Smith v. School City of Hobart, Civ. No. H85-798.

Decision Date25 January 1993
Docket NumberCiv. No. H85-798.
Citation811 F. Supp. 391
PartiesPamela SMITH, Charles Smith, and Jean Smith, Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL CITY OF HOBART, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

Nancy M. Tiller, Merrillville, IN, for plaintiffs.

William J. Longer, Hobart, IN, for defendants.

ORDER

LOZANO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the Plaintiff, Pamela Smith ("Smith"), on July 28, 1986, and by the Defendant, School City of Hobart, Indiana (the "School") on September 29, 1986. For the reasons set forth below, the School's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. BACKGROUND

The parties have stipulated to the facts. On March 25, 1985, Smith was a senior class student at Hobart Senior High School in Hobart, Indiana. On this date, Smith, with two other girls, left their fifth period class to go to their Medical Biology Class located at a medical center. On the way, the girls stopped at one of the other girls' homes and drank beer. After admitting to drinking the alcoholic beverage, Smith was suspended for five (5) days. The School reduced Smith's grades twenty percent (20%) in each class for the semester.1 The student handbook provides that knowingly possessing or consuming alcoholic beverages or intoxicants of any kind subjects a student to suspension and/or expulsion. The handbook also provides for a grade reduction of four percent (4%) of the student's grade for the nine-week grading period for each class missed each day during suspension.

Smith alleges that her constitutional right to substantive due process was violated by the reduction of her grades during her suspension. Smith claims that the School's reduction of her grades was arbitrary, capricious, and excessive based on her actions and seeks damages and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); First Wis. Trust Co. v. Schroud, 916 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir.1990). In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir.1991); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must read all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514; Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 394 (7th Cir.1988).

Before diving into the murky waters of substantive due process, it is necessary to first note that school discipline is not an area in which courts lay claim to any expertise, nor should consider lightly. As so aptly stated by Judge Mills,

School discipline is an area which courts enter with great hesitation and reluctance — and rightly so. School officials are trained and paid to determine what form of punishment best addresses a particular student's transgression. They are in a far better position than is a black-robed judge to decide what to do with a disobedient child at school. They can best determine, for instance, whether a suspension or an after-school detention will be more effective in correcting a student's behavior. Because of their expertise and their closest situation — and because we do not want them to fear court challenges to their every act — school officials are given wide discretion in their disciplinary actions.

Donaldson v. Board of Educ., 98 Ill. App.3d 438, 53 Ill.Dec. 946, 947, 424 N.E.2d 737, 738 (1981).

With this in mind, the School acknowledges that students do have constitutional rights,2 but contends that a public high school grade reduction for consuming alcohol during school hours does not violate a student's right to substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The School relies on Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), in support of its argument. Similar to the present case, Wood involved two high school students who were expelled from school for violating a school regulation prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicating beverages at school or school activities. Id. at 311, 95 S.Ct. at 995. Specifically, the students spiked punch with malt liquor, which was served to students and parents at an extracurricular activity. Id. Like Smith, the students brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that such expulsion violated their rights to due process. Id. at 309-10, 95 S.Ct. at 994-95. The district court directed a verdict for the school officials. Id. at 310, 95 S.Ct. at 995. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, and based upon their interpretation of the school's regulations, found that the school officials were acting in violation of the students' substantive due process rights. Id. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision, admonishing the lower court not to substitute a school's interpretation of their own rules with the court's interpretation:

"It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. Public high school students do have substantive and procedural rights while at school. (citations omitted) But § 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees."

Id. at 326, 95 S.Ct. at 1003.

But at issue in this case is not whether it is proper for a court to substitute its judgment for that of a school administrator. Rather, at issue is whether the School's rule is constitutional. Students do not "`shed their constitutional rights' at the school house door." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). The due process clause forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. Id. "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of the what the government is doing to him," the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied. Id. In Goss v. Lopez, the United States Supreme Court held that students have procedural due process rights to notice and a hearing before suspension. Id. at 579, 95 S.Ct. at 738-39. In Goss, "school authorities ... suspended appellees from school for periods of up to 10 days based on charges of misconduct. If sustained and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment." Id. at 574-75, 95 S.Ct. at 736. It is thus clear that a student's academic record has importance not only as to the student's high school or grade school standing, but also affects the student's ability to enter the college of his choice, obtain postgraduate degrees, and eventually affects the student's chances of obtaining a job. Academic records are also routinely examined when applying to the military or other government jobs.

The School's rules regarding suspensions are as follows:

All absences except those set forth in the previous section, Excused Absence, shall be considered unexcused absences.
1. Students will be permitted to make up work missed during such absences
2. Unexcused absences are, but not limited to, the following:
a. Suspensions "out-of-school"
b. Truancy
3. Unexcused Absences Due to Disciplinary Suspension(s)
a. Students who receive an "in-school" suspension will be permitted to make up classroom work while in suspension, but will suffer grade deduction. Failure to do make-up work will result in a loss of learning for the day(s) of suspension.
b. Students who receive an "out-of-school" suspension will be permitted to make up their class work for the day(s) of suspension, and will suffer grade deduction.
4. All unexcused absences, except truancy, will be assessed a 1% grade deduction for each class missed during the week of the incident.
* * * * * *
In-School Suspension
1. Students will attend school but in a special room during the school day.
2. The student will do work assigned by the classroom teacher and have no other privileges such as library passes, convocations or other extra-curricular activities.
3. The detention room will be supervised.
4. There will be a 2% grade deduction for the 9-weeks grading period.
Out-of School Suspension 1. Students will have the opportunity to make up work in the time designated by the teacher.
2. Student must forfeit all school activities during the period of suspension.
3. Student will suffer a 4% grade deduction for each class missed during the time of suspension, to be deducted for the 9-weeks grading period.
Classroom Discipline
1. Students may be suspended from classroom for various reasons. Before doing so, teachers should make out a referral slip and conferences should be set up with parents and/or a counselor and administrator.
2. If a student is suspended from a class, the teacher must provide class work for the student to work on while in suspension.
3. Grade deduction while in suspension is 2% per each day in that status.

Smith claims that the School violated her substantive due process rights when it3 reduced her grades...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Packer v. Board of Educ. of Town of Thomaston
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 4, 1998
    ...necessity, be left to public school officials to determine what forms of misbehavior should be sanctioned"); Smith v. School City of Hobart, 811 F.Supp. 391, 393 (N.D.Ind.1993) "School discipline is not an area in which courts lay claim to any expertise, nor should consider lightly.... 'Bec......
  • Foo v. Trustees, Indiana University
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • June 28, 1999
    ...due process] claim cannot possibly succeed."). Mr. Foo relies upon one case in support of his position, Smith v. School City of Hobart, 811 F.Supp. 391 (N.D.Ind.1993). In Smith, the court considered the constitutionality of a school rule providing for a 4% reduction in grades for each day s......
  • Harwood v. Johns Hopkins, 5457
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • March 2, 2000
    ...766, 774 (D.Vt.(1987)). School discipline is not an area in which courts lay claim to any expertise. See Smith v. School City of Hobart, 811 F.Supp. 391, 393 (N.D.Ind.1993). Consequently, "courts will not generally interfere in the operations of colleges and universities." Lexington Theolog......
  • Hearn v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • March 31, 2020
    ...the cases relied on by the Plaintiff to allege that his dismissal was for academic reasons are unavailing. In Smith v. School City of Hobart, 811 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Ind. 1993), the court found unconstitutional a school policy that reduced a student's final grade by a particular percentage f......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT