Saipan Stevedore Co. Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

• Decision Date: 06 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-70836,96-70836
• Citation: 133 F.3d 717
• Parties: , 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 91, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 165 SAIPAN STEVEDORE COMPANY INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS; Helal Uddin, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 717

133 F.3d 717

1998 A.M.C. 680, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 91,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 165

SAIPAN STEVEDORE COMPANY INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS; Helal Uddin, Respondents.

No. 96-70836.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 6, 1997.

Decided Jan. 6, 1998.

Traylor T. Mercer, Agana, Guam, for petitioner.

Joshua T. Gillelan, II, Office of Workers' Compensation, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Petition to Review a Decision of the Workers' Compensation Program. BRB No. 93-1947.

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

In this case, we consider the extent to which a Congressional Act follows the flag. Specifically, we are required to decide whether the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act applies to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. We hold that it does and affirm the Benefits Review Board.

I

The events precipitating this appeal began in June 1987, with an errant ship derrick and an injured stevedore. Helal Uddin was unloading a container on the Pacific Rim which was docked on the Island of Saipan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The derrick suddenly malfunctioned, loosening wire runners and sending a large brass container hook pedulating uncontrollably. Uddin jumped to avoid the violently swaying clasp and severely injured his back. Unable to walk for a month, he left his employment with appellant Saipan Stevedore Company, Inc. ("Saipan Stevedore") and obtained lighter work as a security guard.

Uddin filed for compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq., in 1990. At the time of the accident, the Commonwealth had no general workers' compensation law. ¹

Saipan Stevedore contested the claim, arguing that the Act did not apply to the Commonwealth. In November 1992, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denied Saipan Stevedore's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and held that the Act applied to the Commonwealth. After a hearing on the merits, the ALJ awarded benefits to Uddin. On appeal, the Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ's jurisdictional determination. ² This timely appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1823, and review this question of law de novo. Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir.1997).

II

On its face, the jurisdictional reach of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act seems plain enough. It includes the "several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, including the territorial waters thereof." ³ 33 U.S.C. § 902(9). Because the Commonwealth is a United States territory, completion of the syllogism should end the inquiry. However, Saipan Stevedore urges us to explore the nuances of the noun "territory" in its historic context. Because appellant's position is founded on that examination, we shall. However, at journey's end we are left where we began, and conclude that Congress meant what it said.

A

The Northern Mariana Islands are a chain of thirteen single islands and one group of three small islands located in the western Pacific Ocean near Guam. The total land surface is about 185 square miles; the three largest islands are Saipan (47 square miles), Tinian (39 square miles) and Rota (32 square miles). The Northern Mariana Islands are north of Guam and approximately 3900 miles west of Honolulu. The current population is estimated at near 60,000. ⁴

Spain controlled the islands from the sixteenth century until the Spanish-American war. In 1898, after the war ended, Spain ceded Guam to the United States and sold the rest of the Marianas chain to Germany. Germany's brief control ended with the commencement of World War I when Japan took possession of all islands except Guam. After World War I, Japan continued to govern most of what is now considered Micronesia, including the Northern Mariana Islands, under a mandate from the League of Nations.

By the end of World War II, most of the Micronesian islands were occupied by the United States military. In 1947, the United Nations designated Micronesia a "strategic trust territory" and appointed the United States as trustee. ⁵ During the trusteeship period, the United States had the power to apply federal laws in the Northern Mariana Islands, but did so only to a limited extent. Under the Trusteeship system, the United States was "placed in a temporary guardian relationship with the trust territories for the purpose of fostering the well-being and development of the territories into self-governing states." ⁶ Under the Trust Agreement, citizens of the Northern Mariana Islands were not citizens or nationals of the United States.

In the early 1970s, the Northern Marianas ideologically diverged from the rest of Micronesia and sought a closer, more permanent relationship with the United States. In 1975, negotiations resulted in a legislative-executive agreement which redefined the political relationship between the United States and the Commonwealth. The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America ("Covenant"), ratified by Congress by joint resolution, ⁷ established the Commonwealth as an unincorporated territory of the United States. ⁸ See 48 U.S.C. § 1801 and note; Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.1990). The Covenant The general application of federal statutes to the Commonwealth contains one proviso: if congressional legislation is not applicable to the states, the Commonwealth must be specifically named in the legislation to be effective in the Northern Marianas. Id.

                governs the relationship between the United States and the Commonwealth. 9  U.S. ex rel. Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749, 754 (9th Cir.1993).  The Covenant provides that the "United States may enact legislation in accordance with its constitutional processes which will be applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands."   Covenant, § 105.  In effect, the Covenant acknowledges Congressional power over territories as provided in the Constitution's territorial clause which provides that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."  U.S. Const., art IV, § 3.  However, although the territorial clause provides the Constitutional basis for Congress' legislative authority in the Commonwealth, it is by the Covenant that we measure the limits of that power.  Richards, 4 F.3d at 754
                

The extent to which federal laws enacted prior to January 9, 1978 affect the Commonwealth is governed by § 502 of the Covenant, found at 48 U.S.C. § 1801:

(a) The following laws of the United States in existence on the effective date of this Section and subsequent amendments to such laws will apply to the Northern Mariana Islands, except as otherwise provided in this Covenant:

(1) ...

(2) those laws not described in paragraph (1) which are applicable to Guam and which are of general application to the several States as they are applicable to the several States;

Thus, previously enacted laws which are of general application to the States and which apply to Guam, apply to the Northern Mariana Islands.

The Covenant codifies the Commonwealth's determination that its legal rights and obligations more closely parallel those of the residents of Guam, rather than any other United States territory. American "rule" over the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands derives its legitimacy from the consent of the Northern Mariana people and from our national respect for the unique customs and values that have developed over hundreds of years. As a result, to the extent not expressly covered by the Covenant, the interpretation and application of federal laws under Covenant § 502 must take into account these historical and cultural considerations.

B

The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 ("Act" or "LHWCA"), was adopted in 1927 in order to provide workers' compensation for non-crew-member maritime workers, particularly longshoremen. Enactment was prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917), which held that the individual States were without power to extend their workers' compensation laws to longshoremen "injured on the gangplank between a ship and a pier." Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 257, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 2353-54, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977). Thus, longshoremen injured on the land side of a vessel or pier fell within the protection of state workers' compensation schemes, but those injured on the seaward side of the pier were without a remedy. Jensen held that states could not cover those workers because of the exclusive federal jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters.

Congress appeared determined to remedy this inequity. However, its initial attempts were rebuffed by the Supreme Court as improper delegations of admiralty jurisdiction. ¹⁰ Recognizing that comprehensive reform was required, Congress passed the Act, which created a national compensation statute that covered longshoremen and those performing maritime repair work on navigable waters.

III

Given the history of the Northern Mariana Islands and the legislation, we conclude that the Act must apply to the Commonwealth.

First, the Act's plain language supports such a construction. If the intent of Congress is clear from the face of the statutory language, we must give effect to the unambiguously expressed Congressional intent. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Indeed, "if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter." Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781.

The Act on its face applies to the "several State and...