Salem Springs, LLC v. Salem Twp., Docket No. 322956.

• Decision Date: 08 September 2015
• Docket Number: Docket No. 322956.
• Citation: 312 Mich.App. 210,880 N.W.2d 793
• Parties: SALEM SPRINGS, LLC v. SALEM TOWNSHIP.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

312 Mich.App. 210

880 N.W.2d 793

SALEM SPRINGS, LLC

v.SALEM TOWNSHIP.

Docket No. 322956.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Sept. 1, 2015, at Lansing.

Decided Sept. 8, 2015, at 9:05 a.m.

Carson Fischer, PLC, Bloomfield Hills (by Robert M. Carson and Jeffrey B. Miller ), for plaintiff.

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and O'CONNELL, JJ.

HOEKSTRA

, J.

In this case, brought in the nature of a quo warranto action under MCL 600.4545

, plaintiff, Salem Springs, LLC, challenged the results of a voter referendum pertaining to a zoning amendment in Salem Township. Intervening defendants appeal as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff and invalidating the referendum results. Because plaintiff lacks statutory standing to bring a challenge under MCL 600.4545

, we reverse the trial court's order and we remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of intervening defendants.

The underlying dispute in this case concerns the zoning of 91.61 acres of property (the property) in Salem Township, Washtenaw County, Michigan. Plaintiff previously owned the property, but it transferred the property to Salem Springs Owner, LLC, in 2009. Plaintiff is now the sole manager of Salem Springs Owner, but Salem Springs Owner is a limited liability company, separate and distinct from plaintiff.

In October 2011, the property in question was zoned agricultural-residential property, and plaintiff submitted an application to the township to have the property rezoned to general-commercial property. The Salem Township Planning Commission recommended denial of plaintiff's application, but it was nonetheless approved by the Salem Township Board of Trustees on May 8, 2012. After approval of the amendments to the zoning map, pursuant to MCL 125.3401(7)

, the township published notice on four separate occasions—on May 20, May 24, May 31, and June 14—apprising the public of the intended changes. On May 22, intervening defendant Norman Klein, Sr., who lives in a residential area north of the subject property, filed a notice of intent under MCL 125.3402(1) to petition to have the amendments submitted to the electorate for approval. On July 12, Klein later submitted a petition signed by the requisite number of voters, and the township clerk concluded that Klein's petition was adequate. See MCL 125.3402(2) and (3). The township board thereafter approved ballot language submitting the issue of the zoning amendments to the voters for approval.

Plaintiff filed suit seeking to enjoin the vote based on the contention that Klein's petition was invalid. The trial court denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and this Court, as well as the Michigan Supreme Court, denied plaintiff's emergency application for leave to appeal.¹ After plaintiff's application for leave was denied, the election proceeded on November 6, 2012, with the zoning referendum on the ballot. A majority of voters were opposed to rezoning the property in question to general-commercial property and they voted to reverse the township board's zoning decision. In effect, the property remained zoned as agricultural-residential property.

Following the election, on November 20, 2012, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which included a quo warranto claim challenging the election results under MCL 600.4545

. Intervening defendants moved for summary disposition based on the assertion that plaintiff lacked statutory standing to bring an action under MCL 600.4545. Plaintiff opposed intervening defendants' motion for summary disposition and asserted that summary disposition should instead be granted in plaintiff's favor because no material question of fact remained with respect to whether Klein's petition was untimely and thus invalid. The trial court concluded that plaintiff had standing and it granted plaintiff's motion for summary disposition based on its determination that Klein's July 12 petition was untimely, despite the fact that it was filed within 30 days of the township's last published notice. Intervening defendants now appeal as of right.

