Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury County, Iowa

• Decision Date: 16 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. C 98-4113-MWB.,C 98-4113-MWB.
• Citation: 66 F.Supp.2d 1035
• Parties: Maximo SALCIDO, by his Next Friend, Ameila GILLILAND, Plaintif, v. WOODBURY COUNTY, IOWA; Jessie K. Rasmussen, in her Official Capacity as Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services; and Thomas J. Vilsack, in his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Iowa., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

66 F.Supp.2d 1035

Maximo SALCIDO, by his Next Friend, Ameila GILLILAND, Plaintif, v. WOODBURY COUNTY, IOWA; Jessie K. Rasmussen, in her Official Capacity as Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services; and Thomas J. Vilsack, in his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Iowa., Defendants.

No. C 98-4113-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

September 16, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Frank Cal Tenuta, Legal Services Corporation of Iowa, Sioux City, Iowa, for Maximo Salcido, plaintiff.

Mary W. Vavroch, Assistant Attorney General, Diane M. Stahle, Special Assistant Attorney General, Des Moines, Iowa, for the state defendants, Governor Vilsack and Jessie K. Rasmussen.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING THE STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

BENNETT, District Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1038
                II. LEGAL ANALYSIS .................................................... 1039
                    A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity .................................... 1040
                       1. General principles .......................................... 1040
                       2. Suits against state officials ............................... 1041
                       3. Immunity here ............................................... 1043
                          a. The ADA and RA claims .................................... 1043
                          b. The § 1983 claims ................................... 1045
                    B. Inadequacy Of Claims ........................................... 1046
                       1. Standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion ........................ 1046
                       2. Equal protection ............................................ 1047
                       3. Preclusion of constitutional claims ......................... 1052
                III. CONCLUSION ....................................................... 1053
                

Mental disability led to the plaintiff's civil commitment to a state mental health facility, but that did not lead to his immediate admission. Instead, a dispute over who should pay for his care initially kept him out of the facility, and led him instead to federal court. The plaintiff has brought claims under the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) against his county of legal settlement and two state officials, the governor and the director of the state department of human services, arising from the defendants' failure to place the plaintiff in the state mental health institution to which he was committed. The state defendants have moved to dismiss these claims as to them on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity and failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

I. INTRODUCTION

According to the complaint in this matter, filed on December 18, 1998, plaintiff Maximo Salcido suffers from serious mental illnesses, including diagnoses of dementia — secondary to multiple etiologies — and a mood disorder. Although he was committed to the Clarinda Mental Health Institute (CMHI), a state mental health facility, in civil commitment proceedings over a year ago, on July 27, 1998, Salcido was barred from admission to that facility until the entry of a stipulated preliminary injunction some nine-and-a-half months later by a dispute between the defendants over whether the State of Iowa or Woodbury County should pay for Salcido's care. Woodbury County contends that it is not required to pay for Salcido's placement at CMHI, because payment for care of mentally ill persons diagnosed with dementia is excluded from the County's "single entry point" management plan for the care of the mentally ill. The County points out that its management plan was approved by the Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services, one of the "state defendants" in these proceedings.¹ The CMHI — allegedly on the authority of the other state defendant, the Governor of the State of Iowa² — initially refused to admit Salcido without County approval. The state defendants contend that Woodbury County, as the plaintiff's county of "legal settlement," should fund Salcido's placement at CMHI. As a result of the dispute over payment for his care, Salcido remained at Marian Health Center in Sioux City, Iowa, a private facility, from the time of his civil commitment, with payment for his care provided by Title XIX (Medicaid) funds.

In an attempt to compel the defendants to place him in the institution to which he had been committed, Salcido filed this lawsuit on December 18, 1998, and a motion for preliminary injunction on April 19, 1999. The parties agreed to the entry of a stipulated preliminary injunction on May 17, 1999, under the terms of which Salcido was admitted to the CMHI at state expense. However, under the terms of the preliminary injunction, no party waived any defense or claim to payment for Salcido's care, and the issue of who is responsible for payment of past and future expenses for the care of Salcido was preserved for further consideration in these proceedings.

Consequently, the stipulated preliminary injunction did not dispose of any of the claims in Salcido's lawsuit, or any of the grounds for dismissal of that lawsuit asserted by the state defendants in a motion filed February 11, 1999. In his Complaint, Salcido asserts three kinds of claims. First, in claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Salcido asserts that the defendants have violated his right to equal protection by treating him differently than similarly situated individuals; violated his right to substantive due process by denying his right to adequate treatment; and violated his right to procedural due process by denying him appropriate placement under state law and thereby depriving him of liberty. In a claim pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 12133, Salcido asserts that he is a disabled person qualified for care and treatment, but that the defendants have decided to exclude him from an appropriate placement and have thereby discriminated against him. Finally, in a claim pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), Salcido asserts that he is a disabled person qualified for care and treatment, but that he has been denied access to the benefits and services provided by the defendants' federally-funded programs for the mentally disabled. Salcido sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, costs, and such other relief as the court deemed appropriate.

In their motion to dismiss, which is now before the court, the state defendants first contend that they have immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to a private citizen's claims for damages or equitable relief brought against them in their official capacities. Second, they contend that Salcido has failed to state a claim for violation of his right to equal protection, because under "rational basis" scrutiny, the Iowa laws regarding care of the mentally ill bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental goal. Finally, they contend that Salcido's claims pursuant to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act preclude his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act cannot be enforced through § 1983 actions, as both of these federal acts have comprehensive enforcement mechanisms of their own.

In his response, Salcido argues that the state defendants have no Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits for prospective equitable relief, and he specifically eschews any claim for damages from the state defendants he might be construed to have made on the claims brought pursuant to § 1983. Salcido notes that the state defendants have made no other challenge to his substantive and procedural due process claims. As to his equal protection claim, Salcido contends that, some heightened scrutiny may be appropriate, but even under a "rational basis" test, he has adequately stated a claim. Specifically, he contends that the state laws pertaining to care of the mentally ill, which allow for different coverage in each of the ninety-nine counties of the state, hardly seem rational, and that there is no rational basis for any distinction between the treatment of mentally ill persons suffering from dementia and those mentally ill persons suffering from some other mental illness. Finally, he argues that his ADA and RA claims do not preclude his § 1983 claims, because he is not seeking to enforce the ADA or the RA through an action pursuant to § 1983, but is instead asserting violation of his constitutional rights in his § 1983 claims.

In reply, the state defendants contend primarily that Salcido's suggestions that some heightened level of scrutiny is applicable to his equal protection claims are mistaken, and that under rational basis scrutiny, his equal protection claims cannot be sustained. In an addendum to their motion to dismiss, the state defendants contend that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in an en banc decision, Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir.1999), that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials under Title II of the ADA, because that title of the ADA is not a proper exercise of congressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and consequently could not properly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In a second addendum, the state defendants assert that a still more recent decision, Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Ed., 189 F.3d 745 (8th Cir.1999), has the same impact on a claim under § 504 of the RA.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The court's legal analysis will begin with the state defendants' broad assertion that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any of Salcido's claims as against them, because these defendants are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court will address the state defendants' challenges to the adequacy of Salcido's claims only...