The trial in this matter occurred subsequent to our court's decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, and the trial court, heeding this court's advice in Li to use "broad discretion" in devising procedures to implement that decision's principles (13 Cal.3d at p. 829, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226), directed the jury to make "special findings" indicating first, upon what theory, if any, each defendant was found liable, and second, what proportion of "fault" for the injuries was attributable to each defendant found liable. In response, the jury indicated that Safeway's liability rested on both negligence and strict liability principles, that Nest-Kart's liability was grounded solely on strict liability principles and that Safeway's comparative fault for the accident was 80 percent and Nest-Kart's was 20 percent. ¹

Thereafter, the trial court entered a judgment of $25,000 in favor of plaintiff and against Safeway and Nest-Kart. After the judgment had initially been satisfied by Safeway and Nest-Kart on an 80 percent-20 percent basis, Safeway moved in the trial court for a judgment of contribution to require Nest-Kart to pay an additional 30 percent of the judgment to Safeway, so as to achieve an equal 50-50 apportionment between the two tortfeasors. The trial court, while indicating that "common sense" called for an apportionment of the judgment on a comparative fault basis, ultimately concluded that such comparative apportionment was not permissible in light of the existing statutory contribution provisions. ² Accordingly, acting pursuant to sections 875 and 876 of the Code of Civil Procedure, ³ the trial court granted Safeway's motion and ordered each defendant to bear 50 percent of the judgment. It is from this order that Nest-Kart appeals. ⁴

2. Under the common law equitable indemnity doctrine as modified in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, liability among joint tortfeasors may be apportioned on a comparative fault basis. Such apportionment may appropriately be effected between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent defendant, as well as between multiple negligent defendants.

As noted above, in determining whether to grant Safeway's motion for contribution, the trial court looked solely to California's statutory contribution provisions and, adhering to the interpretation of these statutes established by past decisions (see, e. g., E.B. Wills Co. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 650, 653, 128 Cal.Rptr. 541; Herrero v. Atkinson (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 69, 73, 38 Cal.Rptr. 490), the court concluded that despite the jury's special findings allocating 80 percent of the responsibility for the accident to Safeway and only 20 percent of the responsibility to Nest-Kart, apportionment of the judgment could only be effected on a 50-50 basis.

In evaluating the merits of Safeway's claim against Nest-Kart solely on the basis of the contribution statutes, the trial court was, of course, following the conventional legal analysis which sharply distinguished between the doctrines of contribution and equitable indemnity. (See, e. g., Rollins v. State of California (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 160, 165, 92 Cal.Rptr. 251; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Lan Franco (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 881, 886, 73 Cal.Rptr. 660.) Under this traditional approach, questions as to the apportionment of damages among multiple tortfeasors were seen as presenting solely an issue of contribution; the equitable indemnity doctrine, by contrast, was viewed historically as an all-or-nothing concept concerned only with the complete shifting of liability from one tortfeasor to another, rather than with the sharing of liability between the two.

In the recent American Motorcycle decision, however, after reviewing the origins and development of the common law equitable indemnity doctrine, our court concluded that in light of the principles of Li, the all-or-nothing character of the doctrine should be modified to permit partial indemnity among multiple tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis. (20 Cal.3d at pp. 591-599, 143 Cal.Rptr. 692, 574 P.2d 763.) Our American Motorcycle opinion addressed at some length the question of whether California's present contribution statutes should be interpreted to preclude the evolution of such a common law comparative indemnity doctrine, and concluded that the Legislature did not intend to bar such a common law development. (20 Cal.3d at pp. 599-605, 143 Cal.Rptr. 692, 574 P.2d 763.) Thus, American Motorcycle has now explicitly held that, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the existing contribution statutes do not in themselves necessarily prohibit apportionment of liability among multiple tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.

The question remains, however, whether the comparative indemnity doctrine, recognized in American Motorcycle as a permissible basis for apportioning liability among multiple negligent tortfeasors, may also be applied to apportion liability when, as in the instant case, the liability of one or more defendants derives from principles of strict liability. For a number of reasons, we conclude that the comparative indemnity doctrine does provide an appropriate basis for apportioning liability in such circumstances.

First, and most significantly, we believe that the basic equitable considerations that led our court to adopt a rule permitting comparative apportionment of liability among multiple tortfeasors apply equally in the instant setting. As American Motorcycle explains, although in both origin and development California's implied indemnity doctrine drew its sustenance from fundamental equitable considerations, that doctrine, because of the unyielding all-or-nothing character of the traditional indemnity rule, frequently in actual operation fell far short of its equitable heritage. The doctrine failed to provide for a fair allocation of liability in those many instances in which the responsibility of multiple tortfeasors for an injury called for an apportionment of liability rather than a complete shift of liability from one tortfeasor to another. This fundamental failing of the traditional equitable indemnity doctrine was as...