Sakon v. Town of Glastonbury
Citation | 958 A.2d 801,111 Conn.App. 242 |
Decision Date | 18 November 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 28933.,28933. |
Parties | John Alan SAKON v. TOWN OF GLASTONBURY. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
John Alan Sakon, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).
Beth Bryan Critton, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).
GRUENDEL, ROBINSON and FOTI, Js.
The plaintiff, John Alan Sakon, appeals from the judgments of the trial court denying two tax appeals brought pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-117a and 12-119. The defendant in this matter is the town of Glastonbury. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that he was not aggrieved, (2) applied the doctrine of assemblage to determine the value of properties appearing separately on the grand list, (3) determined that the highest and best use of his property was commercial development, (4) concluded that the assessment on the property was proper even though there was no possible use of the property to generate income and (5) found that evidence of the predatory nature of the defendant's commercial property assessments was not admissible. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
This case concerns consolidated tax appeals involving three separate but contiguous parcels of undeveloped land owned or leased by the plaintiff in Glastonbury. None of the parcels has direct frontage, but each has access by way of easements. Together, the three parcels cover approximately 9.36 acres and are located within a commercial zone designated as the planned travel zone.1 The first parcel, Main Street Rear, is comprised of 4.922 acres and was purchased by the plaintiff in 1985 for $210,000. The second parcel, Griswold Street Rear, consists of 1.82 acres and was purchased by the plaintiff in 1988 for $89,000. The third lot, known as 2980 Main Street, consists of 2.56 acres and was acquired by the plaintiff under a long-term lease commencing on February 11, 1999, for a fifty year period with four twelve year options to renew. Pursuant to the lease agreement, the plaintiff pays rent in the amount of $12,500 per year for use of this parcel.
On the grand list of October 1, 2002, the date of the last townwide revaluation, the town's assessor valued the three parcels at $122,425 per acre. The plaintiff appealed from this assessment to the board of assessment appeals (board), and the valuation was reduced to approximately $40,000 per acre. The plaintiff did not appeal from this decision to the Superior Court, and the reduced value appeared on the 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 grand lists.
In 2005, the plaintiff once again appealed from the valuation to the board. The appeal was denied, and, pursuant to § 12-117a, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. The plaintiff also brought a direct claim pursuant to § 12-119, alleging that the defendant had imposed an illegal tax on his property. The two claims were consolidated on January 23, 2006.
At trial, both parties submitted testimony as to the proper valuation of the property. The plaintiff, testifying as to the value of his property, calculated the total value of the three parcels at $18,604 or approximately $2000 per acre. The defendant's expert, the town appraiser, Sean T. Hagearty, calculated the total value of the three parcels as $650,000, or approximately $70,000 per acre. By memorandum of decision, the court found the value of the three parcels to be reflected accurately in the reduced value previously determined by the board—a value of approximately $40,000 per acre. Following the close of evidence, the court found that the plaintiff had not sustained his burden of establishing overvaluation and, thus, denied the claims. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for reargument, which was denied, and this appeal ensued. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff's claims, we first set forth the well settled legal principles underlying a § 12-117a tax appeal, as well as our applicable standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Breezy Knoll Assn., Inc. v. Morris, 286 Conn. 766, 775-76, 946 A.2d 215 (2008).
On appeal, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Narumanchi v. DeStefano, 89 Conn.App. 807, 811-12, 875 A.2d 71 (2005).
Cognizant of these principles, we now turn to our resolution of the claims raised in the present appeal.
The plaintiff's principal claim contests the court's finding that he was not aggrieved pursuant to § 12-117a; however, this claim is based on two specific yet intertwined findings made by the court in support of its conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish aggrievement.2 In reaching its determination that the property was not overassessed by the defendant, the court found applicable the doctrine of assemblage to combine the three parcels for purposes of valuation and then determined that the highest and best use of the assembled property was for commercial purposes. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that both of these findings, as well as the resulting conclusion that he was not aggrieved, is improper.
Before discussing the merits of the underlying claims assailing the aggrievement conclusion, we briefly set forth the legal framework governing aggrievement in tax appeals taken pursuant to § 12-117a. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Westport, 61 Conn.App. 834, 842, 767 A.2d 1237 (2001).
With the foregoing in mind, we turn first to the claims underlying the plaintiff's broader claim that the court improperly determined that he did not establish aggrievement.
The plaintiff claims that the court improperly relied on the doctrine of assemblage in its determination of what constituted the highest and best use for his three parcels, a determination that ultimately affected the court's valuation of his three parcels. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that it is not appropriate to value parcels as an assemblage when the parcels appear separately on the grand list. We are not persuaded.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abington, LLC v. Avon, 101 Conn.App. 709, 715, 922 A.2d 1148 (2007). Indeed, courts have adopted a wide range of valuation methods. See, e.g., id., at 715-17, 922 A.2d 1148 ( ).
In the present matter, the court found that the plaintiff's property was not overvalued at the grand list value of $40,000 per acre because the highest and best use of the parcels was for commercial development. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the plaintiff's proposed valuation overlooked the doctrine of assemblage and the effect that this doctrine has on the property's potential use....
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