Saidi-Tabatabai v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 07 August 1967
• Docket Number: SAIDI-TABATABA,P
• Citation: 61 Cal.Rptr. 510,253 Cal.App.2d 257
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Mary Elizabethetitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 31850.

Page 510

61 Cal.Rptr. 510

253 Cal.App.2d 257

Mary Elizabeth SAIDI-TABATABAI, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 31850.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Aug. 7, 1967.

Samuel B. Picone, Beverly Hills, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Evelle J. Younger, Dist. Atty., Harry Wood, Chief, App. Div., and Robert J. Lord, Deputy Dist. Atty., for real party in interest.

McCOY, Associate Justice pro tem. ^*

Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent court to exercise its jurisdiction and to hear her motion to suppress certain evidence.

Following a preliminary hearing, at which the evidence in question was admitted, petitioner was held to answer and an information has been filed charging her with first degree murder. Trial was set for May 8, 1967. On or about April 18, 1967, petitioner filed a motion to suppress two statements taken from her by the police, allegedly in violation of the Miranda rule, and evidence received from one Edward Eisen which it was contended was obtained by use of petitioner's said statements. On April 27, 1967, the court denied the motion to suppress and dismissed the proceedings on the motion. Petitioner alleges that respondent court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear the motion. The trial has been continued until the disposition of this proceeding.

An alternative writ was issued by this court. No answer or return has been filed by respondent court. However, an answer and return was filed by the district attorney for the People of the State of California, as real party in interest. In this return it is alleged that petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested herein 'for the reason that the respondent Superior Court had no power to grant it.' No authorities or judicial interpretations are cited for this position. It is also alleged that petitioner is not entitled to any of the relief sought because at the hearing in the trial court on her motion she produced no competent evidence in support thereof.

The initial question is whether respondent court, in fact, refused to exercise jurisdiction, or where it assumed jurisdiction and its ruling, right or wrong, was made in the exercise thereof.

Petitioner's motion was supported by her declaration and that of her attorney. At a hearing held on April 26 the court heard testimony from three witnesses on behalf of petitioner and received certain documents in evidence. The People filed no counteraffidavits but, rather, at the commencement of the proceedings made the objection that 'this procedure is not proper procedure to take at this time. I think the trial court is concerned with the questions of admissibility of evidence; that a motion to suppress any evidence, any rulings, should be determined by the trial court. I think that this is not a proper motion to bring before this Court.' After some discussion the court told petitioner that 'you may proceed at this time with your motion. I think then this would have to remain for the trial judge to make any further rulings, depending on all matters that are presented.'

Petitioner's counsel sought a stipulation that the declaration of petitioner and that of himself be considered their direct testimony. The deputy district attorney agreed as to the declaration of petitioner, subject to the right of cross-examination, but refused to so stipulate as to the attorney's declaration upon the ground that his declaration contained nothing but hearsay. Petitioner's counsel then requested that he be permitted to testify and the court ruled that he could 'present any witnesses you wish.' The declaration of petitioner's attorney, intended to show that petitioner had not been advised of her constitutional rights, and more particularly that she had not made a knowing and willful waiver thereof, consisted principally of quotations from various documents and reports he had received from the West Covina Police Department, such as the official crime report and detective bureau supplemental reports which, in turn, contained statements taken from various witnesses. The testimony of petitioner's counsel consisted solely of his reading verbatim from his declaration. Upon objection, certain portions were eliminated and the witness was cross-examined. Two other witnesses (Officer Miller, the police officer in charge of the investigation, and Judy Lee Baird, a clerk-stenographer for the West Covina Police Department) were produced on behalf of petitioner and questioned concerning certain police reports and documents upon which petitioner relied as showing that she did not waive her constitutional rights. Some of the reports and documents were received in evidence. Throughout, the People objected upon the ground that not only were declarant's statements hearsay, but that the documents were themselves hearsay and that petitioner must present direct evidence, with an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who made the statements and reports.

When the hearing resumed on the morning of April 27, the judge expressed concern as to the manner of the proceeding in this matter. He made reference to the new Evidence Code, and to the fact that when the question of admissibility of a confession is raised in the trial court the burden is on the district attorney to present evidence. He therefore expressed doubt as to whether the pretrial motion could be heard on affidavits, as to who has the burden of proof, and whether his ruling would be res judicata. He said he thought there may be a distinction 'between the two matters of return of illegally seized evidence and the matter of confessions'; that he would favor the adoption of a similar procedure with regard to confessions or admissions, but that there was no authority in California for it at the present time. After lengthy colloquy between the judge and counsel for both parties, the court stated: 'At this time I am going to deny the motion of the defendant to suppress evidence and dismiss these proceedings. I would state this, that I think some procedures ought to be adopted by the Legislature or the courts for the purpose of making these determinations prior to the actual trial itself. I am not convinced at this point that such proceedings do exist. I would state that this ruling is made certainly without any prejudice to the defendant to raise these issues in front of any trial court, whichever trial court handles this particular matter. * * * If this Court is wrong and procedures can be outlined for the hearing of these matters by way of a motion to suppress evidence, I would be perhaps even favorable to this. My second question arises, however. I am really questioning whether this can be done by way of affidavits or whether we should have all witnesses testify in view of the nature of the matter being presented to the Court.' (Emphasis added.) Petitioner's counsel pointed out that he was not relying solely on affidavits, that oral testimony and documentary evidence had been received, and that he wanted the 'record to be clear upon what your Honor is basing the motion for dismissal, because it becomes important. Your Honor has heard the testimony.' The court stated: 'I think it's clear that I am making this ruling on the basis that I don't think at this point the law provides for the procedures of suppression of evidence, suppression of evidence on a motion to suppress evidence that we have adopted here.' The following colloquy then took place: 'MR. NORMAN (deputy district attorney): Your Honor is not ruling at this time, is he, that the Court does not have the jurisdiction but simply does not wish to exercise its discretion to hold a hearing at this time?

'MR. PICONE (petitioner's attorney): Well now, just a moment, that's a leading and suggestive question. Let the Court declare exactly on what basis he is denying my motion to suppress because this, your Honor knows, is going to become very important.

'THE COURT: It ought to be clear so far as each of you is concerned.

'MR. PICONE: Please, your Honor, for both of our sakes, sir, and for the sake of future law and procedure.

'THE COURT: Your question is: Do I feel I have the discretion to handle this motion at this time?

'MR. NORMAN: Yes, sir, your Honor, in my arguments I mean I was not implying the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter at this time. It was that I felt that the Court's discretion should be exercised and in such a way that the matter should be heard before the trial court, * * * I feel that the Court has the jurisdiction, but I don't feel that it's the proper exercise of its discretion.

'MR. PICONE: Your Honor cannot be exercising, respectfully, its discretion because I haven't rested. Your Honor doesn't know what other evidence I have. The People have not. So, therefore, you are in effect saying I don't have the right to this motion at this time, as I interpret your Honor's ruling.

'THE COURT: This is what I am saying. * * * I think the record should be clear that I am deciding that you do not have the right to this motion at this time. Therefore, in the event that I am wrong * * * I would think that you should have adequate time to take this up to the District Court of Appeals. I think, furthermore, the issue ought to be decided whether this can be heard by way of affidavit or would require direct testimony of all witnesses. You see, what I'm worried about is the procedure we're involved in. * * * I think, too, that there is an issue of whether the ruling of the Court would be res adjudicata or not. If it is, it certainly makes a difference as to how it should be handled and who has the burden of proof on this particular issue on which there seems to be some dispute between counsel. I will make the ruling, and it's based on the fact that I don't think the Court has jurisdiction to...