Salem Community School Corp. v. Easterly, 571A91

• Citation: 150 Ind.App. 11,275 N.E.2d 317
• Decision Date: 17 November 1971
• Docket Number: No. 571A91,No. 2,571A91,2
• Parties: SALEM COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORP. et al., Appellants, v. Phil EASTERLY, Appellee
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 317

275 N.E.2d 317

150 Ind.App. 11

SALEM COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORP. et al., Appellants, v. Phil EASTERLY, Appellee.

No. 571A91.

Appellate Court of Indiana, In Bank, Division No. 2.

Nov. 17, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1971.

Kightlinger, Young, Gray & Hudson, Howard J. DeTrude, Jr., Indianapolis, Myers, Slagle & Shirey, Wayne A. Shirey, Muncie, for appellants.

Warner, Clark & Warner, Darrel K. Peckinpaugh, Muncie, for appellee.

SHARP, Judge.

This case involves the question of whether public school authorities in the State of Indiana have the power to expel from such public schools a student under the age of sixteen years. The Trial Court held that the Indiana Compulsory School Attendance Act which is Acts 1921, Chapter 132, as amended, which is found in Ind.Stat.Ann. § 28--5310 (Burns 1970), I.C. 1971 20--12--25--1 precluded the public school authorities from expelling a child under the age of sixteen years. The Trial Court held that only a court exercising juvenile court jurisdiction could cause such a student under the age of sixteen years to be expelled. On the basis of the foregoing, the Trial Court granted an injunction in favor of the Appellee-Student against the Appellant-School Officials enjoining the latter from expelling the former from a public school.

This case involves the interpretative inter-relationship of the above cited Indiana Compulsory School Attendance Act, the General School Powers Act, which is Acts 1965, Chapter 307, § 202 as found in Ind.Stat.Ann. § 28--1710 (Burns 1971), I.C. 1971 20--5--2--2, the Juvenile Court Act which is Acts 1945, Chapter 347, as amended, which is found in Ind.Stat.Ann. § 9--3101 (Burns 1956), I.C.1971 31--5--7--4 and Acts 1907, Chapter 278 as found in Ind.Stat.Ann. § 28--6105 (Burns 1970), I.C.1971 20--4--1--6.

The facts in this case are not in dispute and the controversy concerns itself purely with a question of law. It is admitted that on October 30, 1970 the Plaintiff-Appellee, Phil Easterly, was a minor under the age of sixteen years. He was expelled by the Appellants from Salem Community High School for the remainder of the fall semester. According to the evidence, Phil Easterly had been a 'problem student' and the principal of the school had on four occasions contacted the student's mother for personal conferences and had engaged in two telephone conferences with her in regard to Phil's misconduct before he was expelled. The student was late for class fourteen times in October, 1970 and regularly left the study hall without permission. He was disorderly during sessions of the Junior Band and regularly used four letter obscenities in the presence of female students and teachers. He refused to sit in his assigned seat, he talked constantly in class, he used profanity in class, he threatened to strike a female teacher, and he defaced school property. The evidence indicated that all of the above conduct was contrary to the rules and regulations of this public school. On the basis of the above evidence, the Trial Court found that Phil Easterly was an incorrigible and delinquent child. However, the Trial Court held that under the Indiana Compulsory School Attendance Act, the Appellants as school officials had no power or authority to expel Phil Easterly from Salem Community High School for such misconduct.

At the outset, it is not disputed that a court exercising juvenile jurisdiction under the Indiana Juvenile Court Act has the authority to expel from a public school a student under the age of sixteen years. It is also clear that such a Juvenile Court has the authority and jurisdiction to expel a student under the age of sixteen years under the proviso in the Indiana Compulsory School Attendance Act which states:

'Provided, further, That the judge of the court having juvenile jurisdiction may suspend the provisions of this act in cases of juvenile delinquents and incorrigibles whenever, in his judgment, the welfare of any child warrants such action.' Ind.Stat.Ann. § 28--5310 (Burns 1970), I.C.1971 20--12--25--1.

The question to be determined here is whether or not such a Juvenile Court has the sole jurisdiction to expel a student under the age of sixteen from a public school for admitted violations of reasonable rules.

