Salla v. United States

• Decision Date: 01 October 1900
• Docket Number: 600.
• Citation: 104 F. 544
• Parties: SALLA et al. v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

104 F. 544

SALLA et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 600.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

October 1, 1900

The plaintiffs in error seek to review the judgment of the district court of the United States for the district of Idaho in a case in which they were convicted of a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States. The facts on which the indictment was based are the following: On April 29, 1899, the Northern Pacific Railway train was boarded by a large number of armed men at different points between the towns of Burke and Wallace. When the train reached Wallace some of these men compelled the engineer to run his train over the track of the Oregon Railroad &amp Navigation Company to Wardner Junction, a place about 12 miles west of Wallace. They then proceeded to the mill of the Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Company, near Wardner Junction, and destroyed it by the use of dynamite after which they dispersed, and returned on the train towards Wallace and the points from which they had come. There were three counts to the indictment, but on the trial, at the conclusion of the evidence, the second and third courts were ordered dismissed. The indictment in the first count charged that the plaintiffs in error did 'unlawfully, wickedly and maliciously confederate and conspire together to commit an offense against the United States; that is to say, to unlawfully, willfully, maliciously, and knowingly delay, prevent, obstruct, and retard the movement and passage of a certain railway car and train over the lines and tracks of the Northern Pacific Railway Company, by the said Northern Pacific Railway Company, the said Northern Pacific Railway Company then and there being engaged in the business of a common carrier of the mails of the United States, which said railway car and train were then and there carrying and transporting the mails of the United States. ' The indictment then proceeded to charge the commission of an overt act in pursuance of said conspiracy. The plaintiffs in error demurred to the indictment, and, after verdict thereon, moved in arrest of judgment, upon the ground that the facts stated in said count of the indictment do not constitute a public offense.

Reddy, Campbell & Metson, for plaintiffs in error.

R. V. Cozier, for the United States.

Before GILBERT, ROSS, and MORROW, Circuit Judges.

GILBERT Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, .

We think that on the authority of U.S. v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 26 L.Ed. 1135, and Pettibone v. U.S., 148 U.S. 197, 13 Sup.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419, the indictment is insufficient to sustain the judgment. In U.S. v. Carll the indictment was found under section 5431 of the Revised Statutes, which denounces a penalty against 'every person who, with intent to defraud, passes, utters, publishes, or sells * * * any falsely-made, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation, or other security of the United States. ' The indictment charged that the defendant 'feloniously, and with intent to defraud the Bank of the Metropolis, * * * did pass, utter, and publish upon and to the said Bank of the Metropolis a falsely-made, forged, counterfeited, and altered obligation and security of the United States. ' It was held that the indictment was insufficient, ever after verdict, for the reason that it did not allege that the defendant knew the obligation to be false, forged, or counterfeited. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Gray said:

'In an indictment upon a statute, it is not sufficient to set forth the offense in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished. * * * The language of the statute on which this indictment is founded includes the case of every person who, with intent to defraud, utters any forged obligation of the United States. But the offense at which it is aimed is similar to the common-law offense of uttering a forged or counterfeit bill. In this case, as in that, knowledge that the instrument is forged and counterfeited is essential to make out the

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