Salazar v. State
| Decision Date | 17 January 2001 |
| Citation | 38 S.W.3d 141 |
| Parties | (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) ROBERT MADRID SALAZAR, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS NO. 73,451 |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appellant was convicted in March 1999 of a capital murder committed in April 1997. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(8). Pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 37.071 §§2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 37.071 §2(g). Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 37.071 §2(h). Appellant raises fourteen points of error.
In point of error one, appellant claims the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's affirmative answer to the "future dangerousness" special issue. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that "there is a probability that [appellant] would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Art. 37.071 §2(b)(1). See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 322 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 174 (1994).
Appellant was charged with intentionally or knowingly causing the death of the two-year-old victim, who was the daughter of appellant's girlfriend. Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that on April 23, 1997, appellant's girlfriend left the victim in appellant's care while she went to work. When appellant's girlfriend came home from work, she found the victim in bed and unconscious, breathing abnormally with blood in her mouth. Appellant was not there because he and a friend had gone to buy beer. Returning from the store, appellant and his friend saw an ambulance at his girlfriend's house. They did not stop, but continued on to appellant's mother's house to drink the beer they had purchased.
When paramedics arrived at the scene, they noted that the back of the victim's head was caved in and felt like "Jello." There were also marks and bruises all over the victim's body. Suspecting child abuse, the paramedics contacted the police. The victim died later that evening.
Not long after discovering the victim, the victim's mother called appellant at his mother's house, and appellant told her not to tell the police that he had been watching the victim. Appellant later gave a written statement to the police. He admitted that he had been with the victim while his girlfriend was at work. He claimed that while giving the victim a shower he became angry with her because she would not stop crying and he had used the back of his hand to push her down in the bathtub, causing her to fall down and hit her head. Appellant also claimed he had abandoned the victim because he was scared.
The victim's autopsy revealed at least three life-threatening injuries and numerous non-life-threatening injuries. All of these injuries were "acute," meaning they had been inflicted within 48 hours of the victim's death. The pathologist testified that the victim's cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma and that the manner of death was ruled a homicide. The pathologist also testified that the injuries sustained by the victim were not consistent with appellant's version of the facts, but rather, indicated repeated blows of severe force.
According to the pathologist, the victim's life-threatening injuries were caused by hard blows to the victim's head, chest, and stomach. These injuries were "all high energy, high impact injuries." The blow to the head, consistent with having been slammed into something hard, fractured the victim's skull. A "major blow to the chest" bruised the victim's lungs, diaphragm and heart. The chest injury surpassed what the pathologist had seen previously in automobile accident injuries. The heart was so severely damaged that had the victim lived, it would have ruptured, which would have been "incompatible with continued life." The blow to the stomach pushed the victim's abdomen against her backbone, crushing the tissues in between.
Injury to the victim's tongue and mouth was indicative of a blow to the mouth. The victim also suffered such severe shaking injuries that, had she lived, she would have been blind. There was bruising to the victim's neck and some of her ribs had been broken. Finally, injury to the victim's vagina was consistent with some type of sexual penetration.
During punishment, the prosecution presented evidence that appellant had committed a few minor thefts and had been involved in several assaultive offenses, including an assault on the mother of his two children. Soon after being placed in the county jail, appellant threatened to kidnap someone and escape. Appellant also threatened to commit suicide.
Appellant presented evidence that, if sentenced to life in prison, he would probably be placed in administrative segregation, which has a low incident rate because the inmates are closely monitored. He argued these circumstances lowered the risk that he would present a future danger. The prosecution presented rebuttal evidence that, although only 10-15% of the prison population is in administrative segregation, almost 40% of felony offenses committed within the prison are committed in administrative segregation. One of appellant's punishment witnesses also testified on cross-examination that, "left without any intervention" in the free world, appellant would commit criminal acts of violence in the future. This was based in part on appellant's lack of remorse for his actions as well as his tendency to minimize his involvement in the offense.
Appellant contends that based upon a consideration of all the evidence, particularly evidence that he presented showing he was abused and neglected as a child, no rational juror could have affirmatively answered the "future dangerousness" special issue. A juror may give any weight or no weight to a particular piece of evidence in determining the special issues. Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The evidence viewed in a light favorable to the jury's determination was sufficient to support an affirmative answer to the "future dangerousness" issue.
The circumstances of this offense were particularly heinous. See Barnes, 876 S.W.2d at 322-23 (). Appellant inflicted numerous life-threatening injuries on the two-year-old victim and then left her alone while he went to buy beer. Appellant beat the victim so badly that the back of her head felt like "Jello," and he so severely shook her that she would have been blind had she survived. Appellant had a history of committing assaultive offenses, and one of appellant's own witnesses admitted that he is dangerous to free society. In addition, testimony from the State's witnesses indicated that appellant could still be a future danger even if placed in administrative segregation. See Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), cert. dened, 525 U.S. 929 (1998) ().
On this record, we cannot say the jury's affirmative answer to the "future dangerousness" special issue is irrational. Point of error one is overruled.
In point of error two, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's negative answer to the mitigating evidence special issue. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 37.071, § 2(e)(1). Appellant claims that the mitigating evidence he presented "was such as to require the imposition of a life sentence rather than a death sentence" and that the only way to afford him "meaningful appellate review" is for this Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's negative answer to the mitigating evidence special issue.
We do not review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's negative answer to the mitigating evidence special issue, and we have rejected the claim that this deprives a defendant of "meaningful appellate review." See McGinn v. State, 961 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1179 (2000) (); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 106-07 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997) (); McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 498-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997) (). Point of error two is overruled.
In points of error three through five, appellant claims the trial court's failure to inform the jury that a life-sentenced appellant would be ineligible for parole for 40 years violated due process (point three) and equal protection (point four) guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (point five). We have rejected these claims. See Green, 934 S.W.2d at 105-06. Points of error three through five are overruled.
In points of error six through nine, appellant claims the trial court erred in denying him a new trial because the jury's extrinsic-to-the-record discussion of inaccurate parole information during punishment deliberations constituted jury misconduct under state law (point six) and deprived appellant of a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment (point eight), of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment (point...
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