On appeal, consistently with their arguments in the trial court, intervening defendants maintain that plaintiff lacked statutory standing under MCL 600.4545 because plaintiff is not the county prosecuting attorney, the attorney general, or a citizen of Washtenaw County. In contrast, plaintiff maintains that it is a “citizen of the county” within the meaning of MCL 600.4545

because a corporation may, in general, be a citizen and more particularly because it previously owned the land in question and now continues to manage Salem Springs Owner, the present owner of the land.² In the alternative, plaintiff contends that, even if it lacks standing, any error amounts to merely a technical defect in the pleadings because Salem Springs Owner has standing and the pleadings can be amended to include Salem Springs Owner. As discussed more fully later in this opinion, we conclude that plaintiff lacked statutory standing under MCL 600.4545, that plaintiff cannot rely on Salem Springs Owner's purported standing to file suit, and that, because the time for filing an action under MCL 600.4545 has passed, plaintiff cannot amend its pleadings to add Salem Springs Owner as a new party. Because plaintiff lacks standing, the trial court erred by denying intervening defendants' motion for summary disposition.

We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.

Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999)

; Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins. Trust v. City of Pontiac No. 2, 309 Mich.App. 611, 617–618, 873 N.W.2d 783 (2015). Ordinarily, questions of law, including statutory interpretation and the issue of a party's standing, are also reviewed de novo. In re Complaint of Mich. Cable Telecom Ass'n, 241 Mich.App. 344, 360, 615 N.W.2d 255 (2000).

Before a court may exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim, that plaintiff must possess standing. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 481 Mich. 601, 606, 751 N.W.2d 463 (2008)

. “[S]tanding historically developed in Michigan as a limited, prudential doctrine that was intended to ‘ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy’ by litigants.” Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed., 487 Mich. 349, 359, 792 N.W.2d 686 (2010). A litigant may have standing “if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant.” Id. at 372, 792 N.W.2d 686. When a cause of action is governed by statute, the Legislature may, of course, choose to limit the class of persons who may raise a statutory challenge. Miller, 481 Mich. at 607, 751 N.W.2d 463. Consequently, the doctrine of statutory standing in particular requires statutory interpretation to determine whether the Legislature intended to “accord[ ] this injured plaintiff the right to sue the defendant to redress his injury.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The claim at issue in the present case is in the nature of a quo warranto action under MCL 600.4545

. Under MCL 600.4545(1), a lawsuit in the nature of a quo warranto action may be brought “whenever it appears that material fraud or error has been committed at any election in such county at which there has been submitted any constitutional amendment, question, or proposition to the electors of the state or any county, township, or municipality thereof.” The purpose of such an action is to test the “ validity of the election itself,” and to succeed requires a showing of “fraud or error that might have affected the outcome of the election.” Barrow v. Detroit Mayor, 290 Mich.App. 530, 542–543, 802 N.W.2d 658 (2010)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). The specific statutory requirements for bringing an action under MCL 600.4545 are set forth in Subsection (2), which states:

Such action shall be brought within 30 days after such election by the attorney general or the prosecuting attorney of the proper county on his own relation, or on the relation of any citizen of said county without leave of the court, or by any citizen of the county by special leave of the court or a judge thereof. Such action shall be brought against the municipality wherein such fraud or error is alleged to have been committed. [MCL 600.4545(2)

(emphasis added).]

According to the plain language of the statute, an action to challenge an election under MCL 600.4545

may be brought by (1) the attorney general, (2) the prosecuting attorney of the proper county, or (3) “any citizen of the county.” A person authorized to bring an action under this section may do so “without any showing of a special personal interest in the subject matter at hand.” Penn Sch. Dist. No. 7 v. Lewis–Cass Intermediate Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 14 Mich.App. 109, 117–118, 165 N.W.2d 464 (1968). However, because MCL 600.4545 expressly empowers select persons to file suit, it follows under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius that only those individuals specifically identified in the statute have authority to bring an action under the statute. See Miller, 481 Mich. at 611–612, 751 N.W.2d 463

. In other words, the statute prevents persons not identified in the statute from bringing a challenge to election results. Cf. id. In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff is neither a prosecuting attorney nor the attorney general. Consequently, to file suit under MCL 600.4545, plaintiff must qualify as a “citizen of the county,” and the issue in this case thus becomes whether plaintiff is a citizen of Washtenaw County.

There is no statutory definition of the phrase “citizen of the county” in MCL 600.4545

. Because the phrase is undefined, we accord the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning and may consult a dictionary to ascertain that plain meaning. Spectrum Health Hosps....