Salisbury v. Lane

• Decision Date: 08 December 1900
• Parties: SALISBURY v. LANE, ASSESSOR
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

63 P. 383

7 Idaho 370

SALISBURY v. LANE, ASSESSOR

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 8, 1900

ASSESSMENT OF MINES.-Mines and mineral lands, the title to which is in the private owner or claimant, and not in the United States government, are, under the revenue laws of Idaho, subject to assessment for taxation.

REVENUE STATUTES ARE TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED.-Revenue statutes are to be liberally construed under section 4, of the Revised Statutes of Idaho, so as to effect the object of such statutes and promote justice, while exceptions contained in such statutes are to be strictly construed.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-TAXATION.-A construction of a statute to raise revenue which extends the terms of a proviso therein contained making exceptions, so as to exclude from taxation a large proportion of property in the state, and which is owned and held by private persons for their individual benefit, the title thereto not being in the United States government tends to defeat the object of such statute (raising revenue) and does not promote justice, and, therefore, violates the provisions of section 4 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that "statutes must be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice."

SAME-JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION.-It is the policy of the revenue laws of Idaho to tax all private property the title to which is not in the United States government, and this policy should not be abridged by judicial construction.

EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION.-Courts should not, by technical or strained construction, extend the exemptions of property from taxation.

SAME.-To exempt certain private property from taxation under a statute making all private property taxable, the exemption must be in terms so specific and certain as to admit of no doubt.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court, Blaine County.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions, with costs of appeal to appellant.

W. E. Borah, for Appellant.

We call attention in the first instance to the well-established rule, so strictly enforced by all courts, that in order that property be exempt from taxation, the terms of exemption must be clear and positive. There must be no doubt, for if there is a doubt about the intention to exempt the property, then it will be held that the property is subject to taxation. (Thurston Co. v. Sisters' House of Providence, 14 Wash. 264, 44 P. 252; People v. Commissioners, 76 N.Y. 73; People v. Davenport, 91 N.Y. 586; Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 204, 205; 1 Desty on Taxation, 108; Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 P. 1097; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 10 How. (U. S.) 376.) The omission of the taxing officers of the state in previous years to assess this property cannot control the duty imposed by law upon their successors, or the power of the legislature, or the legal construction of the statute under which the exemption is claimed. (Railroad Co. v. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665, 6 S.Ct. 625.) The words "mining grounds" and "mining claims" are practically synonymous, and the supreme court of Nevada, in commenting on the phrase "mining ground," says: "They refer to that interest which the mere occupant of a mine has in the same. They are not the words used when a fee simple or leasehold interest in real estate is to be conveyed." (Hale Co. v. Storey, 1 Nev. 104; Atkwood v. Fricot, 17 Cal. 38, 76 Am. Dec. 567; Mt. Diablo v. Callison, 5 Saw. 439, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 9886, 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 616.) There is nothing in the exceptions to justify the claim that mines to which patents have been issued should not be subject to taxation. (Waller v. Hughes, (Ariz.), 11 P. 122.)

R. Z. Johnson and R. H. Johnson, for Respondent.

Statute law is the will of the legislature, and the object of all judicial interpretation of statutes is to determine what intention is conveyed, whether expressly or by implication, by the language used. (23 Ency. of Law, 297.) The great object of maxims of interpretation is to discover the true intention of the law; and whenever that intention can be indubitably ascertained, and is not a violation of constitutional right, the courts are bound to obey it, whatever may be their opinion of its wisdom or policy. (1 Kent's Commentaries, 468; Lieber's Legal Hermeneutics, 88.) That the policy of our legislature was to exempt all mining claims, whether patented or unpatented, is shown by the fact that, at the time this provision was re-enacted at the Second Session, California had excepted all mines that had become private property, from the above clause. Mr. Lindley, a gentleman of long and diversified experience in the mining regions and in mining practice, says: "The words 'mining claim' have no reference to the different stages in the acquisition of the government title. They include all mines, whether patented or not patented, if acquired under the mining laws." (1 Lindley on Mines, sec. 327; Idaho Gold Min. Co. v. Winchell, 6 Idaho 729, 59 P. 533.) A word repeatedly used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the instrument, unless it is apparent that another meaning is intended. (See, also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 255, and cases cited; Uhe v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 4 S. Dak. 505, 57 N.W. 484-488.) Where a word is used in different places in a statute and its meaning in one instance is clear, it must be given the same meaning elsewhere, unless it clearly appears that a different meaning was intended. (Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Farmville etc. Co., 96 Va. 661, 32 S.E. 468; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Norfolk etc. R. Co., 88 Va. 920, 14 S.E. 805.)

HUSTON C. J. QUARLES, J. concurring. SULLIVAN, J. dissenting.

OPINION

HUSTON, C. J.

This is a submission of a controversy without action. It is unnecessary to set forth the entire stipulation of facts, as shown by the transcript. The question submitted to the court upon this agreed case is as follows: "Were mining claims, for which United States patents had been issued, exempt from taxation in 1898 when the mining claims hereinbefore mentioned were assessed?" This submission involves simply the construction of subdivision 7, section 1401, of the Revised Statutes. Said section provides that "the following property is exempt from taxation: . . . . Seventh. Mining claims, but machinery, property and improvements upon or appurtenant to mining claims shall not be so exempt." The tenth subdivision of said section includes "possessory rights to public lands." It is not, as we consider it, necessary to enter into a philological discussion of the origin or general meaning of the term "mining claim." What does the term mean as used in the statute under consideration? The organic act of the territory of Idaho contains a provision similar, if not exact, with that of most of the territories. Section 1851 of the Revised Statutes of United States, provides: "The legislative power of every territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States. But no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil; no tax shall be imposed upon the property of the United States; nor shall the lands or other property of nonresident be taxed higher than the lands or other property of residents." Primarily, the title to all lands in this country is in the government, and until the government has parted with the title it remains "the property of the United States," and as such is not subject to taxation. And it was in recognition of this law that the first legislature of the territory exempted "mining claims"--i. e., claims asserted under the mining laws of the United States, to certain lands of the government supposed to contain mineral deposits. These claims might, by compliance with the provisions of the United States laws, ripen into a title, at the option of the locator or claimant; but, so long as the title remained in the government they were exempt from taxation by the territory or the state. When, however, the title passed from the government by the issue of patent, they were no longer within the purview of the provisions of the federal law. They were no longer the property of the United States, but became incorporated into the general property of the citizen or citizens of the territory or state, and were a part of "all property . . . . subject to taxation," under the provisions of section 1400 of the Revised Statutes, unless exempted by the express provisions of some statute of the state. The claim, which was an inchoate right had by the acts of the claimant, confirmed by grant of the government, ripened into complete title. The title of the holder of mining property under a patent from the United States government is in no way different from the title by patent to any other lands granted by the United States. "'Twas mine; 'tis thine." By virtue of the paramount law, while it was the property of the United States it was exempt from taxation by the local law. When it passed from the United States to the citizen, it became subject to the same general law as that of all other property of the citizen.

Section 1400 of the Revised Statutes, which is the existing law in this state, provides that "all property in this territory [state] not exempt under the laws of the United States, except as enumerated in the next section is subject to taxation as in this title provided; but nothing in this title shall be construed to require or permit double taxation." The seventh subdivision of section 1401 is as follows (after defining exemptions): "Seventh. Mining claims, but machinery, property and improvements upon or appurtenant to mining claims shall not be so exempt." Is not the intention of the legislature clearly apparent...