Salgado v. IQVIA, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 May 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 18-cv-2785-BAS-WVG
• Citation: 459 F.Supp.3d 1318
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: Cindy SALGADO, Plaintiff, v. IQVIA, INC. and Quintiles Commercial US, Inc., Defendants.

459 F.Supp.3d 1318

Cindy SALGADO, Plaintiff,

v.IQVIA, INC. and Quintiles Commercial US, Inc., Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-2785-BAS-WVG

United States District Court, S.D. California.

Signed May 8, 2020

Sarah B. Schlehr, Stacey Rochelle Brown, The Schlehr Law Firm PC, Burbank, CA, for Plaintiff.

Tracie Lynn Childs, Jennifer Megan Hendricks, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart P.C., San Diego, CA, for Defendants Iqvia, Inc., Quintiles Commercial US, Inc.

Tracie Lynn Childs, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart P.C., San Diego, CA, for Defendant Does 1-100.

ORDER: (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF Nos. 28, 29]

Cynthia Bashant, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court are cross motions for partial summary judgment by Plaintiff Cindy Salgado and Defendants Quintiles Commercial U.S., Inc. and Iqvia Inc. ("Def. Mot.," ECF No. 28, "Pl. Mot.," ECF No. 29.) Both motions are opposed, ("Pl. Opp'n," ECF No. 33, "Def. Opp'n," ECF No. 34), and both have replies filed in support, ("Def. Reply," ECF No. 39, "Pl. Reply," ECF No. 37). The Court finds resolution of these Motions is suitable without the need for oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion and DENIES Defendants’ Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for Quintiles Commercial U.S. Inc. on or about June 11, 2015. (Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, "JSUMF," ECF No. 38, at ¶ 1.) In November 2017, following a merger, Quintiles became Iqvia, Inc. (Id. )¹ Iqvia is a global provider of biopharmaceutical development and commercial outsourcing services. ("Vick Decl.," ECF No. 28-2, ¶ 2.) One of Iqvia's contracts for biopharmaceutical services is with AbbVie, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company involved in the research, development, marketing, and distribution of biopharmaceutical products, including Humira. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.) Iqvia has a dedicated workforce to support patient outreach for AbbVie's Humira business. (Id. ) The Humira project includes approximately 200 to 250 "Nurse Ambassadors" who train patients on administering their injections and provide patient care, paperwork help, and other services. (Id. ¶¶ 3–8.) There are about 29 to 30 District Managers who supervise, manage, and train the Nurse Ambassadors. (Id. ¶ 8.) At all times relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint, Iqvia utilized Unum Group ("Unum"), a third-party leave management service, to administer employees’ leaves of absence. Unum evaluates eligibility for leave, tracks the leave, and ensures compliance with applicable law. (Def. Opp'n at 4.)

On May 12, 2016, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of District Manager on the AbbVie/Humira Nurse Ambassador Project for the Southern California Region. Plaintiff began working in that position on May 23, 2016. (JSUMF ¶ 2.) On May 25, 2017, Plaintiff began a leave of absence related to her pregnancy. (Id. ¶ 3.) Unum administered Plaintiff's leave and disability benefits. (Def. Opp'n at 4.) Plaintiff gave birth to her baby on July 23, 2017. (JSUMF ¶ 4.) Plaintiff's anticipated return date was November 25, 2017. ("Compl.," ECF No. 1-1, at ¶ 14.) In October 2017, Plaintiff began treatment for postpartum depression and postpartum anxiety. (JSUMF ¶ 15.) She was diagnosed with postpartum depression and received a doctor's note from Dr. Shahida Parveen to be placed off work through November 1, 2017. (Exhibit P, ECF No. 34-12.) Plaintiff then received a second note to be placed off work until November 29, 2017, a third note to be off work until December 13, 2017, a fourth to be off work until December 29, 2017, and a fifth to be off work until January 10, 2018. (Exhibits Q, R, S, and T, ECF No. 34-13 to 34-16.)

On January 8, 2018, Plaintiff sent Human Resources Specialist Christal Carmona an email, attaching a Work Status Note from her healthcare provider providing a return to work date and restrictions. (Exhibit 14, ECF No. 29-16.) Plaintiff requested to return to work on January 16, 2018, working no more than 20 hours a week or 4 hours a day for the first and second week and working no more than 30 hours a week or 6 hours a day for the third and fourth weeks. (Id. )

On January 11, 2018, Carmona sent Plaintiff an email stating that Iqvia was "unable to support the return to work accommodations" and suggesting that Plaintiff contact her doctor to see if there were any other solutions or schedules that could be provided. (JSUMF ¶ 8.) The same day, Plaintiff responded saying she would follow up with her doctors and asked what modifications Iqvia could support. (Id. ¶ 9.) On January 12, 2018, Iqvia told Plaintiff her employment was terminated, effective that day. (Id. ¶ 10.) On January 16, 2018, Plaintiff received an email from Aliza Zaidi, the Associate Director of Human Resources, explaining the termination. The email stated Iqvia had received Plaintiff's requested work schedule, and "[a]t this time we are unable to accommodate this request, due [sic] critical business needs and needed to have someone working the territory on a full-time basis, as such we made the decision to terminate your employment ...." (Exhibit 18, ECF No. 29-16.)

In total, Plaintiff was on a pregnancy-related leave of absence from May 25, 2017 through January 12, 2018. Plaintiff's leave consisted of leave provided for by California's Pregnancy Disability Leave Law, the California Family Rights Act, and the California Fair Employment Housing Act. (JSUMF ¶ 6.) Unum was responsible for determining whether Plaintiff was eligible for leave, and Iqvia relied on Unum's determinations. ("Carmona Depo.," ECF No. 29-4, at 65:6–66:2; 93:2–16.)

In October 2018, Plaintiff filed suit for: (1) discrimination, (2) failure to accommodate, (3) failure to engage in the interactive process, (4) retaliation, (5) interference with leave and violations of California's Pregnancy Disability Leave Law, (6) interference with leave and violations of the California Family Rights Act, (7) failure to investigate and prevent discrimination, (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (9) violation of California Labor Code section 1030.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her first, second, third, sixth, and eighth causes of action. Iqvia moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's punitive damages claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n , 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

If the moving party fails to discharge this initial burden, summary judgment must be denied, and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 159–60, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). If the moving party meets this initial burden, however, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment merely by demonstrating "that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co. , 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient." (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 )). Rather, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and by "the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ).

When making this determination, the court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural Issues

Both parties have filed objections to certain pieces of evidence filed by the other. To begin with, the Court notes that it does not consider the parties’ relevance objections. See Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that various evidentiary objections, such as relevance, are redundant at the summary judgment stage where the court can award summary judgment only in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on evidence the contents of which must be admissible). The...