Salazar v. Driver Provider Phx.

• Decision Date: 30 January 2023
• Docket Number: CV-19-05760-PHX-SMB
• Parties: Kelli Salazar, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Driver Provider Phoenix LLC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Kelli Salazar, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Driver Provider Phoenix LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-19-05760-PHX-SMB

United States District Court, D. Arizona

January 30, 2023

ORDER

HONORABLE SUSAN M. BRNOVICH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 23 Certification. (Doc. 331.) Defendants filed a Response (Doc 342), and Plaintiffs filed a Reply (Doc. 379). Oral argument was held on January 11, 2023. After reviewing the parties' arguments and the relevant law, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' Motion in part, and deny in part, for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' Motion seeks class certification on Count II of the Fourth Amended Complaint-violation of the Arizona Wage Act (“AWA”), A.R.S. § 23-350, et seq.-and Count III of the Fourth Amended Complaint-violation of the Arizona Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”), A.R.S. § 23-362, et seq. (See Docs. 114; 331.) Prior to ruling on this Motion, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' AWA claim with leave to amend. (See Doc. forthcoming). Therefore, the Court will deny without prejudice Plaintiffs' Motion as to the AWA claim, as it is currently moot. Regarding the AMWA claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants previously and continuously fail to pay their employed drivers a minimum wage under state law and fail to maintain accurate payroll records of hours worked. (Doc. 331 at 2.) The Court will grant Plaintiffs' Motion to certify Plaintiffs' AMWA class because it meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Parties seeking class certification bear the burden of demonstrating that they have met each of the four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b).” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 97980 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Zinser v. Accufix Rsch. Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001)). Rule 23(a)-(b) read as follows:

(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:

(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of:

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:

(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

A plaintiff seeking class certification must “affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule-that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Likewise, when considering class certification courts must engage in “a rigorous analysis.” Id. at 350-51 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). The Rule 23 analysis may “entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim,” id. at 351, but it “grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013). “Merits questions may be considered to the extent-but only to the extent-that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Id.; see also United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although certification inquiries such as commonality, typicality, and predominance might properly call for some substantive inquiry, the court may not go so far . . . as to judge the validity of these claims.” (cleaned up)). In fact, “[n]either the possibility that a plaintiff will be unable to prove his allegations, nor the possibility that the later course of the suit might unforeseeably prove the original decision to certify the class wrong, is a basis for declining to certify a class which apparently satisfies [Rule 23].” United Steel, 593 F.3d at 809 (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975)).

Nevertheless, “plaintiffs must prove the facts necessary to carry the burden of establishing that the prerequisites of Rule 23 are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence.” Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc., v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 665 (9th Cir. 2022). “Failure to meet any one of the requirements set forth in Rule 23 precludes class certification.” Miller v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 759 F.Supp.2d 1144, 1146 (D. Ariz. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 23(a)

1. Numerosity

Plaintiffs argue numerosity is met, and Defendants do not object. (See Docs. 331 at 8; 342.) Under the numerosity requirement, a proposed class of at least 40 members is typically satisfactory. See USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 266 F.R.D. 360, 365 (D. Ariz. 2009). Here, Plaintiffs cite to Defendants' assertions that as of May 18, 2022, there are 356 chauffeur drivers within the limitations period for AMWA violations under A.R.S. § 23-364(H).^[1](See Doc. 331 at 8.) The Court finds the numerosity requirement satisfied. See Vega v. All My Sons Bus. Dev. LLC, 583 F.Supp.3d 1244, 1264 (D. Ariz. 2022) (finding the numerosity requirement satisfied for an Arizona unpaid wages class of potentially 200 members); see also Juvera v. Salcido, 294 F.R.D. 516, 521 (D. Ariz. 2013) (finding numerosity satisfied with AMWA class of “approximately 200” members).

2. Commonality

Plaintiffs next argue commonality is met, and Defendants do not object. (See Docs. 331 at 8-11; 342.) To prove commonality, there must be a “common contention” that is “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution-which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. A plaintiff need only present “a single common question of law or fact that resolves a central issue.” Castillo v. Bank of Am., NA, 980 F.3d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 2020). To satisfy the requirement, not every issue of law and fact need to be common. Juvera, 294 F.R.D. at 521. “The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2012)). “However, [i]f there is no evidence that the entire class was subject to the same allegedly [illegal] practice, there is no question common to the class.” Vega, 583 F.Supp.3d at 1261 (quoting Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet, “[a] common contention need not be one that ‘will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.'” Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., 800 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting AmGen, 568 U.S. at 459).

Here, Plaintiffs argue that:

Whether Defendants were required to keep records under Arizona law of all hours worked, whether they failed to do so, whether Defendants failed to pay required minimum wages . . . are common contentions . . . to each member of the class such that “determination of [their] truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”

(Doc. 331 at 9) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.) In Vega, the court determined the class's common question was whether the defendants' policies “violate state law by failing to timely compensate helpers for overtime and by routinely requiring helpers to perform unpaid work thereby failing to pay them minimum wage.” 583 F.Supp.3d at 1265; see also Abdullah v U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding commonality when there was a “significant question of law” faced by the class on the legality of defendant's policy). Plaintiffs here share a similar common question: Under the AMWA, whether Defendants were required to keep payroll records, and if so, failed to so, and whether Plaintiffs are therefore owed unpaid minimum wages. If determined, it would provide answers sought by the entire proposed class. For these reasons, the Court agrees that...