Salaam v. Commissioner of Dept. of Transitional Assistance

• Decision Date: 24 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-P-1585,95-P-1585
• Citation: 680 N.E.2d 941,43 Mass.App.Ct. 38
• Parties: Muqeedah SALAAM v. COMMISSIONER OF the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 941

680 N.E.2d 941

43 Mass.App.Ct. 38

Muqeedah SALAAM v. COMMISSIONER OF the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE.

No. 95-P-1585.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts,

Worcester.

Argued March 19, 1997.

Decided June 24, 1997.

Francisca D. Fajana, Worcester, for plaintiff.

Salvatore M. Giorlandino, for defendant.

Before KASS, GREENBERG and FLANNERY, JJ.

GREENBERG, Justice.

Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1988), and chapter 118 of the General Laws, the Department of Transitional Assistance (department), formerly known as the Department of Public Welfare, has authority to provide financial assistance to needy, dependent children and relatives living with them. Such benefits are known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC. ¹ On October 13, 1993, Salaam applied for AFDC benefits for herself and her dependant niece. Her application for benefits was denied on the ground that she had not provided adequate identification. Following an administrative appeal, the hearing officer was unmoved and upheld the denial of benefits. As was her right under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, Salaam sought judicial review in the Superior Court. In that forum, the department prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. We vacate the judgment.

It is well settled that the "purpose of the AFDC program is to enable children, one or both of whose parents are absent or unable to provide support, to continue living at home through the provision of funds for their shelter, food, and other necessary items." Civetti v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 392 Mass. 474, 477, 467 N.E.2d 101 (1984). To qualify for benefits, an applicant must, among other things, establish his or her identity. 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 302.130(B) (1982), § 302.300 (1993), § 303.120 (1984). Acceptable sources of verification include the applicant's "Social Security card, driver's license, voter registration card, military service papers, marriage license, employment papers...." 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 302.130(B).

The question here is whether Salaam presented documentation sufficient to establish her identity. The hearing officer decided that she did not, and concluded that there had been no error in the department's initial determination that the information Salaam provided was "questionable" regarding her identity. The hearing officer concluded by stating, "[t]he issuance of two social security numbers after the name change, without a real explanation other than for 'privacy' reasons is not sufficient to outweigh the department's responsibility to assure that information is consistent and accurate." In allowing the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Superior Court judge affirmed the department's decision on the ground that sufficient evidence supported its decision that Salaam had failed to verify her identity.

An administrative agency's decision must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." G.L. c. 30A, § 1, inserted by St.1954, c. 681, § 1. When determining if an agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, courts must examine the entire record, and consider whatever detracts from its weight. Pyfrom v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 621, 624-625, 659 N.E.2d 1206 (1996).

We summarize the evidence in the present case. Salaam claims that she was born Bertha Gayle Stovall, daughter of Gabriel Stovall and Emma Chavis Stovall. When she converted to the Islamic faith in 1980, she changed her name to Muqeedah Zenobia Salaam. Salaam applied for AFDC benefits on October 13, 1993, after being named legal guardian of her niece, Dominique Stovall. As required by AFDC regulations, Salaam supported her application with documentation to establish both her own identity and kinship to the child. 106 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 302.130(B), 303.210(A) (1992). These documents included: a social security card; a 1990 Department of Welfare identification card; the guardianship decree; the birth certificate of her brother, Gabriel L. Stovall (Dominique's father); a birth certificate under her original name ²; high school records of Bertha Stovall ³; a driver's license under her new name, Salaam, containing the November 8, 1955, date of birth ⁴; her marriage license, listing the names of both of her parents ⁵; and an affidavit from her father. ⁶

While processing her application, the department learned that the social security number presented by Salaam was the second number she had been issued. ⁷ In response to department inquiries about the two numbers, Salaam responded that her number was changed for "privacy" reasons, and that she uses only the second number. As support, Salaam presented a social security form verifying that she had been issued a second number, and that she is authorized to use that number only.

On these facts, the hearing officer cited two reasons for her unfavorable decision. First, the hearing officer noted that the affidavit was the sole document equating Bertha Stovall and Muqeedah Salaam. As the affiant was someone "who was not present at the hearing ... and who would be biased since he is her father," the hearing officer refused to accept the document to verify identity. Second, she concluded that Salaam's explanation that she requested a second social security number for "privacy" reasons was "not sufficient to outweigh the department's responsibility to assure that information is consistent and accurate."

Recognizing that the documents support, at least in part, Salaam's assertion that she is the former Bertha Gayle Stovall, the judge characterized the department's reasoning as "at times puzzling." In particular, she found "perplexing" the department's rejection of the affidavit. ⁸ Constrained by the substantial evidence standard, however, the judge thought that the record warranted the department's conclusion. ⁹

While the judge appropriately observed the narrow scope of judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, the department's stated reasons for denying benefits place an unreasonable burden of proof on the applicant in a setting where the department is supposed to be helpful, albeit with watchful eye for overreaching or fraud to its constituents. As the court observed in Correia v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 414 Mass. 157, 164, 605 N.E.2d 1233 (1993), "[a]lthough the department has broad discretion to implement the program as it chooses, ... denials for arbitrary and technical reasons rise to the level of unreasonableness." According to G.L. c. 18, § 2(B)(d), which describes the department's obligations in the implementation of its programs, the department has an obligation to provide assistance "on a fair, just and equitable basis."

The department argues, correctly, that the applicant must provide objective verification of her identity. The department may not, however, erect more of an obstacle course than is necessary to ensure the avoidance of fraud. In the present case, Salaam presented a document from the Social Security Administration (SSA), verifying that she was, in fact, issued two social security numbers. The document stated, "Please be advised that Muqeedah Z. Salaam has been issued SSN [111-11-1111] and SSN [222-22-2222]. She has been using and will continue to use SSN [222-22-2222]." Without articulating why it was dissatisfied with the document from SSA or what additional facts it wanted, the department refused to credit the SSA document. The SSA, pursuant to its own written policies, may issue a second social security number only in particular circumstances and according to detailed procedures. See Social Security Program Operations Manual System RM 00205.001 (1997). The "fair, just and equitable" course would have been for the department to accept the SSA's statement that it issued Salaam two numbers as prima facie evidence that the second number was properly issued. Instead, as the department indicates in its brief, it refused to credit the SSA document because it "does not state that the second social security number was issued for any of the reasons permitted by social security...." By not accepting that the SSA would only issue a second number for a permissible reason, the department was, in effect, second-guessing another agency. The current regulations do not provide for such a practice.

Additionally, a government agency is bound to respect its own regulations, as long as they exist on the books. Amherst Nursing Home, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 16 Mass.App.Ct. 638, 642, 454 N.E.2d 498 (1983). Cella, Administrative Law and Practice § 725 (1986). The department's regulations impose...