Saint Joseph's College v. Morrison, Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 472A205,472A205 |
| Citation | 302 N.E.2d 865,158 Ind.App. 272 |
| Parties | SAINT JOSEPH'S COLLEGE et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees (Cross-Defendants below), v. MORRISON, INC., Appellee and Cross-Appellant (Cross-Complainant below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Lester Murphy Jr., Murphy, McAtee, Murphy & Costanza, East Chicago, for appellee and cross-appellant.
Both parties appeal from a judgment awarding damages and attorney's fees to the Cross-Complainant, Morrison, Inc. (Morrison), who sought to enforce a single mechanic's lien for work done pursuant to a written subcontract and an oral contract for the construction of a project for the Cross-Defendants, Saint Joseph's College et al. (College).
We reverse and remand.
The facts and evidence most favorable to the judgment of the trial court are:
On October 31, 1961, College contracted with Superior Construction Company, Inc. (Superior), as general contractor to construct a student center building and faculty residence building on the College's campus at Rensselaer, Indiana.
Thereafter Morrison entered into a written contract with Superior for the purpose of installing the heating, cooling, plumbing, water main and sewer systems for the two buildings in accordance with the plans, specifications, and conditions of the general contract.
During the course of construction of the project, Morrison performed for the College certain 'additional' services, such as repairing and replacing existing underground utilities which were damaged during the construction of the two new buildings, all of which were performed pursuant to a separate oral contract between Morrison and the College.
On January 29, 1964, Morrison filed a single notice of intention to hold a mechanic's lien against the real estate on which the improvements were constructed. Apparently the improvements constructed, consisting of a student center and faculty residence, were in close proximity to each other on the College campus. The notice stated $148,000 was due and unpaid for work in the construction and on its face made no distinction as to work done under the subcontract with Superior and the additional work performed directly for the College under the oral contract.
Subsequently, the instant suit was begun by one of the other subcontractors, and Morrison filed a cross-complaint in two paragraphs. The first paragraph sought compensation for the amount due under the subcontract; the second paragraph sought recovery for the extra work done under the oral contract with the College. Morrison sought attorney's fees and foreclosure of the mechanic's lien under the second paragraph, in addition to damages in the amount of $8,629.28 alleged to be due and owing.
Eventually, all claims of all parties, except Morrison's claim under Paragraph II, were settled and dismissed pursuant to stipulations of the parties.
The matter of the 'additional' work which was in issue under the second paragraph of Morrison's Complaint was tried before the White Circuit Court sitting without a jury beginning October 27, 1970. The trial court heard evidence and spent considerable effort deciding which of these charges were contemplated by the written subcontract, and thus not separately compensable, and which charges were for work performed pursuant to the oral contract between College and Morrison. The court's findings and judgment were entered on July 29, 1971.
The trial court found that two separate contracts existed: the written contract under which Morrison was a subcontractor, and the oral one under which Morrison had engaged in the 'additional' work.
It also determined that Morrison did not have a valid mechanic's lien for the work done pursuant to the oral contract with the College.
Of the total amount of $8,629 sought under Paragraph II, the court found that invoices totaling $5,208 were for work which was properly a part of the subcontract, and thus not recoverable under Paragraph II of the cross-complaint. The remaining invoices, totaling $3,421, were held to represent work done under Morrison's oral contract with the College. To this amount the court added interest in the amount of $1,334 and attorney fees of $3,500.
Pertinent parts of the judgment are hereinafter set out verbatim.
Both parties filed Motions to Correct Errors. In ruling on them, the trial court reiterated its holding that no valid lien existed to support the oral contract for the additional work and stated that it awarded attorney fees in favor of Morrison under its general equity power to do justice between the parties.
Also the court refused to rule on whether or not a timely lien notice had been filed as to the oral contract because to do so would have no consequential effect.
From this judgment Morrison and the College have brought this appeal.
ISSUE ONE. May attorney fees be awarded to a mechanic 1 seeking to enforce an invalid lien?
ISSUE TWO. Did the trial court commit an error of law in basing its judgment on the premise that a valid mechanic's lien cannot embrace work done under two separate contracts?
As to ISSUE ONE, College argues that absent statutory or contractual authorization, a court is powerless to award attorney fees to a mechanic seeking to enforce a non-existing lien, i.e., no lien, no attorney fees.
Morrison answers that their mechanic's lien is valid because the single lien filed included the work under the oral contract and therefore supports an award for attorney fees; and further the trial court's holding that the lien was invalid was only a technicality, and that under these circumstances equity could intervene and grant the attorney fees which would otherwise have been awarded.
As to ISSUE TWO, College contends that under no circumstances may a single lien be filed to cover work done under two separate contracts.
Morrison answers that claims arising under the two contracts may be joined in a single lien, and that the lien filed was therefore valid.
Morrison asserts as an issue that the trial court improperly ruled that its mechanic's lien had been released by its release and settlement of its claims under Paragraph I of its cross-complaint. The issue arises, Morrison contends, from the following language in the judgment:
'Morrison, having compromised and made settlement of the issues under its Paragraph I and executed a Release cannot now prevail in its action on that Mechanic's Lien in its action against College.'
Contradictory of any such release, Morrison says, is this language in the release and settlement:
'This instrument in no way releases a claim Morrison is asserting against College College, however, interprets the court's words to refer only to a release of those invoices held to be a part of the written contract and not the oral contract. As we must construe the judgment of the trial court below in such a way as to support that judgment, if possible (Rule TR. 52(A), IC 1971, 34--5--1--1, Hiatt v. Yergin, (Ind.App.1972) 284 N.E.2d 834, 842), we agree with College's interpretation and therefore find no issue for decision on appeal.
on a direct claim against College [158 Ind.App. 277] on a contract with it. That claim remains pending as the second paragraph of the cross-complaint of Morrison in the above described action in the White Circuit Court.'
ISSUE ONE.
CONCLUSION--It is our opinion that attorney fees may not be awarded to a mechanic seeking to enforce an invalid lien, even though otherwise entitled to damages for breach of contract.
In general, mechanics' lien laws exist for the benefit of persons rendering services or furnishing machinery or material to the owner of land. While equitable in nature, such liens did not exist at common law. Moore-Mansfield Construction Co. v. Indianapolis, New Castle & Toledo Ry. Co. (1913) 179 Ind. 356, 101 N.E. 296. And one who would avail himself of the special remedies created under the law must bring himself within those statutory provisions. Although remedial in nature, these statutes are liberally construed only insofar as determining the remedies available to one who has already satisfied the strict provisions of the law. See, Rudd v. Anderson, (Ind.App.1972) 285 N.E.2d 836. Such statutes must be strictly construed in order to determine whether the mechanic qualified himself under the statute to receive the liberal remedies there available. Puritan Engineering Corp. v. Robinson, (1934) 207 Ind. 58, 191 N.E. 141.
In Indiana the applicable provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Law are contained in IC 32--8--3--14, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 43--707 (Burns 1965 Repl.), which provides:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The unambiguous intent of the statute is that the lienholder-plaintiff is only entitled to recover attorney's fees if he is successful in securing a judgment for the enforcement of a valid lien as contemplated by the earlier sections of the Statute.
As the court found Morrison did not hold a valid, enforceable lien as to the oral contract, attorney's fees could not be awarded under this exclusive section of the Mechanics' Lien Statute. Morrison may have been entitled to judgment for damages for...
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