In regard to earlier similar statutes providing for the creation and operation of public schools, our Supreme Court in State, ex rel. Andrew v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N.E. 708 (1886) stated:

'In section 4497, Rev.St.1881, in force since August 16th, 1869, it is provided as follows: 'The common schools of the State shall be taught in the English language; and the trustee shall provide to have taught in them orthography, reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, English grammar, physiology, history of the United States, and good behavior, and such other branches of learning, and other languages, as the advancement of pupils may require, and the trustees from time to time direct.'

'Under this statutory provision, and others of similar purport and effect, to be found in our school laws, it was competent, we think, for the trustees of the school city of La Porte to enact necessary and reasonable rules for the government of the pupils of its high school, directing what branches of learning such pupils should pursue, and regulating the time to be given to any particular study, and prescribing what book or books should be used therein. Such trustees were and are required, by the express provisions of section 4444, Rev.St.1881, in force since March 6th, 1865, to 'take charge of the educational affairs' of such city of La Porte; 'they may also establish graded schools, or such modifications of them as may be practicable, and provide for admitting into the higher departments of the graded school, from the primary schools of their townships, such pupils as are sufficiently advanced for such admission.'

'The power to establish graded schools carries with it, of course, the power to establish and enforce such reasonable rules as may seem necessary to the trustees, in their discretion, for the government and discipline of such schools, and prescribing the course of instruction therein.'

In a similar vein, more recently, in School City of East Chicago v. Sigler, 219 Ind. 9, 36 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1941), our Supreme Court said:

'A statute requires school trustees to 'take charge of the educational affairs of their respective townships, towns and cities.' Burns' Stat.1933, § 28-- 2410, Baldwin's 1934, § 5967. They are required to furnish teachers and equipment 'for the thorough organization and efficient management of said schools.' The power to make reasonable rules and regulations to that end can not be successfully challenged. Fertich v. Michener (1887), 111 Ind. 472, 11 N.E. 605, 14 N.E. 68; State ex rel. Horne v. Beil (1901), 157 Ind. 25, 60 N.E. 672. * * *

'The board, not the courts, is charged with the duty of managing the school system and so long as it acts with fairness, its decisions on matters within its discretion are not subject to judicial review.'

In 1944, the then State Superintendent of Public Instruction submitted to the Honorable James A. Emmert, as Attorney General of Indiana, the following question:

'Who has the legal right to exclude or suspend a pupil from the Public Schools of Indiana?'

The answer to this question appears in 1944 Op.Atty.Gen. 451 where it is stated:

'* * *. I am of the opinion the school teacher, the principal or superintendent of the school, unless prevented by a rule or regulation of the school board or township trustee, and the school board or township trustee for the school corporation, have the legal right to suspend or exclude a pupil from the public schools of Indiana, subject to the right of review of their actions in such cases. Specific questions regarding exclusion from school of physically handicapped children, and special laws authorizing health officers to exclude children from attending school in certain cases, are not intended to be covered in this opinion.'

Again in 1953, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction submitted to the Honorable Edwin K. Steers, as Attorney General, the following question:

'Is the judge of the Juvenile Court by 1945 Acts, Chapters 347, 356 and 218 creating a Juvenile Court and declaring its jurisdiction in matters of delinquent, dependent and neglected children as well as in instances of contributors to delinquency, dependency and neglect given authority superseding that of school authorities?'

The answer of the Attorney General appears in an official opinion found at 1953 Op.Atty.Gen. 87 at page 91 where it is stated:

'From the foregoing, it may reasonably be concluded that under the divisional branches of government, the Constitution has seen fit to place the school system in the hands of the administrative branch of the government, pursuant to such laws as are enacted by the legislature. School officials must necessarily establish, maintain and operate schools and in doing so, they are given reasonable discretion in determining what is necessary to maintain discipline even to the point of exclusion of pupils where the welfare of the school system requires it. From the foregoing it is not meant to imply that arbitrary or capricious actions of officers are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, but the rule is well settled that where the matter is one for the discretion of school officials, is reasonably exercised in the interest of the school system, it does not become a matter for judicial interference. Otherwise, the courts would run the schools and not the administrative branch of the government.

'The 1945 statutes referred to in your question concerning the jurisdiction of the judge of the Juvenile Court, being Ch. 218 (Sec. 10--812 et seq. Burns' 1951 Supp. (IC 1971, 35--14--1--1 et seq.)); Ch. 347 (being Sec. 9--3101 et seq. Burns' 1951 Supp. (IC 1971, 33--12--2--1 et seq.)); and Ch. 356 (being Sec. 9--3201 et seq. Burns' 1951 Supp. (I...