Saglibene v. Baum
| Decision Date | 20 January 1998 |
| Parties | , 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 416 In the Matter of Harry SAGLIBENE, Appellant, v. Jack BAUM, et al., etc., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Plunkett & Jaffe, P.C., White Plains (Kevin J. Plunkett, of counsel), for respondents.
Russo & Galgano, White Plains (Louis J. Galgano III, of counsel), for appellant.
Before O'BRIEN, J.P., and RITTER, THOMPSON and JOY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Mount Pleasant, dated April 11, 1996, which denied the petitioner's application for an interpretation of the zoning ordinance so as to permit the use of his residential property for a fence construction business as a pre-existing, nonconforming, "customary home occupation" use, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), dated September 17, 1996, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The notice of appeal from the decision entered August 26, 1996, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment dated September 17, 1996.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The petitioner was served with a criminal summons concerning the use of his residential property for a fence construction business. He sought a determination from the respondent Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Mount Pleasant (hereinafter the Board) that the fence construction business conducted on his property constituted a pre-existing, nonconforming use as a "customary home occupation" under a former zoning ordinance which had provided, inter alia, that: "[t]he office of a doctor, artist, lawyer or any other customary home occupation shall be permitted as an incidental use when not located outside the dwelling house, provided there is no display or advertisement of any kind other than the ordinary small name-plate". The Board found that the petitioner's fencing business was not a "customary home occupation" within the meaning of the former zoning code and therefore was not a pre-existing, nonconforming legal use. The petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul the determination. The Supreme Court upheld the Board's determination, and we affirm.
The petitioner is correct that the plain language of the former zoning ordinance at issue does not limit the definition of a "customary home occupation" to a professional office (see, e.g., Simon v. Board of Appeals on Zoning of the City of New Rochelle, 208 A.D.2d 931, 618 N.Y.S.2d 729). Further, that zoning ordinance, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed against the municipality (see, Matter of Frishman v. Schmidt, 61 N.Y.2d 823, 473 N.Y.S.2d 957, 462 N.E.2d 134). However, where, as here, the Town Board which enacted...
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