Salierno v. Micro Stamping Co.

• Decision Date: 19 September 1975
• Citation: 345 A.2d 342,136 N.J.Super. 172
• Parties: Pasquale SALIERNO, Petitioner-Respondent, v. MICRO STAMPING CO., Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 172

136 N.J.Super. 172

345 A.2d 342

Pasquale SALIERNO, Petitioner-Respondent, v. MICRO STAMPING CO., Respondent-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Sept. 9, 1975.

Decided Sept. 19, 1975.

George J. Kenny, Newark, for appellant (McElroy, Connell, Foley & Geiser, Newark, attorneys).

Herman M. Wilson, Newark, for respondent.

Before Judges LYNCH, ACKERMAN and LARNER.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LARNER, J.A.D.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Workmen's Compensation Division granting petitioner an award which included compensation for total permanent disability.

Petitioner was a power press operator and die setter in respondent's manufacturing plant. In addition, he was the shop steward for the union which was the bargaining agent for the employees in the plant. On April 13, 1971, after a full day of work, he engaged in a negotiating session with the employer for the purpose of arriving at a new union contract. At this meeting there were rpesent, in addition to petitioner, other representatives of the union as well as several representatives of the employer. Near and end of the meeting an emotional outburst took place at which time the employer's representative raised his voice and accused petitioner of making ridiculously unreasonable demands. In reciprocal fashion, petitioner became upset and in a loud voice charged that the employer's representatives were offering nothing for the new contract.

Shortly after this incident, petitioner demonstrated symptoms indicative of a heart attack, including pain in the area of the heart, 'a funny feeling' in his neck and throat, and pain in his arm. After his return home he was taken to the hospital where he remained for 21 days. His treating physician diagnosed the condition as a myocardial infarction.

After a convalescence of three months he returned to work at the end of July but carried out his duties with aid from his fellow workers. He remained under the care of his physician and experienced angina pains which were relieved by taking nitroglycerin pills.

On November 15, 1971 petitioner suffered another heart attack resulting in further hospitalization. This was diagnosed as another myocardial infarction of the same wall as the first involving another branch of the same vessel. Thereafter he never returned to work.

As it is not uncommon in patients with heart episodes, petitioner suffered from preexisting underlying arteriosclerotic heart disease with complicating diabetes. The testimony of the physicians produced by petitioner was that both infarctions and the ultimate total permanent disability were causally related to the tension and excitement of the negotiating session of April 13, 1971. The compensation judge found that the occurrence on that date was an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and, furthermore, accepted the reliability of the conclusions of petitioner's physicians on the issue of causation as it related to both infarctions.

The primary contention asserted by respondent employer is that the incident at the contract negotiation session did not arise in the course of employment and hence the consequent injury is not compensable.

This issue as it pertains to a setting of a labor negotiation is a novel one in the State of New Jersey. Does an accident occurring during a bargaining session between the employer and employee, who is present as the shop steward and representative of the authorized union, after normal working hours on the employer's premises arise 'in the course of employment' as required by the Workmen's Compensation Act (N.J.S.A. 34:15--1)?

We must approach this issue with the established tenet that the act should be given a liberal interpretation to effect the social policy of providing a remedy for injuries sustained by employment. Tocci v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., 28 N.J. 582, 147 A.2d 783 (1959); Complitano v. Steel & Alloy Tank Co., 63 N.J.Super. 444, 164 A.2d 792 (App.Div.1960), rev'd on dissenting opinion below, 34 N.J. 300, 168 A.2d 809 (1961). This liberal approach in favor of employees has served to extend the many fact patterns held to constitute activities 'arising out of and in the course of employment.' See, E.g., Gerard v. American Can Co., 32 N.J.Super. 310, 108 A.2d 293 (App.Div.1954); Meo v. Commercial Can Corp., 80 N.J.Super. 58, 192 A.2d 854 (App.Div.1963); Cavalcante v. Lockheed Electronics Co., 85 N.J Super. 320, 204 A.2d 621 (Cty.Ct.1964), aff'd 90 N.J.Super. 243, 217 A.2d 140 (App.Div.1966).

The basic rule for determining that an injury arises in the course of employment is that it take place within the period of employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be and while he is fulfilling his duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. Tocci v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., supra, 28 N.J. 582, 147 A.2d 783; 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 14.00 (1972).

A corollary to this rule is that an injury is compensable if it 'arises out of a risk which is reasonably incidental to the conditions and circumstances of the employment.' Buerkle v. United Parcel Service, 26 N.J.Super. 404, 407, 98 A.2d 327, 329 (App.Div.1953). An employee does not have to be actually engaged in work for the employer at the time of the accident. Van Note v. Combs, 24 N.J.Super. 529, 533, 95 A.2d 12 (App.Div. 1953).

In seeking to apply the liberal interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act in favor of employees our Supreme Court has developed the 'mutual benefit doctrine' in cases arising out of an employee's recreational or educational activities. Complitano v. Steel & Alloy Tank Co., supra, 63 N.J.Super. 444, 164 A.2d 792, rev'd 34 N.J. 300, 168 A.2d 809; Cuna v. Bd. of Fire Commissioners, 42 N.J. 292, 305, 200 A.2d 313 (1964); Strzelecki v. Johns-Manville, 65 N.J. 314, 317, 322 A.2d 168 (1974).

It is manifest to this court that the so-called 'mutual benefit doctrine' should be applied to the facts of this case as a key factor in determining compensability. See Kennedy v. Thompson Lumber Co., 223 Minn. 277, 26 N.W.2d 459 (Sup.Ct.1947).

The petitioner was a shop steward and as such served the mutual interests of the employees and the employer. His function in that capacity was to deal with the employer on a day-to-day basis in solving employee problems and grievances, in order to assist in a continual flow of production without unnecessary interruptions. Although he represented the union and the employees, his daily activities incidentally benefited the employer as well in maintaining peace and equanimity in the plant.

His participation in the contract talks were, of course, as representative of the employees. Nevertheless, the successful consummation of an agreement would have benefited not only the employees but also the employer. Obviously the meeting took place for their mutual interest in presenting their views and arriving at a compromise solution which would be codified in a contract acceptable to both. Without such a contract the employer would probably have been unable to carry on his business. The presence of petitioner on behalf of the union was essential for the advancement of the interests of the employer in arriving at a mutually satisfactory contract which would assure him of labor peace and uninterrupted production and sales. See Gerard v. American Can Co., supra, 32 N.J.Super. 310, 108 A.2d 293.

In fact, the present milieu of unions and...